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Chapter 1
Introduction
Should you be interested in this book?
Opening words
Science is commonly perceived to be the last word in logic and objectivity, where the
latter has two aspects to it — one of being person-independent and the other of being
a true description of the workings of Nature. In this little book of mine I will tell you,
as best as I can, of the possible presence of extra-logical components in the reasoning
process of individuals and groups of individuals, making special reference to the context
of scientific inquiry. And I’ll also indicate the possibility of a skewed fit between what
science tells us about nature, and Nature itself. In the process, we will get to under-
stand how all this can constitute a strength rather than a deficiency in the way science
inquires into nature.
To what extent do people conform to standards of logic and rationality in everyday
reasoning and in scientific activity? How do the extra-logical components woven into the
reasoning process of individuals lend color to the way they solve problems relating to
workings of nature? To what extent does inter-personal and group interactions succeed
in effacing the subjective component involved in individual and collective reasoning and
yield objective knowledge, transformed from the belief-laden knowledge of individuals
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and groups to knowledge gained by humankind?
These and related questions have repeatedly been addressed by authors for a long while
now. I will collect here a few of the basic ideas that have come up in the course of
studies into these important and interesting issues. In the process, I hope to tell you,
in outline, how and to what extent scientific inquiry can possibly be conditioned by the
mindset of people.
In recent decades, philosophy has taken a naturalistic turn. Briefly stated, naturalism
looks at things and processes as they actually are, without looking at these from too
abstract and analytical a perspective — a tendency so common in philosophy. In
this, the naturalist point of view follows the point of view of science itself (see, for
background, [48], [43], chapter 1). The issues relating to mechanisms underlying
the inferential processes in men, and to human rationality at large, are now being
addressed from a naturalist point of view. The branch of inquiry dealing with these and
many other related questions on mechanisms of human thinking that has developed
over the last fifty years or so is known as cognitive science. In this book, I will have
occasion to refer to the naturalist point of view and to ideas in cognitive science,
as someone who has been keenly interested in these in the context of philosophy of
science, someone with a background in physics.
My job in this book will be to share with my readers a point of view that has a good
degree of contact with current literature on a broad area in cognitive science and
philosophy of science. I will explain a number of basic concepts to set the tone of
this book and then go on to propose a framework that raises deep questions on the
received view of science, based on cognitive aspects of our reasoning process. In the
process, I will venture to place before you my own interpretation and speculation of
how things work in individual inferential processes that find expression in scientific
exploration by individuals and by scientific communities at large, again taking care
that these do not conflict with the body of opinions and beliefs shared by experts in
the relevant areas of discourse.
I will do my best to build up a picture that hangs together, is not inconsistent with what
experts have found and written on the issues involved, and is, one hopes, relevant and
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interesting.
Here are a few words on how the text is displayed in this book.
As you can see, this book runs in two courses one written in larger font that consti-
tutes the main text, and the other in smaller font that makes up a sub-text. The latter
is for the purpose of additional explanation and clarification, along with references to
literature. There will not be too many of the references, and most of those will be to
books and monographs. You will find only few references to journal articles, since I
do not want to burden the presentation with technicalities. You can read the text and
the sub-text any way you like.
This said, let us move ahead. I will, in the remainder of this opening chapter, take you
to a brief tour of some of the key ideas that will define the content of this book.
Inference and reasoning: the intrinsic and the extrinsic
The first basic idea I wish to highlight is that of the role of inductive inference in rea-
soning in general, and in scientific inquiry in particular. Induction and deduction are
commonly taken to be two distinct modes of reasoning where, in either of the two, one
starts from one or more premises and then draws a conclusion. This act of starting from
a set of premises and reaching at some conclusion I will call inference. In this act of
inference, a person may, depending on circumstances, make some use of rules that may
have something to do with logic. Now, this may seem to be a pretty roundabout and
tentative way of putting things but, in this book, you will soon get used to such round-
about statements, and qualifications (with or without the use of parentheses), because
most of the time we will be treading on murky ground.
Going back to inference and the use of rules, we will say that the act of inference con-
forms to the description of reasoning whenever some set of rules of general validity are
involved, applied sequentially. Now, the concept of rules is a tricky one since there are
two distinct contexts in which one can talk of rules — a distinction that, at times, goes
unnoticed. As a person gets into an act of inference, she may be following, in her own
3
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way, a set of rules of her own where, to make matters complicated (and interesting too!),
many of the rules may be unknown even to herself because they operate unconsciously.
These we will call intrinsic rules for the sake of easy reference. On the other hand,
somebody, say, a cognitive psychologist, looking at her inferential act may try to fathom
out what she (the subject) is doing, by trying to relate the relevant premises and the con-
clusion by means of a set of extrinsic rules, rules called in use by her, the psychologist.
How are these two sets of rules related?
In a sense, this is a fundamental question not only in the area of inquiry we are
looking at, but in all areas of human inquiry, being central to the concept of science
itself. I, like many others, have always found it fascinating. This is a theme we will
time and again come back to. As I see it, it is a basic question raised by naturalism.
Think of the following scenario: a sequence of numbers is being taken out from a
machine — never mind how or by whom — and the numbers are being displayed
to you. You are trying to fathom out the rule underlying the sequence in which the
numbers appear. You make a guess and find that the guess is working — only up to a
point. As more numbers come out, you make a fresh guess and are again rewarded,
but once again you find that the sequence is more inscrutable than what your guess
tells you. The rules you are guessing at and comparing with the sequence at any point
of time are the extrinsic ones, which don’t quite match with the ‘rules’, if any, by which
the sequence is made up — the intrinsic ones. For all we know, the sequence may be
of a random nature, with a number of regularities built into it that make you arrive
at guesses and let you be hopeful of eventually arriving at the ‘correct’ intrinsic rues.
Nevertheless, the intrinsic and the extrinsic remain inexorably distinct. The business
of science is no different. Here, it is Nature that causes a multiple sequence of events
for mankind to guess at the rules underlying the occurrence of those. Naturalism
firmly distinguishes between the guesses and the actual workings of nature, and does
not entertain abstract notions of whether and how the former may approach the latter.
Cognitive science tries to guess at the intrinsic rules, if any, involved in the inferential
reasoning process of individuals by comparing it with a set of extrinsic rules, and the
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starting point in this endeavor is provided by what may be called the rules of logic. Here
the term ‘logic’ really refers to deductive logic, because people also make frequent use
of the term inductive logic, thereby referring to a distinct type of inferential activity. It
makes more sense, however, to speak of inductive inference rather than of inductive
logic, and to use the terms ‘deductive logic’ and ‘logic’ interchangeably.
At a deeper level, the concept of ‘intrinsic rules’ of nature (or, in a different context,
of intrinsic rules operating in inferential processes), taken literally, is somewhat a
misplaced one. What we think of as a set of intrinsic rules may be just a set of
interrelations, or correlations, among things in nature (or among cognitive factors in
the process of making of inferences). Science aims at understanding or ‘reproducing’
(in its models of the world or of the human mind) these correlations, but in its own
interpretational terms; what is ‘intrinsic’ to the world or to a cognitive mind, is sought
to be replicated ‘externally’, by means of ‘laws’ and ‘rules’. Inherent to the idea of
laws and rules is the supposition of some design (not necessarily, though, by some
superhuman ‘mind). The correlations in nature, or among cognitive factors in the
human mind, need not be based on any ultimate design that is there for us to decipher.
In more precise terms, one has to distinguish — as far as extrinsic rules are concerned
— between various classes of logic like, for instance, propositional logic, predicate logic,
doxastic logic, and deontic logic or, more generally, instances of modal logic, some of
which may partially overlap with one another in connotation. However, all of these are of
the nature of deductive logic since they relate to ways of inference involving the operation
of unequivocally defined inferential rules on premises whose meanings in some bigger
context are not of direct relevance. As for now, all we need to know is that deduction
and induction are two types of inferential activity that can, at least provisionally, be
distinguished from each other. In this scheme of things, reasoning can be described
as an inferential activity that has some correlation with rule-based inference, where
the rules, generally speaking, are not specific to individuals, and have some degree of
universality such as the rules of deductive logic. As you see, there is no sharp distinction
between reasoning and inference, which is only to be expected of the issues in human
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cognition we will be discussing in this book.
The various instances of modal logic are designed to capture different aspects of
thought and reasoning, as they operate in real life, but from the logical and com-
putational point of view. These find applications in a wide variety of disciplines and
are, in particular, of vital relevance in artificial intelligence. An overview of modal logic
can be found in [7].
Indeed, as we will see, the distinction between deductive and inductive inferences is
also not so sharp. Once again, if this sounds confusing, you better get used to it be-
cause cognitive psychology and some other parts of cognitive science are way apart from
physics or chemistry, and require a different mindset. Be warned that our job here is,
primarily, to get exposed to a number of ideas rather than to try to define those too
precisely and too prematurely. In this, we will be following the spirit of a critique to the
conventional image of science itself, an image that is increasingly being brought into
question in recent decades.
Aspects of the conventional image of science, one that has lingered in philosophical
and logical accounts of science, as also in popular perception, have been collectively
termed the ‘legend’ by Philip Kitcher ( [71], chapter 1). Kitcher is a notable name in
contemporary philosophy of science in his broad, perceptive, and nuanced approach
to issues in science, including those relating to social aspects of science in today's
world.
In the remainder of this chapter I will introduce a few other terms that will come up
repeatedly in this book (as these do in our everyday discourse as well) in connection
with human mental activity, namely, perception, thinking, and cognition, of which, the
last term is a bit more specialized compared to the other two. And again, I will be no
more specific than telling you that I will use these terms in the sense of common usage.
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Perception and cognition
We perceive something when a set of stimuli act to influence our senses (typically, the
sense organs) so as to create an impression of the source(s) where the stimuli originate
from. Frequently, perception involves an internal processing of information whereby
our mind comes to form an idea of that source of information (such as, the appearance
of an external object in the case of visual perception) conforming, in some sense, to
the nature of the source itself (thus, we perceive a table as a table, though there exists
serious debate, not all vacuous, as to how much our perceived table is the same thing
as the table itself).
There has been protracted debate as to whether our senses give us an unblemished
picture of the world. Each and every act of perception is, in a very basic sense, an
act of interpretation in terms of past experience. “No one now seriously believes that
the mind is a clean slate upon which the senses inscribe their record of the world
around us: that we take delivery of the evidence of the senses as we take delivery of
the post”, writes Peter Medawar, a pioneer in the field of immunology and in the sci-
ence of tissue transplantation, and philosopher of science of great clarity of view [88].
Medawar goes on to quote Nietzsche: “Everything that reaches consciousness is ut-
terly and completely adjusted, simplified, schematized, interpreted,....”, and Kant as
well: “experience is itself a species of knowledge which involves understanding,...”.
Here is one more instance of how perception involves complex psychological processing
of information received from the world:
“Perceptual processes were at one time believed to be lower-level function-
ing, both because they are accomplished without our conscious control and
because even animals can do such things as recognize patterns ....... and
learn spatial layouts.... . Perceptual processes were contrasted with the
higher mental processes, such as problem solving, logical thinking, and de-
cision making, which are accomplished consciously, and are much less obvi-
ous in animals. There is, however, a basic problem with labeling perceptual
processes as lower-level: The ability to recognize patterns and direct our
attention involves very elaborate cognitive computations, which are heav-
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ily influenced by top-down processes that depend on ones knowledge and
interpretation of situations. Thus, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to
separate lower and higher forms of cognition.” ( [125], p181).
The idea that all our perception of nature is, fundamentally, an interpretation, will
constitute a recurring theme in this book.
Incidentally, we often use the term ‘perception’ in a deeper and broader sense (my
perception of the current political situation differs from yours). This variation in senses
attached to the same term is very common when we try to say something of our mental
world, since the mind is an infinitely complex and flexible whole, where it is almost
impossible (but often necessary!) to meaningfully distinguish between parts of it or
between mental processes of various descriptions.
When we say that perception involves some processing of information, we are close to
the sense carried by the term ‘cognition’, because cognition is commonly understood to
be that mental activity where there takes place some processing of thoughts and ideas,
tied to some purpose. What is important and interesting in this context is that some
(or most) of the processing may be of an unconscious nature, which we ourselves may
not be aware of. Cognition, in other words, refers to a broad class of mental activity
that includes inference making and reasoning in which, generally speaking, there is
a conscious component. In this, inference making and reasoning are special types of
cognitive activity where there is a relatively greater role of a ‘purpose’ or a ‘goal’ guiding
the course of that activity though, again, the purpose or goal may be, to a large extent,
hidden from our own conscious awareness.
While perception and cognition are broader in scope than inference making and rea-
soning, ‘thinking’ is, likewise a broad and all-inclusive term with unconscious and con-
scious processes involved in it. Of, course, like everything else, the term ‘thinking’ is
used in senses often widely differing from one another (‘what were you doing?’,— ‘oh,
just thinking’; or, ‘I am thinking hard how best to entertain our guests’); but, well, what
can one do?
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Concept: the basic entity of thought
One other term will be especially relevant for our purpose in this book: concept. What is
a concept? As I see it, a concept is some kind of organized thought about some object or
set of objects (or about some other concept(s)) that tells us something about the object
and that is made use of in any context involving that object. For instance, my concept
of a table is involved when I ask somebody to move our dining table to some other place
in the room (the concept tells me that the table is something that can be moved, by the
application of some particular kind of effort, without getting altered in any appreciable
way) or when I am engaged in a philosophical debate, claiming that the table is not
entirely what it seems to be (the concept tells me that there are aspects to the table not
perceived by me). The term concept holds a huge significance since it is by means of
concepts that we understand and organize the world around us and, what is more, act in
(and upon) it. Concept, in brief, is the thought entity by means of which we make sense
of our world and of our life. A concept commonly involves a central entity (the table)
associated with numerous other entities stored in the mind, all these woven into a single
whole. Concepts, in turn, are associated with one another at various levels so as to make
up more complex structures like ideas, beliefs, and items of knowledge. I emphasize
the term ‘association’ here: association between thought elements in the formation of
concepts, and association between concepts in the formation of more complex forms of
thought.
In summary, I have introduced to you the terms ‘reasoning’ and ‘inference’, ‘deductive’
and ‘inductive’ types of inference, and ‘logic’. I have also mentioned terms that will
hover in the background throughout the discourse presented in this book — ‘thinking’
(or ‘thought’), ‘cognition’, and ‘perception’. And I have told you what the term ‘concept’
will be meant to stand for. This will constitute the starting point to the next phase of our
journey where we will dwell upon these ideas at greater length, and upon many other
related concepts and ideas.
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The substratum of cognition
Let me go back to the point where I digressed from, namely, inductive inference. While
the basic idea of inductive inference will be one constituent of the central theme that
will define this book, the other constituent ideas of dominating relevance will relate to
the substratum of mental activities that determine and guide the process of inductive
inference — activities that belong to a substratum in the sense that these have tradi-
tionally been ignored in the understanding and analysis of human cognition, and also in
the sense that it involves a multitude of mental processes that the individual (or group
of individuals) engaged in making the inference is often not aware of. I refer to the
substratum of the cognitive unconscious.
This idea of a substratum is of relevance in every sphere and at every level of human
inquiry. It is relevant, in the sense indicated above, in the context of the way we per-
ceive the process of cognition. More generally, it is relevant in the way science inquires
about nature. Any such inquiry is, by the very nature of things, limited to some spe-
cific domain or other, and there is a substratum that is either ignored as being not of
relevance or whose existence is not known or suspected. But, unknown to us, the sub-
stratum holds the key to many things. For instance, in the domain of electricity and
magnetism, the substratum, at one stage of discourse (before the introduction of uni-
fying ideas by Faraday and Maxwell), was constituted by the wave nature of electrical
and magnetic disturbances, which held the key to a vast range of phenomena involv-
ing the joint variation of electrical and magnetic field strengths. At a different level,,
within the context of the classical electromagnetic theory, the substratum relates to
the quantum nature of the electrical and magnetic fields. This is another theme that
will be repeatedly encountered in this book: every inquiry is limited to some specific
context or other that may or may not be explicitly acknowledged, underneath which
lurks a substratum one that is either not known to us or about which we are not
aware. The entire perspective of the inquiry changes as the substratum is recognized
and taken into account, whereby a new context is set.
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Logical leaps in inference
Continuing with the question of inductive inference, I will, in this book, devote quite a
few words to induction and deduction, broadly distinguishing between the two (I will
outline to you the sense in which these two are distinct and also the one in which they
overlap), emphasizing time and again that inductive inference is a process involving
logical leaps, i.e., gaps in the sequential application of rules of a more or less general
validity ones of well-defined nature. This is an all-important and pervasive feature of
human thinking that begins at the level of the most trivial mental activity of the child
and of the grown-up (and, of course, the trivial is only seemingly so) and ending at
the level of the most intricate scientific reasoning of the individual and the scientific
community. The logical gaps entail, inevitably, the necessary role of choice between
alternatives, where a choice is a selection that is not dictated by rules independent of
the specific context in which it (the choice) is made. This will again require that we
address the question as to what the choice really and precisely is and how it is actually
exercised, and will again make us confront the question of conscious and unconscious
factors in determining the course of human inferential activity. Incidentally, whenever
we exercise a choice, we actually make a decision. The exercise of choice and the making
of decisions, these are ubiquitous at all levels of human activity though we are not
always aware of these. The surgeon makes a choice and saves the patient's life; or, the
general exercises a choice and makes a strategic retreat it is only such momentous
events that engage our attention. But, unknown to us, choices and decisions continue
to be made incessantly, and this is what makes our very existence possible.
What science aims at
Science is done by the individual scientist on the one hand, and by the scientific com-
munity on the other. I will not try to define who the individual scientist is, or what
differentiates her from her fellow men. And the scientific community will remain simi-
larly undefined, like so many other things in this book, because explicit definition does
not always add to understanding.
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In quite a considerable number of issues addressed in this book, I will rely on what I
think is the common ground between me and you, and will not try too hard to make
things ‘evident’ — all I want to do is to share, and not to impart. Sharing begins on
common ground and ends up expanding it.
The scientific thinking of the individual is generated and processed in the labyrinthine
innards of the human mind and, as such, is conditioned by and stamped with indi-
vidual idiosyncrasies. At the same time, the initiation of the thought process and the
final product of it have to relate, at least in some sense, to what the scientific community
thinks and does. It is the community that ultimately decides whether and when the in-
tellectual product offered by the individual scientist gets to be integrated into mankind's
storehouse of knowledge. Here we will have to confront the question as to how far the so-
cialization of individual thought leads to an ‘objective’ view of nature, as it is commonly
supposed to.
And this will open up another vital issue: what is science for? Is science a means to
solve, and to keep on solving, problems faced by men and groups of men as they move
along in the business of their life, a means to continually ensure and improve upon their
survival and existence? In short, is science a means and a strategy to solve problems
faced by men and women in this world? Problems relating to disease, hunger, and the
innumerable other aspects of living? Or, is science a strategy to probe into the workings
of nature, into the hidden secrets and mysteries that make nature what it is? How much
of a practical necessity is science and how much of an aspiration to Truth? Can it be
that the two are so intimately related that it is futile to seek an answer to this question
either way? Or, can it be that by recognizing the distinctive natures of these two aspects
to science we can achieve clarity in addressing and answering some other questions of
concern to us? I dont really know, but we will see ..... .
Whatever be the purpose that the individual or the scientific community may want
fulfilled by doing and practising science, the effort to do science involves immensely
complex motivations, aspirations, tensions, and intellectual resources. Some of these
are within the individual, and some within the community, but the two merge unto
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each other in unfathomable ways. In this book, my attention will be focused once onto
the individual and once onto the community, but always with the implied admission
that the individual is a microcosm of the community and the community carries all the
contrariness of the individual. Science begins in the mind of the individual and ends
up in the knowledge, belief, and practice of the community. And again, it begins in the
concerns of the community, and ends up blossoming in the mind of the individual.
By the term ‘community’ I will primarily mean the scientific community within which
the individual scientist works; at times it will implicitly stand for smaller groups of
workers in the immediate periphery of the working scientist with whom she collabo-
rates and shares her thoughts; and at others it will mean the social environment at
large that nourishes and nurtures her and, at the same time, makes her a part of a
complex process.
The logical and the extra-logical: inferences and beliefs
And now I feel I have set the tone of this book: Within the broader question of what
we want science to do for us — how much we do science with a view to understanding
the mysteries of nature and how much to acting upon nature to achieve certain ends
— this book will take up the question of how science is done by the individual situated
within a broader context — the context provided by the scientific community on the
one hand, and by the broader social and cultural environment on the other. In the
pursuit of both these questions, we will examine the role that logic plays in the scientific
activity of the individual and of the scientific community, and in shaping our concept
of nature, and we will look at the nature and extent of extra-logical aspects in the
inferential processes involved in most of our everyday activity and in science. These
extra-logical aspects relate to the logical leaps and the choices that are forced upon us
in facing and confronting the world around us, in confronting Nature if you wish, where
both conscious and unconscious factors contribute to the process of taking a leap and
making a choice.
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In this book, I will adopt the view that doing science is continuous with our everyday,
mundane inferential activity, while being an exceptionally special and focused instance
of the latter.
In this, the two recurrent themes that will be thrust upon your attention will be: in-
ductive inference, and belief. Belief is commonly, and quite justifiably, held to be the
harbinger of superstition, pseudo-science, and bigotry. At the same time, belief is also
commonly held to be the antithesis of logical inquiry. But here I will try to present a
different perception of the role of belief.
Belief-emotion-feeling: the unacknowledged trinity
Belief is that vast marshy ground that supports both superstition and bigotry on the
one hand, and the most astounding inferential feat on the other. And it is exquisitely
difficult to disentangle these two aspects of belief from each other. Part of the difficulty
lies in the fact that there has not been much relevant work specifically on belief in
cognitive psychology, while not an inconsiderable part also relates to the nature of belief
itself. Belief is not knowledge, but it provides that substratum on which knowledge
rests and unto which knowledge merges continuously, quite seamlessley, and with little
differentiating shade. In inductive inference, belief provides the springboard for logical
leaps, the compass needle that, rightly or wrongly, lets us select, choose, and decide
among alternatives for which pure logic supplies no clue. And in this, belief is aided
and abetted by emotion and feeling. Belief, emotion, and feeling, these make up the
triumvirate, operating mostly in the unconscious world of men, that I believe to have a
great but subtle role in guiding and shaping their scientific quest, a quest commonly
perceived to be the pinnacle of conscious, logical inquiry on the part of humankind. In
this book I will tell you if there is ground for this belief of mine.
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The received view — and beyond
Indeed, this book will, in its own way, pose a critique to the commonly held image or,
in other words, the ‘received view’, of science. As I have stated above, recent decades
have witnessed a questioning, from various different quarters, of the traditional image
of science and, as a matter of course, of science itself — of what science has been doing
to our world. I will draw from some of these other critiques. I will, in particular, look
into the question of how objective a view of nature science provides us with and examine
how fragile that view is. This, along with a number of other similarly important issues,
will constitute an implied re-examination of the commonly held perception of science, if
not of science itself.
The origin of the ‘received view’ is diffuse, since this view resulted from diverse ac-
counts of science and the scientific method given by scientists and philosophers, and
other men of eminence, mostly belonging to the western intellectual tradition. Roger
Bacon and Francis bacon are considered as initiators in the building up of the per-
ception of what should count as the method of science. The British empiricists con-
tributed greatly to the further consolidation of the view, to which a logical foundation
was added by the logical positivists and logical empiricists of the last century. Many
of these trends within the broad umbrella of the received view were, of course, re-
markably acute and prolific, and were sharp enough to lay the foundation of a critical
examination of the received view itself. Karl Popper, while an outspoken critic of logi-
cal positivism, was among the last great architects of the received view, and attempted
the formulation of a sharp criterion for the demarcation between what is scientific and
what is not. The demarcation problem subsequently lost its initial promise of providing
a precise definition of what science is supposed to be. Ironically, the Marxist trend in
social movements contributed to the perception of science as a disembodied intellec-
tual process, realizing the immutable laws of dialectics. It added to the received view
the tenet of social determination (but not social construction) of the course of science
that eventually turned out to be a simplistic and suffocating point of view while, at
the same time, retaining the potential to pose a substantial critique to science in the
present day world.
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The counter-current to the received view began with a naturalistic turn to the philoso-
phy of science whose origins were, however, yet more diffuse. Results of the naturalist
turn in the philosophy of science were augmented by trends in cognitive psychology
that emerged as the behaviorist approach in psychology lost momentum. Naturalism,
moreover, is itself not a sharply defined point of view, and various naturalist trends
are often devoid of a common and strong family resemblance. Michael Polanyi was
among the early critics of the logical positivist and logical empiricist view of science
as the repository of impersonal, logical, and objective knowledge, progressing cumula-
tively to a ‘true’ picture of nature and its inner mechanisms. N.R. Hanson, the ‘Flying
Professor’, raised doubts against the idea of an ‘objective’ confirmation of scientific
theories by observed data, pointing out that observation itself was theory-laden and,
drawing upon the pragmatist tradition in the philosophy of science, contributed in no
small measure to the inauguration of the cognitive-naturalist era. And then came the
final onslaught by ideas unleashed by Thomas Kuhn [76], aided quite considerably by
a criticism of the received view of science by Paul Feyerabend [38].
Philip Kitcher [71] has drawn a distinction between ‘legend bashers’ and ‘science bash-
ers’. Among the former are those critics of the received view of science who aim at
transcending its limiting horizon and arriving at some position beyond that horizon.
Kitcher is himself a critic who, nevertheless, aspires to identify a ‘legacy’ to the legend
that has been built around the received view.
Science bashers, on the other hand, will not be referred to in this book beyond making
the remark that science bashing is the necessary obverse of science fetishism which
completely ignores deep questions relating to the idea, seemingly ingrained in science,
of taking control over Nature. Science, indeed, is in trouble in todays world since it
has become, to all intents and purpose, synonymous with control and power.
These few remarks are, of course, too sweeping to be taken seriously. I include these
as being indicative of the spirit in which this book would like to view the commonly
held perception of science. Precisely because of the sweeping and personal nature of
the appraisal presented in these remarks, I do not include a great many references to
substantiate what I say. However, I consider [71] and [72] as general references that
you may find useful, and illuminating too.
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The themes raised in this chapter will run through the course of this book.
I will move on from here.
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Objectivity
How truthful is science?
Or
Does science REALLY describe the workings of Nature?
This chapter will be concerned, principally, with scientific realism.
I will examine, to the best of my understanding, how objective our conception of Nature,
gained through Science, is. Now, the term ‘objective’ may have different connotations
in different contexts. One possible connotation is: person-independence. We would
prefer the findings of science to be independent of the idiosyncrasies and the mindsets
of individuals, as also of those, if any, of specific communities and cultures. In short,
we would prefer science to be a product of the whole of mankind. At this point, I will
not question as to how far this ideal aspiration is achievable, either in practice or in
principle. I will provisionally assume that, somehow, science appears as a product of
mankind without any birthmark resulting from its origins in individuals and particular
scientific communities. In that case, the second connotation of the word ‘objective’ will
demand attention and examination: how accurately does Science tell us what Nature
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actually is, and what its inner workings are?
The question of impersonality of science will be addressed in subsequent chapters
(mostly in chapters 3, 5, and 6), where we will get to face the contrariness inherent in
the process of science: science purports to be knowledge possessed by mankind, but it
develops in the minds of individuals — minds deeply riddled with beliefs of a personal
nature alongside of ones less personal and more objective.
This, in brief, is the question that scientific realism addresses.
There exists quite a vast literature on scientific realism and critical appraisals of its
tenets from various different points of view. This is a subject of hard core philosophy
which it is way beyond me even to think of outlining or summarizing, let alone attempt-
ing an in-depth review on. Scientific realism as a point of view, or as a philosophical
position, has had its beginnings in antiquity, and continues till date to spawn heavily
polemical literature of various shades at a rate that shows no signs of abetting. The
polemics proliferates into ever-expanding areas, in pace with scientific theories them-
selves.
Further reflections on realism and anti-realism, two oppositely oriented points of view,
are to be found here in chapter 9.
My aim in this chapter is, as a matter of fact, quite modest, one which neither the realist
nor the anti-realist will, perhaps, consider worthy of objection in any strong measure. In
the end, however, I will likely be judged closer to the realist position, and the anti-realist
may not be happy. The realist also may not feel comfortable in my company, but I will
not worry too much on questions of who thinks what, and will now get down to what I
want to say to you on how and to what extent science describes nature and explains its
workings.
Recall that I want this book to make you aware, if you are already not so, that the
conception of nature that science builds up, is rather riddled with logical gaps or, in
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other words, that science is not as logical a business as it is commonly made out
to be, being in the nature of an interpretation of the world. It is the existence of
the irreducible gap between the interpretation and that which is interpreted, that, on
the face of it, speaks against realism. At the same time, this book does not want to
give you the impression that science is not much more than a convenient and clever
exercise, with little engagement with reality, where it is incapable of making authentic
statements about nature, which is where it will differ from the anti-realist point of
view as well: if science constitutes an interpretation of the world, then the world has
necessarily to be supposed to exist independently of the interpretation.
The irreducible gap
The very first thing that, I think, is needed, is to stick to the basic fact that our concep-
tion of nature, as built up in scientific theories, is distinct from nature itself. I will not
adopt the position of stating that it is meaningless to talk of ‘nature itself’, which is the
stance sometimes adopted in critiques of realism where one underlines the fact that the
most that we can say in the matter is to the effect that we have innumerable ‘sense data’
— various sensations on the basis of which we build up all our concepts and theories.
When we press our palm against a table-top, we feel some specific sensation which,
when we come to think of it, is all that we have in this particular instance of our con-
ception of a table. To be sure, we can also see the table standing in front of us, but
there again, all we can be ‘certain’ of is our sensation of vision. Even summing up all
our sensations about the table, we can never be sure of the existence of the table itself.
How, for instance, can we rule out the possibility of an omnipotent malicious demon
creating in us the illusion of all these sensations of a table, which is how Descartes
argued his case for radical skepticism? (Likewise, Descartes argued, you cannot rule out
being in a state of perpetual dream). This is the position of idealism that Bishop Berkeley
espoused. It may seem to be a strange position to adopt for a mind as remarkably
penetrating as Berkeleys. Berkeley's arguments were indeed of great cogency, so much
so that if one cares to follow those arguments closely, one will be left with little option
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but to reach the position to which he leads ( [78], chapter 5).
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) is acknowledged as one of the founders of modern west-
ern philosophy. His approach was a foundationalist one in that he looked for irre-
ducible foundations of knowledge. He adopted an attitude of fundamental skepticism
towards things empirical and accepted the workings of the mind (that part of it of
which we are aware) as the one facet of reality we can be certain of, being the foun-
tainhead of rationality. The other facet of reality the mind works on is a God-given
one, distinct from the reality our senses tend to lead us to. In this, Descartes’ position
was antithetical to the one later adopted by the empiricists who accepted the empir-
ical as the ultimate authentic source of knowledge, and were skeptical towards the
authenticity of what the mind infers.
George Berkeley (1685-1753) accepted the reality of the sense impressions but did
not accept these as being caused indubitably by an independently existing world.
Reality, in other words, consisted only of sense impressions or ideas, and the mind
that perceives those ideas. Our conception of an independently existing real world is
possibly some kind of a trick that the ideas play on us.
This is one instance of a general problem that we will encounter again and again in our
discourse. It is indeed not possible to come up with a purely logical argument taking
us from our sensations to the world ‘out there’, since there does exist an irreducible
gap between the two. The realist's argument that our sensations must be sensations
of something and that, that something is simply the world out there, may appear to be
quite ‘natural’, but that still does not make it incontrovertible from the point of view of
logic, because one may conjure up alternative, though apparently weird, explanations
of our sensations like the one invoking the malicious demon (or a modernized version of
it, namely, the so-called ‘brain-in-the-vat’; there exist entire semi-religious philosophies
saying that the world is nothing but one great illusion). Arguments between realists and
people going by these theories of mind-dependent reality — a reality that is a construct
of the mind making use of the sense impressions — can be endless as also pointless
since the worlds of the two protagonists never meet.
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The ‘brain-in-a-vat’ (see, for instance, [99]) is a certain type of thought experiment
supporting the position of universal skepticism (akin to Cartesian doubt) towards an
empirically sensed reality. Assuming that all our sensations and ideas originate in
patterns of neuronal excitation in our brains, it is not necessary to inquire further as
to where those excitations come from. A disembodied brain, with its neurons excited in
various appropriate patterns can be made to produce exactly the series of sensations
that an individual goes through in her life. Once again, there is no sure-shot way
of countering such an argument because it is meant to be impervious to any such
attempt.
The world, indeed, transcends our senses and our concepts (or, to put it differently,
our concepts transcend the world), and to reach from the latter to the former is a fun-
damental and irreducible act of induction that the realist cannot deny, and the more
sensibly he comes to terms with this basic fact the wiser he will prove himself to be. It
is precisely the gap between nature-in-itself and our conception of nature that implies
the possibility of alternative routes in the explanation of our sense data, such as the evil
demon, the brain in the vat, or even the world as a big dream or illusion.
The ‘irreducible gap’ between Nature and our conception of it is, however, only a matter
of our perception as cognitive agents. More of this later.
It is all very well to accept the realist explanation, of the existence of a real and struc-
tured world causing our sense impressions, as ‘natural’, and to dismiss these other
explanations as ‘weird’ and contrived, but quite another to use pure logic alone in the
act of dismissal because, in the end, all these labels like ‘natural’ or ‘weird’ are extra-
logical qualifications that we impose on concepts and theories. Later in this book we will
have occasion to look into the matter of the relevance of such qualifications in making
inferences in our daily life and in doing science (the general theory of relativity is a beau-
tiful one; the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory looks weird to me; he has the
knack of coming up with simple and elegant ideas). All we have to take note of now is
that these qualifications do not necessarily make an explanation either compelling or
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worthless from the point of view of pure logic. The way we interpret the relation between
our sensations and the world around us is a choice that we have to make — one that
cannot be done sitting back and looking at formulas in logic. All our life we have to
go on applying our mind, look at possible alternatives, and risk making choices — the
responsibility for the making of those choices lies with us, and us alone. The choice of
accepting the position that all our senses are caused by an independent and structured
reality (the senses are also part of that reality) is a huge act of induction that every
child goes through without ever being aware of it. And, as she grows up, she renews
her commitment to the choice, this time consciously, and continues to get along with it
unless, of course, she gets weary of accepting the responsibility of making choices and
decisions in a real, uncertain, and troubled world, and swaps position so as to believe
now that the world is one big illusion.
The observable and the unobservable
Of course, the acceptance of a real world independent of our minds is not the end but
rather just the beginning of scientific realism. While scientific realism has got to say
much more than this, it is not, however, one single, neatly defined package. Protago-
nists differ from one another in what they accept as the defining description of scientific
realism. However, pretty much everybody committed to realism has to address the ques-
tion of a supposed distinction between ‘observable’ and ‘un-observable’ entities making
up the world. The table in front of me is one instance of an observable entity while the
electron, of whose existence we become aware only indirectly, by certain effects created
by it, such as by a voltage pulse in an ionization chamber, is an un-observable entity.
There is a philosophical position that tells us that the claims made in scientific theories
about the un-observable entities are only convenient means of describing and system-
atizing various observations, and the entities themselves cannot be assumed to exist in
any real sense.
Most realists, however, agree that the electron is as ‘real’ as the table in the dining
room, though the means of registering the existence of the two differ from one another.
23
CHAPTER 2. OBJECTIVITY
I will stick by my earlier disclaimer that I will not enter into a detailed analysis of all the
various philosophical points of view. In this book, I will state my position on a number of
philosophical issues without any appreciable engagement with philosophical literature.
While the statements that I make are not inconsistent with what has been said by
specialists in the various issues involved, these will, however, not always be consistent
with the position adopted by any particular philosophical camp. In philosophy, issues
are discussed and analyzed through debate and discourse, rather than by reference
to any independent ‘objective’ determinant of the validity of this or that position. In
looking into what the philosophers say on any particular question or issue, one often
finds them to be clustered into groups around leading personalities whose theses serve
as nuclei for contending viewpoints. However, I will, at times, cut across the various
contending viewpoints and put together the content of this book in what may appear
to be a synthetic approach. Broadly speaking, I will be close to the realist point of
view, but here again, I will move across various different positions within the realist
camp. Indeed, I will be adopting a naturalist orientation while remaining committed
to a broadly realist point of view. Rather than burden you with an account of where
my philosophical loyalties lie (I do not have strong loyalties to speak of), my aim will be
to tell you as clearly as I can, and to the best of my understanding, how and to what
extent scientific theories describe nature and where, in this, these bear the stamp of
extra-logical inferential leaps.
Observation involves interpretation
To come back to the issue of the table and the electron, I will adopt the position that
there is no big difference between the two from the point of view of scientific inquiry.
The table top causes our visual sensory organ to be excited in a more or less direct
manner while the causal link from the state of the electron to our sensory perception is
much more indirect, mediated through a number of intermediate stages. My perception
of the table, while apparently a simple and direct act, involves a complex process never-
theless, starting from the excitation of the visual organ, and proceeding through a large
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number of transformations and associations in my mind, partly conscious and mostly
unconscious. The result of these transformations can, in a sense, be compared with a
theory, because a theory is likewise a complex thing even when it appears to be a simple
one and because a theory is, like my visual perception, an interpretation of what our
sense data, directly or indirectly received, communicate to us. My perception involves,
much like a scientific theory, a large number of associations and chains of reasoning,
some explicit and some defined only implicitly. An electron causes transformations in
the states of systems used for ‘observing’ it, and the actual act of observation is an in-
ference based on some kind of a theory, this time mostly an explicit one, as to how and
why such transformations occur. For instance, consider the statement that the voltage
pulse in an ionization chamber is caused the by ionization of gas molecules by means
of electromagnetic interactions. This, of course, is part of a theory, a theory of what
electromagnetic interactions are, a theory of how and when such interactions cause the
ionization of a gas, and so on. All these remain implied when a scientist says that she
has observed an electron.
That every observation is, in some sense, an interpretation in terms of some theory
lurking in the background, has been the focus of protracted discussion in the philos-
ophy of science. Norwood Russell Hanson, the prolific and colorful “Flying Professor”
of philosophy, drew attention to the theory-ladenness of observations [52] while Kuhn
lent a great deal of weight to this view, within his own terms of discourse, by underlin-
ing how the perception of a scientist depends on the world of beliefs and theories she
resides in ([76], chapter 10). It is now commonly accepted that observations are indeed
conditioned by conceptions of a theoretical nature ( [20], [88]) acquired in past experi-
ence, and that there is no great distinction between the observable and unobservable
parts of reality.
However, the theory-laden nature of all observations has lent itself to other interpre-
tations as well, notably an interpretation espoused by anti-realism in general, and
relativism [14] in particular. If observation is theory-laden, then there is no indepen-
dent determinant of reality since it is through observations that we are supposed to
come to our understanding of reality. In particular, various alternative conceptions
of reality are possible, depending on the theoretical framework we choose to employ
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which, in essence, is the point of view of relativism. Of course, almost everything can
be given an interpretation in accordance with our chosen point of view, and the idea
of theory-ladenness is no exception. For instance, one can say that our conception of
reality is constituted by a complex interplay of facts of observation, originating in an
independently existing reality, and the framework of prior beliefs and conceptions that
we constantly make use of in interpreting the observations, which would be closer to
how I should like to express things.
And, as for relativism, I should not be disturbed by the fact that there can be various
different interpretations of any given part of reality, corresponding to various different
ways we make sense of facts of observation in terms of our prior beliefs and concepts,
so long as we recognize that these interpretations are all oriented towards the same
reality — the latter continues to exist and to evolve without regard to how we inter-
pret it. Moreover, the framework of beliefs and concepts that we use in interpreting
facts of observation cannot be just anything, constructed extempore at the bidding of
our whim, because any such framework is built in a protracted course of experience
involving innumerable acts of inference and interpretation in the past — ones more-
over, that have been tested against earlier facts of observation. It may very well be
that there are more than one such frameworks, depending on culturally acquired dif-
ferences in modes of thought, but that still does not make these arbitrary, with little
commitment to explain an independently existing reality and, in particular, to explain
further facts of observation as these are found in the course of time. It is here that the
various different theoretical frameworks will have to face a reality check when some of
these will prove ineffective, some less so and, perchance, one among these alternative
theories will get transformed into a broader and more powerful theory to take on the
continuing challenge of reality.
But we should not digress too much. We adopt the position that, in a certain sense at
least, the table and the electron are equally real and, on the other hand, our perception
of either is akin to a theory. But, what does this actually mean? Does this make them
amenable to unambiguous description by our theories? Here lies an open terrain that
is not so easy to map. Because here, precisely, lies that gap between reality and our
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conception of reality. There must be something out there that is causally linked to my
perception of the table or to my conception of the electron. But that something is — I am
rather tempted to say — quite fathomless. It gets only very partially and incompletely
registered or mapped into my perception or conception or theory, whatever you will.
Consider, for instance, the table first. Is it that solid object made of wood that has
four legs and a plane top that stands before me? Or, is it that collection of atoms or
molecules that do not have precisely defined positions and are incessantly in vibrational
motion around their mean positions, held together by invisible bonds and separated by
vacuous spaces? Or is it a still more nebulous thing comprised of protons, neutrons and
electrons, with all these corpuscles engaged in a crazy whirlwind of a dancing exercise?
Or, even focusing on a single electron, what can one make of this astounding speck of
reality? Is it a particle with a certain absurdly small mass, a certain quantum of charge,
a certain ‘spin’ (in the jargon of physics), and so on? Or, is it, once again, something
completely different, like, say, a certain state of a wave field?
Observations are partial: multiple layers of description
Whatever reality is out there, it seems to be really pretty inscrutable! Every single bit
of reality has multiple levels of description. And each of these multiple levels invokes a
picture of that bit of reality utterly different from the one evoked by another level. You
will find realists (many of them scientists, really) who refuse to be intimidated by these
multiple layers of reality and rather take it in their stride without making much mystery
about it, telling you that this is the most natural thing to be expected of science which
goes ever deeper into the description and explanation of the real world, discovering ever
more fundamental modes of description. Indeed, probing nature at greater and greater
depths is the specific business of the scientists (we are principally talking of physics
and physicists here, but our discourse, generally speaking, will be inclusive of other
disciplines as well), which is why they are quite so nonchalant about these multiple
levels of description.
Here, though, is a question that requires serious thought. Our conception of the world
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goes on changing like, for instance, from the conception of the table as a single object
to the table as a collection of atoms and molecules, to the same table as a collection
of protons, neutrons, and electrons, and so on. Evidently, none of these conceptual
changes was accompanied by a corresponding change in the world itself, which means
that the thing out there that we refer to as ‘the table’ remains its old self, whatever that
self is. While the world does not change, our conception of it changes, and changes
rather radically. This, of course, testifies to the existence of the gap between the world
and our conception of it. But, granted that the gap is there, what can one say of the
successive stages that our conception of the world passes through?
Even as I have depicted the successive stages of our conception of the table as differing
drastically from one another, the actual process of change in our conceptual world is,
in most cases, more gradual. Conceptions dont change overnight. There was a more
or less prolonged stage when people did not know of electrons and protons, but had a
fairly good idea that matter is made up of atoms and molecules. The concept of elec-
trons, protons and neutrons, and their role in the structure of atoms and molecules
took a long time developing and maturing. But at the end, people did arrive at a theory
of structure of matter that looked radically different from the theory based on atoms
and molecules as the ultimate building blocks.
Here, indeed, is a tricky question. Science is supposed to give a true picture of the
world. Which of the successive conceptual stages I mentioned above, are true, in the
sense of being a correct representation of the object out there we have been referring
to as ‘the table’? Evidently, not all of these conceptual representations can be true at
the same time. Okay, so can we say that none of these is true by itself in any absolute
sense, but that these are more and more accurate representations of ‘the’ truth? This is
the view that most realists, and most scientists, appear to subscribe to.
We will have more to say on this later in chapter 9, where we will see how complex the
concept of truth about nature is. Briefly stated, truth has two aspects to it, one relating
to the mental process of arriving at truth — a process that results in an interpretation
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of some part of nature, and not in an exact description of it, and the other relating
to nature itself, to which the truth pertains. The first of these two aspects can, in
a sense, be said to belong to the domain of epistemology, and the second to that of
ontology.
I have referred to the irreducible gap between nature and our conception of it. It
is precisely because of that gap that our scientific theories, however successful and
accurate these are, are interpretations, and not exact descriptions of nature. The gap
relates to the fact that there is no mechanism by which nature as a whole imprints
an exact copy of itself on our minds. Instead, numerous signals originating in the
world out there, transmitted through various channels of observation, stimulate our
senses and these stimulations then interact with conceptions stored in our minds
that have been produced in a long series of past experiences. It is due to this specific
manner of processing of incoming information in the light of past experience, where the
incoming information is filtered in a selective manner, depending on current goals and
our cognitive and perceptual capabilities, that all our inferences and theories assume
the nature of interpretations. The contrary and complex nature of truth resides precisely
in the fact that the vehicle of truth is an interpretation rather than an exact description.
It is this that lies underneath all the clashes, conflicts, and turmoil in everyday life
as also in science, where men have to exercise their judgment to approach truth, but
have no magic wand of judgment at their disposal.
In scientific investigations, however, magic wand of sorts is, in a sense, provided by
nature itself because here a standard of judgment emerges through repeated processes
of experimentation, observation, and confirmation. While none of these processes ele-
vates a scientific theory from the status of an interpretation to that of objective truth
in any absolute and logical sense, we will assume that the scientific ‘process’, to all
intents and purposes, is capable of interpreting parts of nature within given domains
of investigation in an impersonal way, i.e., in a manner independent of the process of
interpretation occurring in the minds of individuals and groups of individuals. How-
ever, so far as an understanding of nature as a whole is concerned, a scientific theory,
in spite of the elaborate process of justification that elevates it to the status of an
impersonal interpretation, remains an interpretation nevertheless, since it captures
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only some limited aspect of nature, and is contextual, where the idea of context is
again a complex one, involving ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects, as we will see below.
As a consequence, the evolution of scientific theories is not a smooth one since there
occurs a dramatic restructuring of a theory as the external context of observation and
interaction with nature gets changed, and also as the internal context, made up of
the existing framework of our ideas, evolves with time. In other words, the way a
succession of scientific theories captures the truth about some part of nature can-
not, generally speaking, be described in simple terms as a cumulative approach where
some ultimate truth is approximated more and more closely.
The existence of objects, and their relatedness to one
another
In speaking of the ontological aspect of truth, it is really not enough to speak just of
the existence of the world, along with all its parts that we observe either directly or
indirectly. Mere existence does not tell us anything. What is of vital importance is the
relatedness of objects in the world to one another, because it is the relatedness that tells
us how objects behave, what rules, if any, they conform to, and how we can act back
on parts of the world. It is the relatedness of an object with other objects that tells us
of its qualities or properties, and the properties are precisely the aspects of an object
that give it distinction and identity. The properties of the table identify it distinctly from
the chairs arranged around it or from the floor on which it stands. So, the correct
ontological statement would be that the table, the chairs, the floor, and all such things
exist and are related to one another in a manner independent of our mind and of how
our mind attempts to know of their existence and relatedness.
However, the existence of objects and their relatedness to one another, make up a
single whole. It is only provisionally that one can distinguish between the aspect of
existence of natural objects and that of their manifold correlations, appearing as their
properties and mutual interactions, of potentially infinite complexity. The distinction
between the existence of things and their properties and mutual interactions arises
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from our experience of nature, and is also routinely accepted in scientific practice
where an entity with some definite properties is first postulated to exist, which is then
assumed to interact with other entities similarly postulated. However, the properties
postulated to characterize an object are themselves indicative of some of its previously
acknowledged characteristics — ones that have already been learned about it.
Theories as condensed decriptions of inter-relations
All our inferences and theories are actually designed to tell us how the things in the
world are related to one another. In the context of our attempt to know of this world, it is
the relatedness that is of primary importance. Another way of saying this would be that
we come to know of the existence of objects in terms of their qualities and properties.
And, in order to learn what the properties are, how an object is related to other objects,
we ourselves interact with it, either directly through our senses, or by examining it by
means of other objects, by examining its relatedness to these other objects. In any case,
the properties revealed to us this way depend on how we set up the interaction with it,
the context in which the interaction is set up.
To those of you who have an acquaintance with quantum theory, the above para-
graph might look like a reference to the notorious measurement problem, because the
measurement problem is crucially dependent on the context defining the measuring
process. However, I do not specifically refer to the quantum measurement problem in
our discourse here. The type of context-dependence I refer to is relevant to the obser-
vation of objects in general, where the objects are found to reveal aspects of nature
in a manner that depends on the context of observation. The context-dependence of
observations in quantum measurements constitutes a very distinctive instance where
microscopic systems are found to differ radically from large scale (macroscopic) ones.
It seems to me to be a plausible position to adopt that quantum contextuality — I use
the term ‘contextuality’ to denote ‘context-dependence’) is something that is continu-
ous with, and at the same time constitutes a very special case of, the contextuality
inherent in the observation of natural objects and processes in general. But we will
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not confine ourselves to stray remarks, and will initiate our discourse on contextuality
in the next section, postponing further discussions to later occasions.
All observations and theories are contextual
What I mean by contextuality in the observation of natural objects and processes can be
explained with the help of a number of examples. The context in the observation of an
electron in an ionization chamber when the electron possesses a relatively low energy
differs from the context where the observation is made in the setting of a scattering ex-
periment or in some other similar setting where the particles involved in the experiment
possess a sufficiently high energy. One then comes to conclude that the electron is
not even a well-defined particle (or a particle-wave in the quantum mechanical sense),
but is a certain state of a field. Low energy and high energy contexts are seen here to
reveal radically different aspects of nature. It does not really matter that this example
relates to the quantum world because it makes us aware of the general fact that any
observation of an object or an entity gives us a conception of just a cross-section or a
tiny piece of nature, a cross-section determined by the context of the observation. What
is objective is the cross-section in question, and the concepts and theories built up for
the purpose of representing that cross-section can be faithful and accurate, to whatever
degree possible, only within the context — the ‘external’ aspect of it.
On the other hand, at any given stage of development of scientific theories, there exists
a vast web of ideas and concepts related to one another, where these concepts are clus-
tered into more or less coherent wholes — the theories, that give us a picture of nature,
a map to tell us what things there are and how they behave. However, this vast and
complex web is a dynamic one. Concepts and theories — resources that constitute the
‘internal’ context of observation and theory building — get transformed depending on
the way science looks at nature. In other words, there occurs an evolution of the exter-
nal and internal contexts caused by a broadening of the scope of observation of natural
things and their behavior, as also by a restructuring of the conceptual web. New as-
pects — or ‘dimensions’ — of nature are thereby captured in the concepts and theories,
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amounting to a radical transformation in the picture of nature that the sciences build
up for us.
A good way to illustrate the idea of the context is to refer to the practice of engineering
drawing where engineers and architects prepare plans, elevations, and sections to repre-
sent aspects of a complex three dimensional object, say, a grand architectural structure,
on a two-dimensional drawing sheet. These appear as distinct drawings on the sheet,
where each of these drawings represents (possibly with quite exquisite faithfulness and
accuracy), some aspect of the structure in some context of representation. Thus, there
can be several elevations for observations from several different sides (each, therefore,
constituting some particular context of observation), while a top view (a different context
altogether) gives the plan. And, additionally, numerous sections may be necessary for
a detailed description of what the interior looks like and what the internal structure of
each interior object is (like, for instance, whether a pillar is hollow or a solid one). When
done by architectural experts on the basis of detailed survey, each of the drawings cor-
respond to some aspect of the structure to be described faithfully and accurately (hence,
objectively, though with some unavoidable error which we need not take cognizance of
for the present), but none is a representation of the object itself. The object itself, which
is most definitely ‘out there’, appears in our concept only as fractional representations
which we continually attempt to synthesize in our mind, and the real question that then
comes up is, in what relation does the synthesized concept stand to the ‘reality’ since,
in a very definite sense, the former is an interpretation of the latter.
While the program of science is similar to the architects attempts at drawing up plans,
elevations, and sections, it differs in one fundamental and profound respect: an ar-
chitectural structure is an object of which the description by means of plans and
elevations can, in a sense, approach more and more closely the ‘object itself’ (though,
even this is arguable: but we will not be too insistent on finer issues) since the struc-
ture has (again, arguably) only a finite number of distinct aspects, or ‘dimensions’, to
it. In contrast, nature is inexhaustible in its aspects (‘dimensions’) and presents an
unending succession of facets for scientific theories to capture and to describe.
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I will now pause to draw a few significant conclusions from the example of the electron
and of the architectural marvel. The architecture is out there for all to see and to wonder
at, while the electron (or whatever it is that we call an electron) is hidden from our bare
senses, but there are common aspects to our conception of the two. First of all, the
architecture is not really for all to see and visualize since there are hidden aspects in
it too — and I don’t refer here to the fact that it is made up of electrons and protons
or of quarks or whatever, but to the more mundane fact that some of the pillars may
be internally hollow while some others are solid, some of the stones are fitted with
gems, and the surfaces of some of the domes are serrated, and so on. Every time some
new aspects of the structure are revealed to us in some new context of observation, a
new synthesis is made in our mind that alters and replaces the conception that was
previously there. What is important to note is that this alteration is a qualitative one,
and not just an improvement in accuracy and faithfulness and, in this sense, is a
replacement. Contrast this with the other type of improvement of representation that
an engineer or architect often effects, namely, an improvement in the accuracy of a
drawing within any given context like, say, altering slightly some particular angle in
a plan or elevation drawing, which also constitutes a replacement, but of a relatively
simple nature, namely, a quantitative one.
Another illuminating analogy (or, an instance, if you will) as to how our conception of
nature gets conditioned by the context, is obtained by referring to the way we appraise
the personality structure of an individual. Our ‘reading’ of her depends on the various
different circumstances in which we observe her response to environmental inputs
and, additionally, what our current theory of mind is — in particular, what our current
appraisal of her is, because it is the current appraisal that acts as a conditioning factor
to how we set up our interaction with her. There are infinitely many aspects to her
personality that even a lifetime of probing and interaction will not bring out to the full.
Indeed, the very concept of a personality to discover and describe, is not a substantive
one. We discover a person bit by bit, but it never amounts to discovering the person
as such, whatever the ‘person’ stands for. A routinely known aspect of her response
to her environment may undergo a spectacular change as some components of that
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environment get changed. What is more, our conception of the person also undergoes
sea changes as we get to know her across a spectrum of circumstances.
Thus, the epistemological question of our conception of the existence of things is related
in a complex manner to the ontological question of their existence in reality. My con-
ception of the existence of the table or of the electron is dependent on the context of my
observation and experimentation, where the context reveals only a slice of the reality I
am looking at, made up of only a few of the infinite number of aspects or ‘dimensions’ of
the latter. And that conception gets altered quite spectacularly in successive stages as
the context gets broadened more and more, with an ever increasing number of ‘dimen-
sions’ or ‘layers’ of the entities brought under the scanner. Finally, this external aspect
of the context is supplemented by and interacts with the internal aspect I mentioned
earlier, the two together making up the overall context in which we make observations
and build theories in our engagement with nature.
Theoretical concepts: greater and greater depths in a lay-
ered description
What is more, the gap between the reality out there and our conception of that reality
gets even more intriguing when one considers objects and entities, not only in their
aspect of existence, but of their quality, correlation, and interaction, of the mechanisms
underlying their multifarious interactions. As I have mentioned, the question of the
existence of a table or of an electron is inextricably woven into the question of how it
relates to the rest of reality, what the properties of the table or of the electron are, what
the mechanisms of its interactions with other entities are. The world exists as a whole
and it is only in our minds that we perceive, first, objects in individual existence and,
then, the behavior of objects in interaction and evolution, manifest in their innumerable
qualities.
For instance, consider a pair of particles A and B. Now, the mere existence of A and B
is a rather trivial matter to worry about. One has to look at how these two are related
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between themselves, how they interact, how they influence one another, and it is this
that makes our conception of their individual existence really meaningful. And it is here
that our concepts take a spectacular dive into depths that may in the end prove to be
fathomless. Because, now we are concerned not just about the existence of the two
particles, but about how best to describe their relatedness. And, just as the existence
question is no less conceptual than observational, the relatedness question is equally,
if not more, so.
Continuing to refer to the two particles A and B, each of the two can be said to move
through a succession of positions depending on their initial positions and velocities,
and on their mutual interaction. Physicists describe the latter in terms of a certain
interaction potential, which determine the trajectory of each of the two, a curve in three
dimensional space. Now, these are concepts at a different level compared to just the
concept of either particle existing by itself or even to the concept of the joint existence of
the two particles concepts of interaction and trajectory may be, in this sense, said to be
derived ones. And conceptual complexities continue to crop up at every small step that
one takes in describing the behavior of the two particles in their aspect of relatedness,
where concepts derived in successive stages continue to make their appearance. Thus,
for instance, it is not enough to speak of the trajectory as a succession of positions
occupied by either particle at successive instants of time because, of equal importance
is the sequence of velocities, or their momenta, at the successive positions. One thereby
gets to the idea of a trajectory or a curve, not in our familiar three-dimensional space,
but in a six-dimensional one (the so-called phase space) for either particle. The dizzying
journey does not stop here, for, one has to refer to a twelve dimensional phase space
so as to properly describe, in general terms, the joint motion of the two particles under
their mutual interaction. But, hold on. Perhaps we are getting carried away in our
newfound enthusiasm with ideas. Why should one go over to a six dimensional or a
twelve-dimensional space, and why should it not be possible to keep things concrete
and describe the motion of two or, if we like, any number of particles, in our good old
world of three dimensions?
It is certainly possible to describe the motion of any number of particles by referring to
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just the three dimensional space and a set of mathematical functions. Indeed, the higher
dimensional spaces are convenient geometrical constructs for describing features of the
functions that one needs in the three dimensional description, but before dismissing
these in favor of the mathematical functions in the three-dimensional setting, one has
to recognize that the mathematical functions themselves are constructs of a similar
nature. However, the higher dimensional spaces force themselves more and more into
our reckoning as we go on to describe more and more complex aspects of the mutual
influence of the two particles on the motion of each other, or to consider the interactions
of a larger number of particles with one another. In attempting to describe the motion of
a system of particles, there arise questions of greater and greater depth — ones of greater
and greater intrinsic complexity — questions that are virtually impossible to settle in
the setting of the familiar three dimensional space. Phase spaces of arbitrary numbers
of dimensions then become a necessity, and instead of the interaction potential, one
then more conveniently makes use of the Hamiltonian function of the system of particles
under consideration.
The big question: how do theories correspond to reality?
It will not do to go on here with examples of how abstract and labyrinthine our theories
of the mutual interactions of objects and entities can be and how much of a success
those theories can prove to be. What is of importance to note here is that, the vast
and intricate web of interrelations between objects and entities in nature is necessar-
ily described in terms of theories of a more or less complex nature, theories involving
concepts and constructs that appear to be remote from the things existing out there.
It is, of course, meaningless to ask whether a Hamiltonian function exists in nature.
And equally meaningless to ask if there exist twelve dimensional phase spaces or ones
of even higher dimensions. Our description and explanation of interrelations among
objects is utterly and incorrigibly conceptual and theoretical, involving theoretical con-
structs. Granted that such constructs turn out to be immensely successful in answer-
ing subtle questions and explaining deep and complex phenomena, are these constructs
anything more than mere instruments that help us set up explanations, without hav-
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ing something in them that can be identified as truth ? Do the theoretical constructs
correspond to some mechanisms intrinsic to nature? Do the sciences converge in ever
greater measure to these intrinsic mechanisms that are ‘out there’ for us to discover?
I am not sure if anybody can produce a definitive answer to this. Evidently, the the-
oretical constructs are not mere instruments assembled fortuitously, helping us with
explanations of phenomena so that we can, by making use of these constructs, identify
and predict regularities and correlations with uncanny success. That would be miracle
indeed. Like many other realists, I dont opt for miracles. But then, what is there in the
hidden mechanisms of nature that these complex theoretical constructs represent, or
correspond to? A theory, along with its constructs, must in some way hit upon ‘correctly’
some mechanism inherent in nature so as to be overwhelmingly successful in some area
of scientific inquiry. As I see it, this is the central question that scientific realism has to
figure out with some clarity before one can adequately demarcate between the points of
view of realism and anti-realism.
The viewpoint of scientific realism has many facets, of which this question relates to an
important one. In the end, however aligning oneself with realism or anti-realism is not
a matter of hard logic, but one of choosing a position on the basis of shared perceptions
and insights. In real life, we often adopt decisions that cannot be proved to be correct
on logical grounds (this, indeed, is the hallmark of inductive inference), but we can
still try to evaluate those by referring to various circumstantial and contextual factors.
Deliberations and judgments are no less important in this world than logical proofs.
The No-Miracle Argument was made famous by the American mathematician-philosopher
Hilary Putnam who presented it in support of the point of view of scientific realism in
a paper on the philosophy of mathematics ( [101], a collection of essays). Bas van
Fraassen, who has countered the point of view of scientific realism (or, more precisely,
of the point of view that recognizes successful scientific theories as being endowed with
truth) with his own constructive empiricism, has dubbed it as the ‘ultimate argument’
for realism [123], perhaps implying that, tragically, there is no better argument than
this in support of realism which, strictly speaking, is no argument at all. Fraassen has
advanced his own explanation of the success of scientific theories one where success
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is not much more than the outcome of a process of ‘survival’ by competition: a theory
survives the competition from other theories because it happens to have “latched on
to actual regularities in nature”. Notably, he accepts here the position of metaphysical
realism, which speaks of a reality to which all our theories are addressed
I should mention here that we are now referring principally to mathematical and, in
a broader sense, theoretical constructs in science, that are mostly encountered in
theories in the physical sciences. The uncanny effectiveness of these constructs of
exquisite mathematical depth is indeed a matter of genuine puzzlement when one
pauses to think over these. The Nobel winning mathematical physicist Eugene Wigner
[127] famously expressed this in an article entitled ‘The Unreasonable Effectiveness of
Mathematics in the Natural Sciences’, and several other leading mathematical physi-
cists have expressed a similar sense of wonder and mystery in the fact that mathe-
matical structures, predominantly in the nature of mental constructs, are found to be
relevant in the explanation of mind-independent natural phenomena. However, the
issue is of more general relevance in the philosophy of science where theoretical con-
structs are effectively made use of in explaining observed aspects of reality in all the
scientific disciplines.
What is more important than proclaiming oneself as belonging to this or that camp
in philosophy is to try to gain genuine understanding, even without the benefit of
logical proof, of how things operate in this world of ours. And the question of how the
deeply theoretical constructs of science correspond to, or represent, the mechanisms
of nature, stands out as one of paramount importance.
It is not enough to say that the theoretical constructs are ‘true’ in the sense of corre-
sponding with features and relations existing in nature because, to me at least, this
sounds much like a statement of faith. One has to understand with some clarity what
this correspondence actually consists of. Can one say, for instance, that there is a
correspondence between relations among elements of a theory and the web of relations
existing between natural entities? While this is also vague and unsatisfactory, I will use
this as the base camp from where one can have a view of the really intriguing questions
concerning the world and our existence in it.
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A metaphorical description of how mathematical constructs turn out to be relevant in
explaining the mechanisms inherent to a mind-independent reality is that the mind,
taking in cues from an external reality, spins out webs of its own, based on rules
of logic and mathematics, and some of these webs latch on to aspects of reality. Of
course, the webs spun out with threads of logic and mathematics, all hang together,
and so do all the various parts of reality and all the mechanisms inherent in these.
Inferences and theories are produced in a psychological process in which beliefs of
various degrees of generality play a significant role, as we will see later in this book,
but as they acquire a finished form, they pass through a process of justification, both
in the mind of the individual and in the collective mind of the scientific community,
though ‘justification’ and ‘discovery’ are often inextricably mixed with each other (in
this context, see [38], chapter 15). An aspect of justification of overriding importance
is consistency — the quality that makes our theories and concepts hang together.
Our beliefs, however need not be consistent — some beliefs resist justification and
consistency check. Remarkably, the belief system of an individual or of a community
still hangs together. This is because beliefs are tied together with emotions — this we
will have a look at in chapter 6 below.
Summary: the issues of relevance
Before I go on, I will summarize for you what we have had so far the position I want to
adopt as also the issues that it leads up to. For the sake of easy reference, I will make
up a list.
1. There exists a mind-independent reality: this is a matter of inference from
our experience, and not one of logical certainty; there exist alternative points
of view, any of which one may adopt, depending on how one summarizes and
interprets ones experience in life and the experience gained by mankind in
the course of history.
Our existence in a real world entails innumerable problems and conflicts
40
CHAPTER 2. OBJECTIVITY
that we have to cope with and move through; the responsibility lies on us
to understand and explain the multitude of events into which we are thrust,
including social interactions with people around us. For this, we make use of
our naturally evolved inquisitiveness and capacities of inference. We interact
with the reality around us and form hypotheses and theories in order to
explain why things happen. This is vital for our continued existence, and
continued autonomy and authenticity in that existence.
2. In explaining the inner mechanisms of nature by means of scientific the-
ories, we arrive at concepts that involve entities that are not directly observ-
able — ones whose existence we infer by indirect observations and reason-
ing. However, the existence of the unobservable entities is not to be doubted
solely because of this. In the course of development of scientific theories, the
inferences about these entities are made more and more reliable, and little
doubt now remains regarding remotely observed entities, about the existence
of which strong doubts were entertained in the past.
At the same time, inferences may be fallible, and it cannot be ruled out with
absolute certainty that some of the unobservable entities assumed to exist
in our current scientific theories will have to be defined in a new light in days
to come. Indeed, the existence of a certain entity, such as the electron, is
quite distinct from our description of it, and the latter can and does change
radically from time to time.
3. While any object of nature exists and interacts with other objects inde-
pendently of our conception of it, that conception keeps on changing dra-
matically, as the context in which we interact with and observe nature gains
in depth and breadth, and as our conceptual framework itself gets enriched.
Our description of things and processes in nature, and our explanations of
phenomena, is effected by means of theories, where the latter are generated
in a cognitive process. Broadly speaking, that process originates with signals
and stimuli from objects in interaction, and then proceeds through a num-
41
CHAPTER 2. OBJECTIVITY
ber of complex stages: the signals and stimuli generate internal responses
(neuropsychological, emotional, somatic) and these responses initiate further
processing where our past experience in the form of beliefs and concepts as-
sume relevance. The consequence of all this is that our theories describe
parts of nature in a selective manner, in the form of interpretations.
4. All observations of facts of the world are fundamentally cognitive in nature,
and the cognitive processing of one and the same fact of the world may result
in various different interpretations of it. Scientific theories are not determined
solely by facts of nature — the latter only act as the causal origin of the former.
The theories are formed in a cognitive process in the form of a selective and
purposive interpretation, being conditioned by past experience, and by past
beliefs, conceptions, and theories. Observations are theory-laden.
5. Scientific theories constitute a continuation of inferences we make in the
course of our daily life, where these inferences provide the basis for our deci-
sions and actions. In the making of these inferences, we interpret the world
around us by making use of our cognitive abilities and, at the same time,
keep on enriching and transforming that interpretation as the context of our
interaction with the world changes and, at the same time, as our overall con-
ceptual framework gets enriched. What is special in the case of scientific in-
vestigations is the great emphasis on repeated cross-verification against facts
of observation, on rigorous consistency checks against a vast web of currently
existing concepts, and on discourse among members of a community of fellow
scientists where rules of inference agreed upon by the entire community are
made use of. This tends to make scientific theories free, to all intents and
purposes, of relativism, in contrast to inferences of a non-scientific nature,
where interpretations often vary from person to person, and from one group
of persons to another.
This aspect of enhanced reality check notwithstanding, scientific theories con-
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tinue to be in the nature of interpretations of reality, since these capture only
certain aspects of nature through a cognitive process as outlined above.
Even though impersonal to a large extent, scientific theories bear the stamp
of their origin in the cognitive processes of men and of groups of men. The
course of development of the theories is conditioned by modes of thought of
communities and by cultural traits and latent beliefs of societies.
6. Scientific theories aim at providing us with effective descriptions of entities
and mechanisms constituting reality, an effectiveness that is supposed to
imply truth. However, the concept of truth is a complex one since, on the one
hand, it relates to a mind-independent reality and, on the other, resides in
inferences and theories that act as vehicles of it, the latter being produced
by cognitive processes in the minds of men. This contrariness results in
a fundamental tension that cannot be resolved by logical discourse alone.
However, that is how everything in life turns out to be — no concept is ever
pure and free of contrary aspects, least of all the concept of truth.
This, however, does not make invalid the concept itself. Truth is not deliv-
ered to us ready and tied in a neat package. Mankind has to struggle for it,
and struggle with all intensity and commitment to achieve authenticity, as
it has had to do in the past.
There is no denying the irreducible gap between Nature and its workings, and the model
world that science assembles for us in the form of the great web of concepts and theo-
ries, that makes realism a matter of a stand or a viewpoint that we adopt in our own life
process — a viewpoint arrived at in experience, and not as a logically compelling con-
clusion. At the same time, the gap relates solely to the fact that our perception of reality
is cognitive in nature. Nature does not know of any such gap. Signals originating in the
world interact with our cognitive apparatus, and we as cognitive agents, on reflecting
upon our cognitive process, become aware of what we describe as a gap. Looked at
from outside the cognitive process (in so far as such a thing is possible), the whole affair
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is nothing but an interaction between parts of the world and our cognitive apparatus
(with all its ‘software’ of concepts and theories) — just another instance of the vast web
of interactions going on between parts of nature. The mysteries of epistemology arise
only as we make an abstraction, for our own benefit, of questions of epistemology from
ontology.
What is more, the cognitive process itself knows of no great distinction between the
pre-scientific and the scientific. Our web of scientific theories has parts of it built up
through experiences gained in non-scientific and pre-scientific practice, and the rest is
assembled by scientific exploration, where inter-personal differences in interpretation
are sought to be minimized. This lends a new complexion to scientific theories that can
be likened to an edifice built upon a substratum of loose ground, not as coherent as the
edifice itself. But that is precisely how all edifices are built.
“Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as
it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven
down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or “given” base; and if
we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We
simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure,
at least for the time being.” (Karl R. Popper, in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, quoted
in [82]).
We will now have a look at all these issues relating to the scientific process and its
relation to cognitive activities of men, but there is one other thing to take note of before
we can proceed.
The questions that are coming up are not as much in the domain of science as such, as
in that of philosophy of science. If the theories of science constitute a distilled essence of
our experience with reality, then philosophy of science, in turn, constitutes the distilled
essence of those very theories. If the scientific concepts and theories are arrived at by
acts of inductive inference, then the points of view one adopts in philosophy of science
are, in turn, arrived at by induction of a higher order.
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Philosophies are produced not by the passive application of universally accepted rules
but by a choice from among alternatives, where a choice cannot be right or wrong but
can only be more plausible or less so. The alternatives are, fundamentally speaking,
not many, because philosophical ideas are made up of only few building blocks when
compared with the vast and awe-inspiring array of concepts the scientist works with.
But the scientist has an arbiter standing in front of her to whom she and her fellow
travelers defer in judging the worth of their theories — Nature herself. To the philoso-
pher, on the other hand, Nature does not proffer any yardstick for judging right or
wrong — she only smiles enigmatically (however, even for the scientist, the yardstick
does not come ready-made; but more of that later). Science creates a new world for
itself every time the horizon of mankinds interaction with nature expands; philosophy
only recreates the world — a world built in contemplation.
What makes philosophy a really challenging exercise is the innumerable nuances that
the few basic ideas are combined with. Where the scientist works with a great variety
of building blocks, erecting structures of awe-inspiring complexity, the philosopher
works with clay — only a few colors of it — to which she gives innumerable shapes.
The philosopher of today works with the same old clay and the same old colors that
the philosophers of antiquity worked with, but the shapes made up by the two differ
much, because the edifice that science assembles goes on being built, acquiring new
additions of ever-renewed shapes. While the edifice of scientific theories is built in
successive episodes upon the existing edifice and takes on ever-expanding fantastic
forms, philosophies are re-built. There appear cycles in philosophy, where old ideas
are worked anew, worked in new contexts, because the philosophy of science works
on scientific theories — theories that keep evolving in fantastic ways. And, precisely
because of this, philosophical practice is forever filled up with polemic, with exchanges
between competing camps. In contrast, scientific practice involves polemic only during
the phase of emergence of a new theory, or at a time the existing theory proves sterile
in solving new problems while no definitive shape of a successor has emerged. Once a
new theory proves its worth, polemic is replaced with feverish and predominantly co-
operative work — perhaps competitive as well — in the journey forward. In philosophy,
you can say nothing really new, you can only adopt a different way of looking at
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things. And, it is precisely because of this that there cannot be sharp and lasting
demarcation lines between the various camps that philosophical thought is divided
into. Old demarcation lines dissolve and new ones appear. Contrasting ideas appear
to be irreconcilable and mutually exclusive only when these are allowed to be bled of
life by being defined with empty words — words that dont really apply to the context
at hand.
While one is to choose between realism and anti-realism, it is by no means a matter of a
simple dichotomous choice between two mutually exclusive clusters of ideas. There do
exist distinct cores to these two positions in philosophy, but the cores do not exhaust the
entire philosophical terrain and it really makes no sense to carve up the entire terrain
into mutually exclusive clusters of ideas. On the contrary, it may be immensely fruitful
to think of novel combinations of elements of ideas that have so long been assumed
to belong to one or the other of these mutually exclusive clusters. Indeed such novel
blending of ideas picked out from what previously appeared to belong to irreconcilable
camps, may be more in consonance with the developments eternally taking place in
the sciences where, again, old frontiers dissolve and new areas of exploration emerge
at an astounding pace. Indeed, explorations for a workable position in the philosophy
of science are to be conducted in close affinity to developments in the sciences, taking
care that such explorations are constrained by these developments, by the successes
and failures of scientific theories. This, broadly speaking, is the naturalist position in
the philosophy of science.
This has been the way Philip Kitcher's position in the philosophy of science appears
to have evolved over the years. For instance, [33] indicates how Kitcher's realism has
undergone a process of moderation as his views have broadened during the years
between the writings of [71] and [72]. Even at the time of [71], Kitcher speaks of a
“vast middle ground” between extremes in issues relating to scientific realism.
I will, then, close this chapter on the note that we will, with these few strands of ideas
introduced here, again face the question we started with: in what sense does science
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describe the workings of nature ? As I understand, there is no clear-cut answer to
the question, which is to be approached, not head-on, but only from the standpoint
of our own cognitive processes, of how we perceive the world. In the end, however, all
these make sense only when looked in relation to the question as to how we perceive
ourselves. This is the question of values, of our goals and purposes: the ultimate testing
ground of mankind.
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The emergence of theories: how
are theories constructed and
accepted?
The explorers in science: individuals and scientific communi-
ties
It seems reasonable to describe this fusion
of the personal and the objective as Personal Knowledge.
Michael Polanyi
This book aims at addressing two complementary aspects of science from two distinct,
though related, perspectives. The first of the two starts by considering science to be
a product of humankind without overt concern as to how the product came to be. In
reality, science is done by human beings in their individual capacity and as members
of groups of people — each as a member of her own immediate group or community of
fellow scientists, as a member of a bigger scientific community, and as one belonging to
groups of fellow human beings sharing various different identities and cultural values;
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and this constitutes the second of the two aspects of science mentioned above. The first
of the two perspectives was adopted in the last chapter. We will adopt the second per-
spective now. However, we will see by and by that the two perspectives are inextricably
woven into each other.
The essential tension: the objective and the subjective
Theories in science are constructs relating to aspects of reality. And herein lies the great
tension in the world of science: on the one hand, theories have a causal link to slices
of reality, depending on the context of our confrontation with these, and, on the other,
these are constructs — ones produced in the minds of individuals and groups. On the
one hand, science is to be loyal to nature while, on the other, it is an interpretation
of nature produced by people whose world of concepts is separated by an irreducible
gap from the ‘real world out there’. I have raised, in the last chapter, the question as
to how and in what sense science can be said to be loyal to nature. This chapter will
deal with the other aspect — that of the way the scientific theories are generated in the
conceptual world of individuals and groups or communities. We will then proceed to a
more complete and meaningful discourse where these two aspects are merged with each
other, making possible a composite picture of science as an evolving map of nature, as
revealed in the minds of people.
Science is supposed to be ‘objective’ not only in the sense of being loyal to nature but in
that of being loyal to nature alone, being free of the vagaries of the minds of individuals
and of communities of individuals. However, like the first of these two suppositions, the
second too is burdened with big question marks hanging over it. This is what we will
have a look at now.
But even before we proceed with an examination of how science is dependent on the
conceptual edifice already there in the minds of people, I must caution you not to
read too much into any one of the two perspectives I have mentioned above to the
exclusion of the other. In philosophy, as in everyday life, we do have a tendency of
reading too much into a single idea and losing foothold. This, for instance, is what I
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refer to by speaking of the big divide between realism and anti-realism. Realists speak
of science being, in some sense or other, true to Nature, and are skeptical of allusions
to the mind-dependence (and culture-dependence too, but culture-dependence can be
looked at within the broader perspective of mind-dependence) of science, while anti-
realists have the opposite tendency of emphasizing the mind-dependence at the cost
of the allegiance of science to nature. In reality, however, the two are blended into a
single whole that we call science. It is only for the sake of convenience of discourse
that we can effect a separation between the two, where we allow ourselves to forget the
essential fusion of and tension between these.
Science on a pedestal
The first three quarters of the twentieth century saw great and dizzying advances in
science where remarkable theories were built and, in a concomitant development, a
certain mindset was developed, whereby Science was placed on a pedestal. Science was
seen as something transcending human fallibility, as a tightly knit body of knowledge,
based on and regulated by the inexorable laws of logic, where the individual human
being had no place simply because the individual human mind was not fully ‘objective’,
nor were the judgments and propensities of communities of individuals. There were
individuals steeped in superstitions; there were tribes engaged in ritualistic dances and
mystical magical practices; there were communities engaged in blind and cut-throat
politics; and there were nations at war. Then, there were music, poetry, literature, and
the arts oriented toward the innards of the human mind. And, among all this blind
passion and subjective explorations, here was Science, the only endeavor truly seeking
to reach out to Nature by transcending human subjectivity.
Paralleling all this lofty status granted to science, there were trends in the philosophy of
science as well, trends that stressed, on the one hand, the great role of logic in science
that made it free of the vagaries of human psychology and, on the other, the epic of
Science unraveling the mysteries of nature, of science engaging with reality. To be sure,
there were conflicts between dictates of logic and claims of science discovering the real
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workings of nature because logic, after all, works in the world of concepts and cannot,
by itself, bridge the great divide between that world and the real world, the World of
nature. But then, it was hoped, science could make our conception of nature converge
more and more to nature itself.
Logic and reality
Philosophy of science in the first three quarters of the twentieth century was dominated
by Logical Positivism and Scientific Realism. The logical approach applied the proverbial
Occams Razor, with logic ideally playing the role of that razor and, to be consistent in
its dissections with the razor, could not, in principle, accede without reservations to the
reality of what goes by the name of Reality, especially that part of it which is remote
from our senses. Instead, science was seen as attempting to identify regularities of
what is sensed and experienced. Scientific realism, in its turn, in acknowledging a
mind-independent world, had to grapple with the question of how the mind can arrive
at truths about that world — that central question of epistemology. In other words, Logic
and Reality resided in distant worlds, and the two could not be united in a consistent
manner — consistency being supposed to be what science was all about.
But questions of philosophy are abstruse ones. The general perception of science, in
both the common man and the working scientist was that science was utterly logical and
that it revealed for mankind the real mechanisms underlying the workings of nature.
The two together made up the picture of objectivity of science.
In philosophy as in popular perception, science was seen as something rational be-
cause (a) it was logical and thus free of the common fallibilities of the human mind, (b)
it was aimed at the truth about nature, and (c) it tended to approach that truth more
and more closely.
Logical positivism was viewed variously even by the proponents of the philosophical
movement themselves. It was based on the analytic-synthetic distinction originally in-
troduced by Immanuel Kant, where propositions in logic and mathematics were of the
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analytic type, while statements with an empirical content were of the synthetic type,
which called for a principle of verifiability of such statements. The question of verifia-
bility brings up the issue of confirmation of scientific hypotheses and theories, but no
logically compelling method of confirmation could be found. During the later half of
the twentieth century, logical positivism gave way to logical empiricism in which the
failings of the logical positivist project gradually gained acceptance. At the same time,
the overall philosophical framework was sought to be retained, though without any
strong unifying thread. Logical empiricism was thus, in a sense, the self-examination
of logical positivism. It was this self-examination that made room for the development
of the pragmatist and naturalist trends in the philosophy of science, within a broadly
realist framework.
An account of the logical positivist and logical empiricist movements in the philosophy
of science can be found in [46].
Logical positivism was no longer the dominant current in the philosophy of science by
the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, while it was precisely this period when
naive realism as a trend was put to question as well. In a sense, the trouble with both
approaches relates to that great gulf separating the conceptual world of men from the
real world out there, where the two worlds could never be bridged seamlessly. Logical
positivism harbored within it the skeptical viewpoint that questioned everything outside
the realm of sense data and could not come up with a solution to the question as
to how the truth of scientific theories could be established by logic, for which it tried
to develop a foolproof theory of induction. If a logic of induction could be developed,
then that would justify the confirmation of theories by means of empirical observations.
But no such logically sound foundation of induction was forthcoming, and the state of
affairs remained pretty much the same as where David Hume had left off, with induction
continuing to remain as the ‘scandal of philosophy’ [15].
Realism, on the other hand, grappled vainly with the question of the truth of scientific
theories, which it could not resolve in a logically sound way. As in the case of logical
positivism, realism got trapped within the cage of consistency — how could the truth of
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scientific theories, being objects in the conceptual world, be ever proved to be true of
the natural world since the two worlds are fundamentally remote from each other? The
last three decades of the twentieth century saw a gradual withering of the lofty status of
realism in the philosophy of science.
Michael Polanyi: roots of personal knowledge
The first major current against the impersonal objectivity of science had been initiated
by Michael Polanyi, a scientist of great repute who turned to the field of philosophy
and put forth ideas of astounding originality, only to be set aside by the philosophical
community with what amounted effectively to a condescending dismissal meted out to
the amateur.
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was a physical chemist of great stature, and turned to
philosophy in his later years. The relevance of his contributions to the philosophy of
science will, perhaps, take many more years to be fully realized and appreciated. A
biography of Polanyi, including his scientific contributions and his economic, political,
and philosophical thoughts, written by his long-standing friend Eugene P. Wigner,
who was also a collaborator, is to be found in [128] (Wigners account of the scientific
contributions of Polanyi is to be complemented by the mention of his path-breaking
work on crystal dislocations that opened up the enormously important field of plastic
deformations). Wigner and Polanyi had a long correspondence and dialog on questions
relating to tacit knowledge, quantum physics, and the mind-body problem, for which,
see [67].
Polanyis major work of great relevance in the philosophy of science was put together
from a collection of lectures and essays, and was named ‘Personal Knowledge: Towards
a Post-Critical Philosophy’ [94], a major concern of which related to the acquisition
of knowledge as the act of individuals and, in particular, to the building of scientific
concepts and theories as a personal endeavor, where the major thrust of Polanyis was
against the all-consuming critical stance of the logical positivist who was skeptical of
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whatever did not conform to the canons of logic. He was one of the early philosophers of
science to grasp the significance and relevance of cognitive processes taking place below
our level of awareness (“we can know more than we can tell” [95]), or what can be termed
pre-conscious and pre-logical stages of cognition. He analyzed the process of formation
of conjectures, hypotheses, and scientific theories as these actually arise in the minds
of people, in which he can be identified as perhaps the first major naturalist in the
modern era. Polanyi, after Freud, was one who delved into the human unconscious as
the substratum of conscious activity, though, to be sure, his thrust differed from Freuds
in that his major concern was to look for the roots of human cognition, where the latter
has a noticeable conscious component as well.
In looking at what he termed tacit knowledge (or what I feel should more appropriately
be termed tacit cognition) Polanyi underlined the role of beliefs entrenched in the human
mind where these beliefs endow the cognitive endeavor of the individual with deeply per-
sonal explorations and commitments leading to the birth of new concepts, hypotheses,
and theories. But this concern of Polanyis with unconscious personal cognitive pro-
cesses did not make him an anti-realist in the sense of identifying scientific theories as
solely mind-dependent constructs having no connection with reality. In fact, Polanyi
was a realist even as he underlined the deeply personal aspects of theory building in
science. His view of the process of emergence of scientific hypotheses was that it was
anchored in reality, though not directly so. Instead, the ‘external’ reality was seen as
causing the generation of a huge store of unconscious bits of clues, the constituents of
tacit knowledge. This vast and ever-growing store of tacit clues was seen as providing
the real context in which concepts and theories were produced.
“To say that the discovery of objective truth in science consists in the apprehension of
a rationality which commands our respect and arouses our contemplative admiration;
that such discovery, while using the experience of our senses as clues, transcends this
experience by embracing the vision of a reality beyond the impressions of our senses,
a vision which speaks for itself in guiding us to an ever deeper understanding of reality
— such an account of scientific procedure would be generally shrugged aside as out-
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dated Platonism: a piece of mystery-mongering unworthy of an enlightened age. Yet it
is precisely on this conception of objectivity that I wish to insist ....... ” ([94], chapter
1).
Thus, it was essentially the supreme naturalist in Polanyi that enabled him to mount
a major two-pronged development in the philosophy of science, a development that, on
the one hand, was directed against the skepticism of the logical positivist denying ev-
erything outside the realm of logic, thereby bringing the personal aspects of scientific
theory-building to the fore, and on the other, sought to establish a causal link between
the reality of nature and the subjective world of the individual in the form of clues in
an unconsciously held storehouse of knowledge. It is essentially a link of the same na-
ture as that involved in the perception of forms and shapes of objects in our everyday
observations, such as the recognition of a face or as the identification of a white, oval
object as an egg. Our mental recognition of either the face or the egg is actually a con-
struction in our mind produced by sensory inputs working in the context of stored clues.
In arriving at such a recognition our mind correctly latches on to some aspects of reality
(as van Fraassen would say), much like a key fitting a lock — it would, metaphorically
speaking, not fit to just any lock, but only to the one whose inner structure fits its own
(the keys) construction — a construction that was dictated by clues supplied by the lock
itself (the key was constructed by an independent hand from these clues, but it would
succeed in opening the lock nevertheless).
In stressing the aspect of hypotheses and theories being constructed in the minds of
individuals, Polanyi highlighted that these are, truly speaking, guesses — guesses that
were not determined uniquely by known data, being generated in flights of imagination,
and ones that left open the possibility of alternative hypotheses. At the same time,
the hypotheses are not pure fancies of the mind since these are constrained from two
sides — on the one hand, the concepts, hypotheses, and theories are constrained by the
sense data, the inputs generated by our experience in the real world, and on the other,
these are constrained by the context of our already acquired cognitive products, the vast
storehouse of knowledge, memories, and clues — partly conscious and overwhelmingly
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tacit. The treasury of tacit knowledge and cognitive clues, in turn, is a product of past
acquisitions from experience where clues were received of the workings of the world out
there, and it is thus within a complex and stratified web of existing concepts, clues,
hypotheses, and theories — all invisibly linked to reality — that new hypotheses and
theories are generated. This is the two-fold nature of newly generated hypotheses and
theories — being products of imaginative guesswork constrained by present and past
experiences of nature, where clues received from nature are made use of. Imagination
and reality — these are the two contrary things that encapsulate the essential tension
inherent in the entire endeavor of science, the tension resulting from the fathomless gap
between the world of nature and our conceptual world.
“We see here [in scientific discovery, akin to guessing the presence of a burglar in the
house at night] a consistent effort at guessing — and guessing right. The process
starts with the very moment when, certain impressions being felt to be unusual and
suggestive, a ‘problem’ is presenting itself to the mind; it continues with the collection
of clues with an eye to a definite line of solving the problem; and it culminates in the
guess of a definite solution.”, ([96], p 9-10).
But that gap between our mental world and the real world is not something that we
need to read too much into because, simply speaking, it is something that we, as lim-
ited cognitive agents, perceive as a divide between ourselves and Nature — everything
that excludes ourselves. It is only in philosophy that all this smoke is produced where
one tries to ‘understand’ this fundamental divide, because all forms of life including hu-
man beings happily continue and thrive without being burdened with this awe-inspiring
‘responsibility’ of ‘bridging’ the gap. In the course of existence, an individual living be-
ing engages in various life processes on the basis of myriads of clues received from the
external reality as also of clues generated internally. The mental activity of man is one
instance of this ongoing life process — one of a very special nature though. It is only
when the mind focuses on its own activity vis-a-vis the external world that the conun-
drum of an irreducible gap between the ‘knower’ and the ‘known’ is raised. At the same
time, it is this gap — the distinction between the real world and our conceptual world
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that irrevocably constrains the way we perceive the mind-independent reality that we
are immersed in.
And Polanyi — the naturalist that he was — did not take it upon himself to resolve
the conundrum, instead choosing to address the question as to how scientific thought
is actually generated in the minds of men. In this, Polanyi analyzed in great details a
number of aspects of the process of formation of new concepts, hypotheses, and the-
ories, much in the manner of an introspective study and analysis, and came out with
interesting and important clues to this process. The first ‘clue’, of course, was that the
process occurred, in the main, within the matrix of tacit knowledge and was essentially
in the nature of a guess-work, though one that made use of clues acquired from the
reality that the hypothesis or the theory sought to describe and explain. And the clues
were immersed within the belief system of the scientist, imparting the process with fea-
tures of a deeply personal nature. A second interesting observation of Polanyi's was that
the process was initiated and sustained by a commitment on the part of the scientist,
triggered by a puzzle, a problem, or an anomaly that the existing theoretical framework
failed to solve or explain.
A third observation was that the clues were half-baked ideas or hints that were tacitly
available to the scientist, having been produced in a long process of experience and
prior attempts — failed as well as successful ones — to solve problems of a similar kind.
Polanyi highlighted the idea of heuristics — hunches and rules of thumb — enunciated
by George Polya in the context of problem solving in mathematics and thereby antici-
pated, along with Polya, a broad and major trend to take shape in subsequent decades
in artificial intelligence and, more generally, in the field of understanding and explaining
inductive inference in the context of human inferential processes.
Yet another feature to emerge in the course of Polanyis analysis of the process of the
formation of hypotheses and theories was that it was not a process aimed at grasping
the whole of nature, of nature in its entirety, but one focusing on some aspect of nature,
one that relates to the immediate problem or anomaly at hand (“...an aspect of nature
seeking realization in our minds”, [96], p 21 ) while, at the same time, picking up and
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pointing at clues to hidden aspects. A hypothesis or a theory proves itself superior to
an earlier one and supersedes the latter in this ability of providing a glimpse to hitherto
unrecognized aspects of nature, thereby finding its place in an unending succession of
hypotheses reaching out to an inexhaustible landscape of nature, awaiting exploration.
In this optimistic outlook on theories reaching out to nature with its infinite hidden
dimensions, Polanyi once again proved himself to be an early exponent of the naturalist
trend in the philosophy of science in the recent era, refusing to address lofty philosoph-
ical questions relating to the ‘mind attempting to comprehend nature’ — questions that
were formal and contemplative ones that required endless reflection, with little possi-
bility of an acceptable solution. And the naturalist in him gave a new and fresh view of
realism too in speaking of the infinitude of nature that remains ever unexplored.
“ A true physical theory is, therefore, no mere functional relation between observed
facts, but represents an aspect of reality, which may yet manifest inexhaustibly in the
future.”, ([97],p 191).
Finally, Polanyi came out with the remarkable observation that a creative act of hypoth-
esis formation on the part of the individual scientist involved a critical stage in which
apparently uncorrelated bits of half-formed concepts undergo a spontaneous coales-
cence into a new coherent form, where the coherence is once again to be interpreted
with reference to the previously existing storehouse of tacitly held cognitive elements
and to inputs from the external reality.
“We may follow up our parallel between discovery and Gestalt perception by regarding
the process of discovery as a spontaneous coalescence of the elements which must
combine to its achievement.”, ([96], p 19).
All these aspects of the formation of new concepts and theories in the minds of individ-
uals will be discussed at greater length in subsequent sections in this book. I mention
these here in order to indicate how concepts corresponding to aspects of reality can
be formed in the minds of men where, as Polanyi pointed out, the process is at once
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constructive and exploratory — one of invention and discovery. It is this interweaving
of apparently contrary aspects that gives rise to philosophical conundrum. I say ‘ap-
parently’ here, because the contrariness is a matter of our perception — Nature does
not have any innate design of baffling us with this hugely tough puzzle of ‘mind versus
reality’. We, as thinking agents, are parts of nature and we are ‘forced’ into making
maps of aspects of nature in our minds where these maps are representative of those
aspects of reality and, at the same time, are fundamentally skewed ones. The ‘forcing’
is, of course, part compulsion and part adventure — adventure into uncharted realms
of reality where the spirit of adventure is, in all likelihood, acquired in an evolutionary
process.
It is the personal and constructive aspects of scientific theories that we will be discussing
further in the pages of this book, acknowledging at the same time that these aspects are
not necessarily antithetical to the other aspect of these theories, namely their allegiance
to aspects of an external reality. In this, scientific theories are, to some extent, compara-
ble to a portrait of an individual created by an artist — the individual is sitting out there
as the live model whom the artist represents in his portrait, but what the artist finally
produces is not an exact likeness of the external appearance of the model, so much so
that the model herself feels anguished at seeing the finished portrait, complaining that
she cannot recognize herself in it. While the artist most definitely anchors his work in
the presence of the model ‘out there’, yet the portrait turns out to be the artist's per-
ception of her, including ‘dimensions’ of hers perhaps unknown to herself, dimensions
relating to her personality, her psyche, and her immediate mood. Clues to these other
‘dimensions’ are received by the artist in ways perhaps he himself cannot define, and
the greatness of the artist lies in how his tacit and unconscious self makes use of these
clues, and combines these with previously stored perceptions in his mind so as to make
a coherent whole that, while being a great work of art, is still a skewed representation
of the subject sitting expectantly in front of him.
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Thomas Kuhn: the paradigm shift
The remarkable insights of Michael Polanyi, however, remained largely unnoticed in
the world of philosophy of science. While constituting a telling criticism of the received
image of science (and of human thought in general) these did not raise much of a tremor
in that world. But Polanyi was followed by Thomas Kuhn who did cause a great tremor
that extended from the terrain of philosophy of science out towards remote cultural
terrains, to merge into broader cultural movements of the last quarter of the twentieth
century. Kuhn's thoughts had quite a significant kinship with Polanyi's in that both had
a naturalist trend and both focused on the constructive aspect of scientific theories, at
the risk of appearing to undermine the received view of the objectivity of science.
Kuhn's naturalism was expressed in his paramount interest in the history and sociology
of science, where he refused to engage with abstract philosophical problems, instead
looking at how scientific theories were actually constructed in the historical unfolding
of ideas in the context of specific challenges of a social and epistemological nature,
and at how scientific concepts and theories are actually handled by communities of
scientists in the course of their professional work. He, like Polanyi, was one of the early
representatives of the naturalist trend of recent decades without overtly contending
or appearing to be so, both primarily engaged in settling a number of issues in the
philosophy of science (issues as perceived by them) without burdening themselves with
abstract questions of epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics.
However, one cannot glibly dismiss centuries of seemingly abstract philosophical dis-
course since philosophical abstraction is by nature akin to scientific abstraction.
Questions abstracted away from the endless contrariness of real life lead to fruitful
analysis but only if the results of that analysis are continually referred back to the
muddied grounds of reality. In a sense, the analytical philosophy of the first half of
the twentieth century was the necessary precursor to the naturalist-cognitive turn
that came about at around the nineteen sixties and seventies. The great merit of the
analytical philosophy was that it never desisted from acute self-analysis.
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In his first acclaimed work, The Copernican Revolution [77], Kuhn presented a study
of how a major transformation in the world view of science was brought about under
the influence of factors only partly of an epistemic nature, where major social-cultural
components exert an equally important influence in the complex of pulls and pushes
resulting in the transformation. In particular, he identified stages in the process where
conceptual changes occurred without regard to evidential support, or, in other words,
without overt concern for convergence with observation data (Polanyi also drew heavily
from an appraisal of the Copernican revolution with his inimitable philosophical insight
([94], [97])). And then he came out with his major and celebrated work, The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions [76] , where he cogently set forth a number of theses relating to
the scientific process that put a question mark to the logical-analytic-philosophical view
of an impersonal and objective science undertaking the Promethean task of bridging the
chasm that separates mind from matter and cumulatively unraveling hidden mysteries
of nature.
Kuhns name has now become synonymous with phrases like ‘scientific revolution’,
‘paradigm’, ‘normal science’ and ‘incommensurability’. However, while his work gen-
erated a great stir in professional circles of philosophers of science, scientists, and
sociologists, and gradually came to create a remarkable impression in the minds of peo-
ple much beyond the limits of these professional circles — quite in contrast to Polanyis
work — his bold ideas were not received by professionals with open-armed acceptance.
What Kuhn had done was to counterpose a point of view to another, entrenched, one,
in a breathtaking sweep, which is precisely why his work received a general acclaim, far
beyond the confines of its avowed subject area. But it did not quite match the scalpel
of the professional who took to dissecting his views much like the zealous surgeon who
dissects in vain to discover where life lies hidden in the patient on his dissection table.
To be sure, there were professionals who found Kuhn stimulating but still, they could
not quite accommodate Kuhn within a rigorously justified framework that they were ac-
customed to. But, despite their demands of precision and rigor, their own field would
never remain the same when Kuhn was done addressing from the mountain-top. He
was speaking, not so much on this or that specific problem in the field of philosophy
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of science, but against the mindset of his time — the same dead-weight that was felt
implicitly by an entire generation. While a work of such sweeping spirit does not appeal
to professionals, it does stir up the minds of people who, at least for the time being, are
prepared to leave aside their professional armor.
Kuhn, of course, was not alone in addressing the mindset of his time since there were
others who gave vent to the gathering tremor in the world of ideas and viewpoints
— those in the likes of Polanyi, Hanson, and Feyerabend, each of whom was to leave a
lasting impression in the field of philosophy of science; but none of these others caught
the imagination of their generation, and of generations to succeed, quite as much as
Kuhn did. Polanyi, in particular, raised issues of a stupendous magnitude in signif-
icance and implication, but was never noticed much within and outside the circle of
philosophy of science, because he did not connect with people, was felt to be idiosyn-
cratic, and expressed concerns too much at variance with those of his time.
The question as to why Kuhns work drew more attention than Polanyis has been
addressed in [119].
On the irrationality of the substratum
What I want to highlight as the seminal contribution of Polanyi and Kuhn in the context
of the issue of the objectivity of science is that both underlined the constructive aspect of
scientific theories — one in the minds of individuals and the other in the perceptions of
scientific communities. And in this, they rose to new heights by refusing to relinquish
the connection of the theories to an external reality, the reality of nature — one ac-
knowledging this connection quite openly and other by implication. What is more, they
both trod what appeared to many as the path of irrationalism but what in reality was
the path of identifying and looking into the substratum of the logical-rational mode of
thought in science. In this, Polanyi explored an area distinct from Kuhn's — in the mind
of the individual as distinct from the pre-logical perception of the scientific community
that was given the name of ‘paradigm’ by Kuhn. It is the substratum that is apparently
at variance with the super-stratum of logical-rational and deliberative mode of thought
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and it is the discrepancy between the two modes of thought that is commonly perceived
as irrationality intruding into the world of science.
The process of formation and initial acceptance of new concepts and theories is rooted
in the substratum, where the concepts and theories are constructed, but this process
of construction is constrained by the external reality and is ultimately aimed at it, the
logical-rational super-stratum being, in a manner of speaking, the mediator between
the two, i.e., between the substratum and the external reality. This, in brief, is the
scheme of things that Polanyi and Kuhn outlined in their work. The distinctive features
of the areas of discourse chosen by the two determined, in some measure, the roles
that these two were to play in subsequent decades. Polanyi, after his time, gained
great acceptance in the fields of cognitive science and psychology because he, more
than anybody else, re-opened the door to the human unconscious after the latter was
banished from respectable science by the ostracization of psychoanalysis and by the
rise of behaviorism. And Kuhn, by contrast, brought in a new wind in the fields of
historiography and sociology of science that ultimately impacted on the philosophy of
science and, then, merged with emerging trends in broader cultural areas.
With this, I am done with laying the groundwork for the remainder of this book. In
addressing the problem of objectivity in science I will repeatedly come back to issues
raised in the last chapter and the present, but by then you will have known the setting
in which one can meet with the ideas I want to share with you — explicit and implicit
ones to be found in the literature put together by researchers.
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Induction: the guessing game of life
Life is an endless process of guessing, and survival and progress means guessing right.
Guessing essentially means drawing a conclusion without adequate support of reason,
and often requires one to choose from possible alternatives or even, at times, to generate
a possible choice where, apparently, there is none.
Guessing is so commonplace an occurrence in our everyday activities and our develop-
mental process right from birth, continuing up to the terminal stages of life, that we
are mostly unaware of its ubiquity and all-pervading importance. We keep on drawing
conclusions based on guesses so continuously that most of the time it does not seem to
involve effort. By contrast, deducing by following the path of regimented logic requires
a great deal of effort, and engages our admiration. The great relevance of guessing goes
unacknowledged in our everyday activity, and more so in science, that highly specialized
form of inquiry and inference.
Your three-month old baby has become irritable and is throwing tantrums. The baby's
father insists that she is hungry and is feeling neglected, and, on the face of it, he
may not be wrong. But you assert that the baby is having sore throat and call in the
physician. Both of you have your ‘reasons’ for your respective assertions, but none is
conclusive in itself.
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A football coach, on looking at the medical report of a player in his team suffering from
an ankle injury for the last two months, selects him for the next important match. On
being criticized for the selection he maintains that he has had a hunch that the player
would make a magical contribution in the upcoming match.
A child, barely four years of age, was shown the drawings of two circles, one large and
one small, and also of two squares and two triangles of different sizes. On then being
presented with the drawing of an oval-like figure and a three-sided figure with curved
sides, she identified the former as a circle, and the latter as a triangle.
All these are instances of inductive inference — a form of inferential activity whose
instances span a stupendous spectrum from the most commonplace to the most creative
and sublime.
“Philosophers since Hume have struggled with the logical problem of induction, but
children solve an even more difficult task — the practical problem of induction. Chil-
dren somehow manage to learn concepts, categories, and word meanings, and all on
the basis of a set of examples that seems hopelessly inadequate. The practical problem
of induction does not disappear with adolescence: adults face it every day whenever
they make any attempt to predict an uncertain outcome. Inductive inference is a fun-
damental part of everyday life, and for cognitive scientists, a fundamental phenomenon
of human learning and reasoning in need of computational explanation.” [117]
Inductive inference will be of central relevance in this book, which is why I will start by
briefly explaining a number of basic ideas relating to induction. First, the business of
defining induction. What, specifically, are the characteristic features that define induc-
tion? Here I cannot give you a universally accepted definition since people distinguish
between different types of induction and adopt different points of view in characterizing
induction. A commonly adopted approach is to counterpose it against deduction. In
other words, one classifies all inferential activities into two major classes, namely, in-
duction and deduction, and then makes further divisions within the class of inductive
inferences. However, neat and clear-cut classifications are not always possible, and one
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quickly finds that things get mixed up to no small degree. In particular, one finds that
the way deduction and induction appear to be related to each other depends on whether
one adopts the problem view or the process view [57].
The problem view and the process view
The problem view distinguishes between deductive and inductive arguments on the ba-
sis of form, without overt reference to content. Consider, for instance, the following:
when I put on my brown coat I look like a joker / I have put on the brown coat today / I
must be looking like a joker,
which is a deductive argument since its form guarantees that if the premises are true,
then the conclusion will necessarily be true. It doesn’t really matter whether the premises
are actually true (the first proposition is definitely not true, I assure you — I don’t have
a brown coat).
Consider, on the other hand, the following:
I feel like an errant child whenever my Aunt Agatha is around / I am feeling like an errant
child now / Aunt Agatha must be around somewhere,
where the form of the argument does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion even
when the premises happen to be true (my maths tutor of bygone days happens to have
a similar sinister influence over me). In this particular example, the argument happens
to be an instance of abduction — the formation of a hypothesis on the basis of evidence
which, according to some, constitutes a type of inference that is, to some extent, distinct
from induction proper, the latter being an argument that constitutes a generalization.
Thus, consider,
all dogs have tails / dogs are mammals / all mammals have tails;
which, manifestly, is a generalization (indeed, one too much so) and qualifies as an
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instance of induction. Both of the last two arguments have one thing in common — there
could be alternative conclusions compatible with the truth of the premises (other great
personalities such as my maths tutor that make me feel like an errant child, and, some
mammals not having tails). This is what will, in this book, be taken to be the distinctive
feature of induction. To be sure, an inductive inference does have other features too
that turn out to be relevant in various other contexts. But an inference in which the
conclusion is not a necessary one, and other similarly contingent conclusions are also
possible, defines a class that is of overwhelming prevalence and relevance.
If the problem view identifies inductive inference in what can be termed an objective
manner, distinguishing it clearly from deductive inference, the process view is a subjec-
tive one, and refers to the psychological processes that generate induction. And, in this
process view, the distinction between deduction and induction is not so clear. But, it is
the process view that is of greater relevance when we ask the question as to how people
actually perform inferential acts of an inductive nature. However, there is no single
accepted account of the psychological processes underlying deduction and induction. It
is possible that both types of inference are based on the same kind of processing while,
in contrast, a two-process account is also of considerable explanatory power.
“According to one-process accounts, the same kind of processing underlies both in-
duction and deduction. Another way to describe this idea is that there is essentially
one kind of reasoning, which may be applied to a variety of problems that could be
considered either inductive or deductive in nature ... . In contrast, according to two-
process accounts, there are two distinct kinds of reasoning. It is possible that these
two kinds of reasoning directly correspond to induction and deduction. Alternately,
the two kinds of reasoning might correspond to some other distinction, such as intu-
itive reasoning versus deliberative reasoning that could be related to the distinction
between induction and deduction.” [57].
We will, in this book, be specifically interested in the processes underlying inference
making in general and inductive inference in particular.
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Processes of an inductive nature are commonly found to occur in organisms ranging
from animals to human beings, and are now performed, in various manners and up
to various degrees of complexity, by computer programs as well, where all these taken
together are at times referred to as cognitive systems. However, in speaking of cognitive
systems, I will mostly have human inferential activity in mind while cognitive systems of
other descriptions will be, at times, also referred to.
Imagine that a cognitive system receives certain inputs from the external world and
becomes activated so as to attain a certain goal. Or, it may even be the case that the
‘input’ is generated mostly internally (a child suddenly feeling that she has not seen
her mother for some stretch of time), thereby setting the desired goal (mother has to be
located) or, to put it differently, setting a ‘problem’ to be solved (a husband receiving
a divorce notice and frantically thinking as to how to revive his marriage). It may quite
conceivably be the case that the inputs are not ones that have routinely been received
in the past and that the goal is also not one routinely faced by the cognitive system,
because in the case of routine inputs and routine goals, the system may make use of
certain rules that have been learned in the past in solving the relevant problems, where
these rules are ‘objective’ in the sense that other cognitive systems, similarly endowed,
would also have made use of similar rules.
Inferential activities are set in action when inputs (generated internally or externally, or,
in parts, both internally and externally) make it necessary that a problem (in a general
sense) be solved or some goal be attained. If the inferential process is based on rules
learned in the past that are not specific to the cognitive system under consideration and
that, when applied appropriately, are guaranteed, more or less, to generate a correct
solution to the problem at hand, then one has a case of deductive inference. On the
other hand, if the inputs and the goal have novel elements in them (mother absent for a
long time and everything too quiet all around) then one has to generate a solution all by
oneself, and for this one looks for clues, again, in part from within (from past experience
stored in memory) and in part from the external world (clues, additional information,
overall context). One then generates, implicitly or explicitly, a hypothesis that points
a way to the attainment of the goal (it crying out loudly, and crawling out through the
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door toward the kitchen where mother was found on a previous occasion), a hypothesis
that would differ to a greater or lesser extent from one cognitive system to another and
one that may even lead to a wrong solution to the problem at hand (mother not in the
kitchen).
Evidently, no idealized description is possible in respect of such an inferential process,
which makes a clear distinction between deductive and inductive inference not an easy
thing to achieve. We do have very definite instances of deduction, though, namely, math-
ematical reasoning, based, in the ultimate analysis, on the rules of logic (and, in addition,
on the postulates and rules of set theory). A child is taught the rules of adding numbers,
and she makes use of these rules whenever asked to work on an addition problem. A
friend of hers also makes use of the same rules, and both arrive at the correct solution
to the addition problem. But then, mathematical reasoning tasks can be stupendously
complex and difficult as well, where it is not simply the matter of a sequential appli-
cation of known rules and arriving at the correct answer. Quite frequently, one does
not know which rules to apply in what sequence so as to arrive at the solution of a
mathematical problem, and one has to decide on a course as to which route to follow
in order that the correct solution be found, which needs inspired guessing an essential
component of inductive inference.
“It is most unlikely that more than a tiny minority of mathematical theorems were ever
in fact arrived at, “discovered”, merely by the exercise of deductive reasoning. Most of
them entered the mind by processes of the kind vaguely called “intuitive”; deduction
or logical derivation came later, to justify or falsify what was in the first place an
“inspiration” or an intuitive belief.”, ([88], p 26).
“Many researchers in the field of philosophy, logic, and cognitive science have sus-
tained that deductive reasoning also consists in the employment of logical rules in a
heuristic manner, even maintaining the truth preserving character: the application of
the rules is organized in a way that is able to recommend a particular course of actions
instead of another one.”, ([82], p 48).
George Polya made remarkable contributions to the analysis and understanding of
mathematical reasoning, and stressed upon the role of inductive inference in all kinds
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of creative mathematical thought (recall, from chapter 3, how Polanyi acknowledged
Polyas work on the role of heuristics in mathematical explorations; heuristics have
a great role to play in inductive inference, as we will see later in this chapter, and
in chapter 6). Polya underlined the non-deductive character of creative mathemat-
ical thought by making use of the phrase ‘plausible reasoning’ [98], contrasting it
with ‘demonstrative reasoning’, the latter serving essentially the purpose of justify-
ing the inferences arrived at by plausible reasoning. Plausible reasoning is another
name of informed and inspired guessing. It constitutes a principal component of the
psychological process of discovering mathematical truth. Commonly, a mathematical
proposition is first guessed at and subsequently proved with considerable effort. At
times, the proposition resists all attempts at proof and, at the same time, cannot be
dismissed as being false, a celebrated example of such a proposition being Goldbach's
conjecture.
However, it is always the way that mathematicians and scientists make use of well
defined rules of logic that captures our imagination as the quintessential feature of rea-
soning and inference. It is the set of these rules (along with the postulates and rules
of set theory, forming the secure basis of much of mathematics) that has, in common
perception as also in the perception of philosophers, set the standard or norm of objec-
tive reasoning and inference. The logical school of philosophy of science sets great value
to the logical structure of scientific theories but, in real life, theories are seldom con-
structed in a logically tight structure (Robert Klee, in [73], chapter 2, gives an instance
of how a theory might look when formulated in such a fashion). Instead, scientists
take great pains to ensure that the theories are not inconsistent with known concepts,
results, and evidence of proven worth. In practice, the ideal of objective reasoning follow-
ing the rules of logic constitutes just one extreme end of an enormously wide spectrum
of inferential processes, and only the instances belonging to this extreme endpoint truly
deserve the name of deductive reasoning. In principle, anything within this wide spec-
trum, not coinciding with the endpoint of rigorous deductive reasoning falls within the
ambit of inductive inference, which is why an overwhelmingly large fraction of all real
life inferential activity has to be identified as being inductive in nature.
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The enormous importance of deductive reasoning in everyday experience and in sci-
entific explorations cannot, of course, be underestimated. What has to be scaled up
is our level of acknowledgment of the relevance of inductive inference. Deductive in-
ference is always carried out in the reasoning process of individuals and groups for
justifying hypotheses and inferences arrived at in an inductive manner. However, in-
ductive inference and its justification mostly proceed hand in hand, and the two can
be distinguished only notionally. Speaking in relative terms, pure deduction is rare
indeed.
That the problem view and the process view distinguishing between deductive and in-
ductive inferential activity by cognitive systems do not correspond to each other is
demonstrated by means of psychological experiments where, typically, a psychologist
poses a problem to the subject that, on paper, appears to be one of deductive nature. In
other words, the subject is required to perform an act of deductive reasoning according
to the problem view — one that can be executed by appropriately following and making
use of the rules of logic known to him (the subject). What is commonly observed in such
experiments is something else — the subject works out a ‘solution’ that does not rou-
tinely agree with what the rules of logic would decree, i.e., in other words, the subject
follows a process that does not necessarily correspond to the problem view.
In summary, inductive inference belongs to a wide spectrum of processes, of which
only one extreme corresponds to truly deductive reasoning which is rule-based, the
rules being independent of the particular cognitive system doing the reasoning, and
guaranteeing to produce the correct solution to the problem at hand. The ideal prototype
of deductive reasoning is provided by the rules of logic which, when applied sequentially
along with a number of basic rules of mathematics (those of set theory, to be precise) do
lead the cognitive system to the correct solution.
Deductive reasoning is essentially formal in that, given a set of premises, the rules
operate on these without regard to their content or meaning. In other words, deduction
is syntactic rather than semantic. The latter involves the meaning and relevance of
concepts and propositions in some larger context.
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Inductive inference: contextual, ambiguous, and non-
deductive
Inductive inference is, in contrast to deductive reasoning, context-dependent where the
meaning or the significance of a set of initial premises or inputs is evaluated within a
given context and then a process is initiated that is more or less specific to the cognitive
system doing the inferential act (for instance, the subject of a psychological experiment)
and where the factors — of whatever nature — driving the process are not laid out
with any degree of clarity to be described and interpreted by external cognitive systems
(the psychologist). Inductive inference is fallible and uncertain — where the inductive
process results in a conclusion which is chosen from among possible alternatives within
the relevant context. The ‘choice’ is once again context dependent and may, in fact, turn
out to be an erroneous one when viewed against the goal set out to be arrived at.
Put differently, inductive inference includes a wide spectrum that can be referred to as
non-deductive, where pure deduction corresponds to an extreme end of the spectrum
and is in the nature of an exception. Non-deductive inference is, mostly, of a mixed type
where context-independent rules have some role to play but where, at the same time,
complex context-dependent processes assume relevance (processes, moreover, specifi-
cally dependent on the particular cognitive system under consideration — our ‘system’
of interest being an individual person). The meaning of the term ‘context’ will emerge in
the course of the remainder of this book.
We will, in this book, try to have a look into the type of ‘processes’ that are involved
in the inductive inference of an individual, thereby connecting with the personal aspect
of knowledge that Michael Polanyi spoke of. What is important to take note of here is
that a non-deductive inference, not being rule-driven like a deductive inference, involves
gaps that are not bridged by the application of rules akin to logical ones. The individual
making the inductive inference performs, in a manner of speaking, logical leaps in
crossing these gaps, and it is precisely the necessity of these leaps that results in what
is specific to the individual person making inference, and that engenders the possibility
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of alternative inferences in the process — some other individual would perform the leaps
in some different manner arriving, possibly, at some other conclusion consistent with
the inputs she started from (two experienced physicians, separately examining a patient
meticulously and thoroughly, and then arriving at different diagnoses based on the clinical
symptoms) or, in some case may even fail to effect a crucial leap or two.
Before we proceed, I want to repeat that when we speak of a ‘non-deductive’ inference
in this book, we will refer, in a general way, to an inductive inference (the apparent
circularity in nomenclature notwithstanding). For me, the crucial feature of inductive
inference is the possibility of alternative conclusions consistent with the inputs initiating
the process of inference and the consequent necessity of making one or more choices
that result in some particular conclusion to the exclusion of other possible ones, these
choices not being dictated unambiguously by strict logic. At times, the term induction
is used in the more specific sense of an inference that produces a generalization such
as the following:
the two items that I was served with in this restaurant were delicious / all the items
available in this restaurant must be delicious.
There are, however, other types of non-deductive inference that differ from inductive
generalization, while being intimately related to it.
In the remaining part of this chapter, I will first come back to the question of a workable
definition of induction, along with a brief survey of the taxonomy of induction — what
various different types of inductive processes there are. The latter will serve the pur-
pose of definition by enumeration, and will make for a more focused characterization of
induction, highlighting the overwhelming importance of induction in human cognition
and behavior. I will, in this context, briefly explain the idea of abduction, the formation
of explanatory hypotheses — an inferential process of great relevance in science. While
abduction is considered by some as a special type of induction, with induction defined
in a general sense, others are in favor of looking at abduction and induction as two
distinct, though closely related, cognitive processes (refer to [82], [40], and to chapter 8
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of this book for a detailed examination of the process of abduction). I will then present
a brief introduction to various factors of relevance in explaining the process of induc-
tion, which will subsequently help us address the issue of human rationality. Finally,
I will close this chapter by, emphasizing on the role of intrinsic factors in the inductive
process, and their context-dependence.
Induction: definition, features, and taxonomy
Holland et al ([61], p 1) define induction as a process that “expands knowledge in the
face of uncertainty”. Here ‘knowledge’ means things learnt in the past or, more generally
— and a bit more vaguely — things believed to be true from past experience. And
‘uncertainty’ refers to the fact that the input data, i.e., the facts of current experience
that set the act of inference in motion, are not sufficient to uniquely lead to a conclusion
— the latter being the premise(s) constituting the ‘solution’ to the problem at hand.
Consider once again the imagined experiment with the child who was shown drawings
of geometrical figures of various shapes and sizes and was told as to which ones were
circles, which ones triangles, and which ones squares. These instructions get stored in
her memory as ‘knowledge’ gained from past experience. But note that she was given
only certain examples, and not precise definitions of the various geometrical shapes,
since the terms of the definitions would not be meaningful to her. On then being pre-
sented with an oval-like figure and a triangle-like shape with curved boundaries and
corners, she is found to identify these as a circle and a triangle respectively.
Neither of these identifications could, in the literal sense, be correct, and she could very
well offer a confused response, which would be quite in keeping with the nature of the
problem presented to her. Yet she did respond (with a charmingly majestic confidence)
in each case, and the response did her credit too since she did identify some features
that were common to the drawings previously shown to her and the ones she was asked
to identify. A figure with three curved boundaries and curved corners could conceivably
be identified as circle-like, and the oval-like figure could conceivably be identified as
triangle-like. But the child did come out with identifications in the face of uncertainty
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and, on being told that her identifications were on the right track, the entire process did
expand her knowledge of ‘circle-like’ and ‘triangle-like’ figures. This ‘knowledge’, which
is admittedly not precise, or ‘correct’ in the literal sense, would later provide the context
in which she would learn and make sense of precise definitions of a circle and a triangle,
but the ideas of ‘circle-like’ and ‘triangle-like’ would continue to stand for valid ones for
her, along with many more instances that she would doubtless come across in course
of time.
The noted psychologist, Philip Johnson-Laird has had the following revealing comment
to make on induction ([68], p 169):
“In fact, much of our reasoning is inductive and outside the scope of logic. Our conclu-
sions may be true, but even with true premises no guarantee can exist for their truth,
because induction is fallible. I mentioned .... that textbooks often define induction as
reasoning from the particular to the general. But ... the definition isn’t quite right.
We can make inductions that make particular conclusions. And so I defended this
working definition: inductions go beyond the information given, and rule out more
possibilities than their premises do. That is their hallmark.”
In this paragraph, Johnson-laird refuses to define induction simply as an inferential
process resulting in a generalization since inductive inference, at times, my involve the
identification of a particular member as belonging to a certain class (identifying a face
on having been given a number of characteristic features such as blue eyes, thick lips,
and a sharp nose), or processes of other descriptions as well. On the contrary, what
he sees as the hallmark of induction is that it leads to conclusions (or actions based
on conclusions generated internally, as in decision making) that do not necessarily
follow from the premises, conclusions consistent with those premises, but ones arrived
at after ruling out some possible alternatives. This, in other words, involves a choice,
where the choice is not determined by the premises alone, but is arrived at by means
of a ‘leap’ across a void left open by the fact that the premises do not provide any key
as they do in a deductive inference where the subject moves through a succession of
intermediate stages by following a set of well defined rules (recall those uneasy days
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when your maths tutor tried to drive home to you the derivation of those abominable
theorems of Euclids). We will return later to the question of how the choice is made,
what the process of making an inductive inference consists of. What is of relevance now
is to have a feel of what is involved in induction an idea, even if a vague one, of the
‘hallmark’ of induction, as Johnson-Laird puts it.
Another way to highlight the basic features of induction is to say that induction in-
creases the semantic information in the premises, where the term ‘semantic’ refers to
the meaning residing in the premises within the context in which the inferential activity
takes place, and ‘information’ to the extent to which possible alternatives are ruled out
in making that meaning more concrete, i.e., in seeking to add something to the mean-
ing. For instance, when we are given clues for identifying a face (blue eyes, thick lips,
sharp nose) and we do identify a particular face on the basis of those clues, the terms
like ‘thick lips’ and ‘sharp nose’ receive an added texture of meaning (in virtue of the
specific identification), and information is gained in that other similar faces are ruled
out in making the choice (thick lips all right, but eyes not so blue, and nose a bit bent).
Here is another instance of how information is gained by the ruling out of alternatives:
if there are five students in a class then the knowledge that a drawing has been done
by one particular student carries some information; but if there are ten students, then
the same piece of knowledge carries more information because it eliminates nine pos-
sibilities while in the former case the name eliminates only four possibilities. Here the
gain in semantic information (carried by the name of one particular student among all
the students in the class — one who did the drawing) increases as more possibilities are
ruled out.
Based on these ideas relating to the basic features of inductive inference, the following
may be identified as a few of the more conspicuous types of induction that we routinely
undertake in our everyday activities as also in higher cognitive activities such as read-
ing and interpreting a highly contentious essay on the international political situation,
getting to the bottom of a sublime piece of poetry, or working through the steps of a
complex experiment in the chemistry lab.
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1. Generalization. This is the most common type of inductive inference men-
tioned in texts. Suppose you have come across a number of objects of a
certain type, all sharing a common characteristic. You then infer that all ob-
jects of that type share that same characteristic. For instance, on examining
a number of items in a vegetable shop newly set up in your locality, you find
those to be not of good quality. You then warn your friend that the shop is
not to be patronized since it sells vegetables of inferior quality.
2. Category formation. A child is shown a particular car for the first time in
her life and is told that the object is a car. On then looking at another car
she immediately shouts in joy that she has seen another car. In this case,
the child has picked out on certain features of the object that was identified
as a car to her — features that appeared to be salient to her senses (for
instance, the wheels), and ignored other features that did not appear to be
as remarkable. On next looking at an object that possesses those salient
features, she blurts out that it is a car, thereby arriving at the suggestion of
a category — that of cars, even though there are, in fact, a thousand and
one differences in particular features of the two cars that she has seen. A
related activity is that of identifying subdivisions within a known category.
For instance, on being told of certain characteristic features of two breeds of
dogs, and then seeing a dog across the street, a child correctly identifies its
breed. Here she focuses on the distinguishing features of the dog in question
from the features of the other breed as told to her, and ignores the similarities,
perhaps less salient to her (in the context of identifying the breed), with the
latter.
3. Analogical reasoning. A nineteenth century scientist, on experimenting
with the signals emitted by a radio transmitter, has a sudden feeling that the
signals have certain similarities with light rays. Subsequently, optical sig-
nals and radio signals are identified as two types of electromagnetic waves,
belonging to two different ranges of wavelength. Identifying analogies across
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apparently unrelated categories is an inferential act of remarkable relevance
in everyday activities as also in scientific discovery, engendering the possibil-
ity of a supremely creative act.
4. Making judgments and decisions. As an examiner in an essay competition,
you are at a loss while judging the relative merits of two particular students.
While one of the two is endowed with a decidedly better literary flair, the
depth of understanding of the other one is really remarkable. Which of the two
would you judge to be the more deserving candidate to receive the first prize in
the competition? You are at a loss because the two qualities — one of literary
flair and other of depth of understanding — are disparate ones. The judgment
that you finally make is crucially dependent on values specific to you and not
determined solely by features or qualities of the two essays in question. Some
other examiner could very well have made a different judgment, in which case
the prize would go to the other candidate.
Decision making is another type of inductive activity closely related to making
a judgement.
“In order to decide, judge; in order to judge, reason; in order to
reason, decide [how reason]” [69].
While teaching a class of teenagers, you have a feeling that one particular
student has a behavioral issue. You observe her keenly for as long as one
month, comparing her traits with those of her class-mates, and find yourself
in two minds as to what course to adopt regarding the child. Finally, you
call up her parents and suggest that they consult expert counsel, even as you
have the nagging doubt that the child may, after all, be having no problem at
all, being just different from the rest. Your decision rests on your judgment
that the child is not simply different from the rest, but is having some kind of
a problem in her social interactions.
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5. Abduction. Abduction is the inferential process of making hypotheses
that have an explanatory power and is of great relevance in, among other
things, scientific thinking. Science seeks to explain, to build new concepts
and theories that expand existing theoretical frameworks, when the latter fail
to explain facts of observation or to make a coherent whole of the facts and
individual concepts making up the framework. At times, auxiliary concepts
and theories are postulated as adjuncts to an existing theoretical framework
so as to consistently accommodate known facts and available concepts within
it, without substantial alteration of the latter. Once in a while, an entirely
novel hypothesis is put forward that subsequently transforms an entire con-
ceptual framework. In all this, the scientist makes a conjecture, in the nature
of a logical leap that subsequently passes through a process of appraisal,
partly in the unconscious mind of the scientist herself, partly in a deliberate
experimental and logical process of appraisal undertaken by her and then, in
the remaining part, through the experimental and theoretical scrutiny of her
peers in the scientific community.
Charles Sanders Peirce, the American philosopher, is credited with a substan-
tial analysis of the abductional process of inference. Peirce's ideas on abduc-
tion were formulated in stages, where, in the early stages Peirce was mainly
concerned with the syllogistic theory of abduction — a theory of looking for
one or more ‘missing premises’ in a logical argument where the conclusions
are known in part or in whole in the form of puzzling statements or observa-
tions that the current body of knowledge (again, in the form of a number of
premises) fails to lead to. Abduction, in this view, is ‘reasoning in reverse’,
which implies that the premises arrived at by abduction are of uncertain va-
lidity since the relation of logical implication is not a reversible or reflective
one (‘A implies B’ does not imply ‘B implies A’). Related to this view is the sub-
sequent idea of Peirces where he advanced the inferential theory of abduction,
in which “abduction represents the hypothesis generation part of explanatory
reasoning” ([40], p5).
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Peirce distinguished between induction and abduction while, at the same
time, leaving the door open for subsuming both under a broader descrip-
tion of non-deductive reasoning. Lorenzo Magnani points out that a pervasive
view in philosophy, of the process of hypothesis generation, looks at it as one
that is “paradoxical, either illusory or obscure, implicit, and not analyzable”
([82], p 1; see also p 21, 27 where the term ‘retroduction’ has been introduced,
in the same sense as ‘abduction’). It may be noted, however, that certain in-
stances of induction and abduction have been generated in artificial cognitive
systems (see [40], [82]).
The process of abduction will be taken up at greater length in chapter 8.
6. Providing support and confirmation, in a limited sense, to generalizations
and hypotheses from observed facts. This brand of induction has evidently a
considerable overlap with induction as the inferential process of generaliza-
tion, but is possessed of a distinct aspect as well, where facts of observation
are made use of in inferring the validity of hypotheses and theories. Indeed,
induction has been looked at in the philosophy of science as providing the
logic of confirmation of scientific hypotheses and theories, which, in a sense,
is antithetical to the view that induction is an inferential process of an essen-
tially non-logical and fallible nature. I will have more to say on this by way
of explanation in paragraphs below, where it will be seen that the program,
in the philosophy of science, of looking at induction as a logic of confirmation
did not quite meet with success, and induction was instead accepted as an
inferential process that can provide support, in a limited sense, to hypothe-
ses and theories. This role, however, is distinct from abduction, which is the
process of generation of hypotheses.
Now that we have some idea as to the defining features of induction as non-deductive
inference, and to a number of types of induction, where the latter includes the process of
abduction — an inferential process of great relevance in science — I will raise a number
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of issues that will set the stage for subsequent chapters of this book. However, before
I do that I must mention that induction, as outlined above, covers almost the entire
range of mental activities in human cognition, where cognition, broadly speaking, refers
to the aspect of information processing in the human mind, such processing being, in
general, in the nature of a sequential activity that may or may not be a well defined
or explicit one. Cognition, in other words, may involve a sporadic succession of steps
rather than a clearly defined sequence based on definite rules, where the steps may
be interlaced with tangled heaps of branches, possibly having unconscious moorings.
While ‘cognition’ is a term having a broad coverage, ‘induction’ is one with a slightly
more specific connotation — that of being an inferential activity in relation to a goal or
purpose, set in motion by inputs from without or within. Induction, indeed, draws upon
almost all mental processes associated with cognition and, conversely, is involved in
some form or other in almost all such processes.
Before I proceed, I briefly deal, in the next section, with the question of whether and to
what extent induction can provide us with a logic of confirmation, because this issue
has been the cause of a vast body of work and polemics in the philosophy of science.
Summarily stated, the very fallibility inherent in the inductive process goes against the
possibility of induction providing a secure foundation for the confirmation of scientific
hypotheses.
Can induction constitute a logic of confirmation?
At the outset, I have to tell you that the terms ‘induction’, ‘inductive logic’, and ‘induc-
tivism’ are used in two different contexts that, paradoxically, are of contrary significance,
at least on the face of it. As I have indicated above, a number of philosophers of science
have used these terms to look for and to describe a logic of confirmation of explanatory
hypotheses, hoping that induction may thus be given a place analogous to deductive
logic, especially in scientific explorations. In scientific inquiry, people continually make
hypotheses to explain numerous facts of observation where the psychological process of
arriving at these hypotheses is obscure, to say the least. However, taking for granted one
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or more such hypotheses in the context of a set of observed facts, can one find a logic
whereby one particular hypothesis, which may be made up of a number of concepts,
and which may assume the form of a theory, is confirmed by these facts in preference to
other possible, alternative hypotheses? If so, then this logic of confirmation of hypothe-
ses from an analysis, scrutiny, and collation of facts of observation can be given the
name of ‘inductive logic’, which will then constitute the standard or norm for testing and
comparing scientific hypotheses and theories in an objective and impersonal manner.
It is important to note that such a purported norm has to be objective, or rational, in the
dual sense of being impersonal, i.e., free of the vagaries of the psychology of individuals,
and of being capable of pointing out the true significance of observed facts relating to
actual properties or qualities of natural objects.
As opposed to such a logic of confirmation, the term ‘inductive inference’ will be used in
this book to stand for the inferential process of arriving at generalizations, hypotheses,
and fallible conclusions that do not, in general, conform to desired norms of objectivity
and rationality. On the one hand, these are in the nature of interpretations of qualities,
properties, and correlations existing in natural objects while, on the other, the process
of generation of these interpretations may have deeply entrenched roots in the minds of
individuals.
Ladyman ([78], sections 1.3, 1.4) refers to two senses in which the term induction can
be used when he speaks of the ‘new tool’ (Novum Organum) of induction proposed by
Francis Bacon on the eve of the scientific revolution in the western world:
“Induction in the broadest sense is just any form of reasoning that is not
deductive, but in the narrower sense that Bacon uses it, it is the form of
reasoning where we generalize from a whole collection of particular instances
to a general conclusion”.
Here the ‘narrower’ of the two senses points to the approach of looking at induction as
providing a possible logic of confirmation of theories from facts of observation. However,
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as I have mentioned above, the support that induction can provide to a hypothesis or a
theory can at best be a limited one because of the inherent fallibility of inductive gen-
eralization which is essentially an interpretation of observed facts rather than a logical
confirmation of a hypothesis on the basis of those facts. On the one hand, philosophers
would like to see induction as providing a rational norm for effecting an expansion of
knowledge in an inferential process where one reaches beyond the premises that one
starts from while, on the other, a psychological examination of the process of inductive
inference fails to identify such normative and rational hallmarks in induction.
The proposed use of the term ‘induction’ in the sense a logic of confirmation did not
quite find a secure ground for itself, even when its intended meaning is broadened
to include probabilistic confirmation, where a set of observed facts is made use of to
infer whether the validity of some particular hypothesis or theory is more probable than
that of others (refer to [78], chapter 2, [46], chapter 2, chapter 14 ). David Hume, for
one, successfully propounded the view that there is ground for profound skepticism to
induction as the logic of confirmation, and that inductive inference really has no ‘logic’
of the same standing as deductive logic. In other words, induction, properly speaking,
is a non-deductive mode of inference that does not conform to standards of objectivity.
There are, however, subtleties here. Once one accepts that there is no justification in
using induction as a logic of confirmation ([78], chapter 2) endowed with the credentials
of objectivity, one is led to looking at induction as non-deductive inference in a broad
sense, as pointed out by Ladyman. And, as I have indicated above, within this broad
connotation, there exists room for the view that induction, in a narrower sense, does
have a role to play in the acceptance, if not in the confirmation, of hypotheses and
theories. Suppose we have a theory A that is consistent with a set of observed facts
and with proposition(s) deriving from some other hypotheses that have been justified on
more or less secure grounds (there is, of course, no absolute justification for anything).
One then does use this as a ground for acceptance of the theory A, at least provisionally.
This is the sense in which one agrees with what Ladyman means when he speaks of
the term ‘induction’ as having two different connotations one broader and the other
narrower.
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Indeed, there exist different points of view regarding the possible role of induction as
providing, in a sense, a logic of confirmation of hypotheses that are now centered around
the search for a probabilistic justification of induction. The latter is a refined and attrac-
tive version of the earlier, relatively naive, view that a painstaking program of collection
and examination of facts of observation in a given domain of discourse enables one to
choose a hypothesis that provides the best explanation of the facts and, if the process of
referral to facts is carried forward appropriately, can even provide a ground for confir-
mation of that hypothesis. There can be found an extensive literature on the Bayesian
theory [46], [116] of justifying an inductive inference, one that is supposed to promise
normative appraisal of such inferences, analogous, in some sense, to the normative role
of deductive logic in respect of inferential reasoning acts belonging to a certain class
well known in exact sciences (indeed, all mathematical derivations may be said to be-
long to this class). The Bayesian theory has found applications in artificial intelligence
where particular tasks are carried out having features common with human inductive
inference. This raises the question as to whether there is a probabilistic basis of human
reasoning and inferential processes in general, and how far this can provide the ground
of a rational appraisal of an inferential act. This we will briefly come back to in a later
section in this book (refer to chapter 7, section entitled The rationality issue: a brief
overview).
Induction: questions and issues
With this much of an introduction to the idea of inductive inference, I will now raise,
as promised, a number of issues that will enable us to gain a deeper understanding of
induction — what it stands for and how it is to be viewed in a broader perspective of
reasoning and inference making in the context of human cognition in general. Some of
these can be looked upon as pointers to a theory of induction where aspects of human
cognition are examined and analyzed, telling us how induction can possibly be realized
in the human mind. A number of these issues will be addressed in greater details in
subsequent chapters of this book.
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The term ‘theory’ in the field of cognitive science does not carry quite the same conno-
tation as that applying to theories of physics or chemistry since theories in cognitive
science are relatively more speculative and vague, serving only to provide us with
plausible explanations or viewpoints in respect of this or that area of cognitive activ-
ity. Controlled experiments of substantial significance are rare, and definitive con-
clusions from experimental observations are equally rare — at times providing almost
comparable support to alternative and competing theories. Indeed, these ‘theories’
are themselves in the nature of inductive inferences with quite wide gaps remaining
in their structural and logical organization and in their relation to facts of observa-
tion. Still, these theories of human reasoning and cognition are useful and valuable
pointers — ones at the cross-road of science and philosophy — towards an under-
standing of human cognition in general, and inductive inference in particular. From
the philosophical point of view, theories of induction, sought to be arrived at from the
experimental and theoretical base of psychology, provides an instance of the natural-
istic approach in philosophy. This approach is likely to give us new insights relating to
traditional problems on epistemology, to which analytic philosophy does not provide
satisfactory answers since it adopts a contemplative approach rather than looking at
how exactly we come to possess our beliefs and our knowledge about the world.
Here is a warning. In the following sections in this chapter, I will place before you a
number of observations and statements some of which, especially those in the section
highlighting on beliefs and emotions do not enjoy direct support in the cognitive science
literature (the same goes for parts of chapters 6 and 7). But, at the same time that
I warn you on this, I also want to assure you that these are not inconsistent with
the literature either. I look at these as plausible ones — I wouldn’t know if you will
agree with me. I put these here nevertheless as indicative of a possible framework for
having a good understanding of the process of inductive inference which is, as of now,
a baffling one indeed. Here I go.
Unconscious cognition
The first issue I want to raise is that of tacit cognition and the role of the unconscious
in human cognition. The realization that unconscious processes play an all-pervasive
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role in human cognition is a relatively recent one. Of course, the unconscious has been
looked upon for centuries as a playground of mystical and dark forces rampaging in
the human mind, but has mostly been confined to folklore, poetry, art, contemplative
philosophy, and literary imagination, without a disciplined investigation into its role in
cognition. It took center stage in the science of psychology in Freudian investigations
into the human mind, but then got eclipsed as Freudian psychology itself fell from grace
in the academics and the viewpoint of behaviorism attained a position of dominance,
when even the word ‘unconscious’ was anathema in academic psychology. The uncon-
scious once again found a place of its own by the mid-eighties of the last century in
the shape of a cognitive unconscious which differs somewhat from the Freudian un-
conscious, though one cannot rule out the possibility of an appreciable overlap and a
correlation between the two (see, for instance, [126], [16]).
Beginning from the late nineteen sixties, several streams of investigation became visible
in cognitive psychology, with their orientation towards the cognitive unconscious. These
investigations, while maintaining their distance from the psychoanalytic unconscious,
quickly broadened in scope and richness.
Mankind has wondered about intuition — intelligence residing in the unconscious — for
ages. The great physicist and philosopher Helmholtz highlighted the role of unconscious
inferential processes in visual perception ([68], p52; see [103], p15, for references to
early speculation on the cognitive unconscious) and of intuition in scientific creativity,
citing the case of Michael Faraday as a prime example of the workings of the intuition
([11], p 36). The notion of an unconscious reasoning mechanism distinct from the de-
liberative reasoning capacity of the human mind, such as the capacity for mathematical
reasoning, was put forward by the philosopher-scientist Pascal ([68], p 53) — a notion
that anticipates the more recent dual-process theories of reasoning that we will have a
look at later in chapter 7 of this book. And a good number of scientists, mathemati-
cians, and poets, while introspecting about the source of their inspiration in creative
contributions, have wondered about their own unconscious capacities.
As for the relatively recent resurgence of interest in unconscious cognitive mechanisms,
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I am inclined to trace it back to the seminal contribution of Michael Polanyi who ex-
pounded on tacit knowledge as a separate storehouse of cognitive skills and abilities
in the human mind (“a wholly explicit knowledge is unthinkable”; quoted in [23], p1).
Polanyis ideas acted as a major inspiration for Arthur Reber who was among the first
to systematically take up the study of these unconscious abilities in the course of the-
oretical and experimental investigations in cognitive psychology, and who was followed
in quick succession by other pioneers, including Axel Cleeremans and John Kihlstrom
who brought insight and diversity into the field. These investigations soon grew into a
major activity, and terms like ‘implicit learning’, ‘tacit knowledge’, and the ‘cognitive un-
conscious’ soon gained wide currency, bringing to the fore the relevance and importance
of unconscious cognition, which essentially relates to processes of acquisition, storage,
retrieval, and manipulation of concepts, many of which are possibly of an atomic or el-
ementary nature, without conscious intent, effort, or awareness: “the process by which
knowledge about the rule-governed complexities of the stimulus environment are ac-
quired independently of conscious attempts to do so” (Reber, quoted in [21], preface).
Today, the investigations in unconscious cognitive activity cover a wider and much more
diverse area compared to early days ([74], [56]) though, by the very nature of things,
these involve a measure of speculative and indirect inquiry distinguishing it from other
areas of scientific activity.
Though the range and variety of unconscious cognitive processes is thought to be enor-
mously broad, we will be more specifically concerned with processes relating to inductive
inference and to abduction (which is, broadly speaking, a type of induction, or at least
a close cousin of it) where, in the context of the latter, we will be having a brief look at
the process of creative thinking.
With more and more attention focusing on the cognitive unconscious, the question of
rationality in human cognition and inferential activity has assumed great relevance.
The ‘logic’ of the unconscious, whatever it is, is not the logic that we have a tendency
to ascribe to the human mind. Are there identifiable principles governing the workings
of the unconscious that we can hope to discover in days to come, when we will gain
understanding of what now appears to be a pervasive lack of rationality in human rea-
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soning and inference making? This question is, to a considerable degree, co-extensive
with that of how inductive inference is carried out in the human mind, or, how exactly
the guessing game of induction is played out.
Unconscious cognition will constitute the topic of chapter 5.
Induction: the role of heuristics
As we have seen, induction is essentially a guessing game, though one that is likely
to have an underlying ‘logic’ not known to us. We need to guess in most situations
in life where strict reasoning is either too difficult, too time consuming, or not in the
realm of possibility due to paucity of information. Indeed, even when sound deductive
reasoning is possible, we do not commonly make use of deductive rules in a consistent
manner because, simply stated, inductive inference is our ‘second nature’. We guess
because our inference-making is intrinsically opportunistic in character and has no in-
built loyalty to quality or rigor of the reasoning process — what is more important than
sound logic is effectiveness. This is a trait we have, perhaps, inherited in the course of
our evolutionary history, and one that, moreover, manifests itself to various degrees in
the developmental history of individuals.
One factor of great relevance in this guessing game is the use of heuristics. Heuristics
are produced as partial and ready-made clues to the solution of a ‘problem’ that a
cognitive system may happen to face (like, for instance, a baby trying to seek out her
mother — mother likely to be found in the kitchen, or a chess player trying to find a good
move at a critical juncture in a game — grab the queen), clues that are themselves in
the nature of guesses, not usually arrived at by solid reasoning. For a person engaged
in making an inductive inference, the heuristics help her along to reach a conclusion
by making logical leaps, i.e., by making guesses. It is by making a judicious use of
these partial solutions, or partial guesses, that the person climbs up, so to speak, an
inferential staircase where, at each step, she makes use of heuristics activated at some
lower level, so as to land on a higher level of her upward journey, finally arriving at
the top. We are all familiar with ‘hunches’ or ‘gut feelings’ that help us to navigate in
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uncertain and demanding situations, often propelling us towards a satisfactory solution
to the problem at hand but, at times, leading us astray too.
Heuristics are used not only in inductive inferences but in deductive ones too where
these appear, in a manner of speaking, as small ‘packets’ of truth residing in the
cognitive mind from innumerable cues picked up from past experience, that find their
use in making ‘fast and frugal’ inferences without, however, the attendant risk of
making the inference fallible. In this context, see [104].
There exists an extensive literature of relatively recent origin on the issue of whether
heuristics constitute a useful and essential means in our inferential activity, or are
defects in our reasoning process, producing biases that make the reasoning deviate
from norms of rationality. Do the heuristics constitute a ‘fast and frugal’ method in
inference making, or are these, predominantly, possessed of a nuisance value in the
context of the reasoning process?
It seems that at least some part of the debate over this issue is an exchange at cross
purposes. Heuristics are indeed a great help in the pursuit of inductive inference while,
at the same time, they constitute the source of fallibility in the inferential process which
is seldom carried out by following explicitly formulated reasoning steps based on clearly
formulated specific rules. The difference in the two points of view stems from a basic
issue, namely, whether it makes sense to speak of normative standards of rationality
in human reasoning, especially in inductive inference. The point of view that heuris-
tics constitute an essential, if fallible, ingredient in inductive inference, rests on the
recognition that, when one looks closely at the inferential process, one finds that, on
the one hand, the course of inference includes segments or stretches that appear to be
rule-driven and rational while, on the other, these stretches are interspersed with gaps
that cannot be negotiated with such well-defined rules. In other words, normative stan-
dards cannot be set for the inferential process as a whole which contains gaps where,
precisely, the heuristics come in.
We, in everyday interactions with our social and natural environment, incessantly keep
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on using heuristics of various descriptions — don’t put all your eggs in the same basket
(quite reasonable, but not a guarantee of success), bribery always works (highly fallible,
but still useful at times), old is gold (doubtful), once you have decided on a course of
action, never deviate from it (headstrong) — all these are instances of heuristics that
may help us take good and effective decisions in matters personal and social, though
each is a half-baked belief, and may not work in a crunch situation. However, we often
do make use of unproven beliefs like these in making judgments and decisions, and
what is more, we are, at times, aware of which of our beliefs we are invoking and what
judgments or decisions we are making. These are heuristics operating in the conscious
domain. More importantly, heuristics may operate in the unconscious domain too. The
unconscious mind is an ever-active system where elementary beliefs and concepts are
born and continue to be operative, as participants of processes of an elementary nature,
associating with other similar beliefs and rudimentary concepts, forming heuristics of a
relatively more complex structure, and thus setting into motion a hierarchical process
where heuristics act in conjunction with one another at various levels. It may so happen
that this entire hierarchical process remains entirely confined within the unconscious
mind, getting expressed in subtle ways in our behavior. Or again, it may surface into
awareness where it may end up being part of conscious reasoning. In his widely read
book ‘Gut Feelings’ [44], Gerd Gigerenzer speaks of heuristics appearing as hunches
and gut feelings that dominate much of our reasoning and decision making, and calls
these ‘the intelligence of the unconscious’.
The gaze heuristic has been discussed to some considerable extent in the literature (see
[44]; in this context see also [93] for a criticism of the idea of the gaze heuristic being
an intuitive mechanism of a simple description). A fielder in a cricket match runs a
big distance to catch a powerfully hit ball that makes a trajectory in the air. One can,
in principle, work out the trajectory of the ball with mathematical precision provided
that one has access to a great deal of data of a very intricate nature. But the fielder
is no mathematician and has no computer at hand to get the calculations done — he,
as a matter of fact, doesn’t have the faintest idea as to what those calculations might
be. But still, he makes the chase and eventually succeeds in taking the difficult catch.
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This he does by the simple expedient of fixing his gaze on the ball and keeping his line
of vision fixed with respect to his body. Does he do it with conscious intent, knowing
whether and how such a tactic should work? Indeed, even if he is made aware of the
trick by some colleague of his, much of his actual mental and motor activity occurs
in the unconscious domain, involving a lot of processing, a massive use of cues, an
equally massive aggregate of implicitly learnt lessons that have no more claim to truth
than, perhaps, some success in the past, and a hierarchy of unconscious decisions, one
feeding the next. Overall, the gaze heuristic seems to be partly unconscious and partly
conscious.
A heuristic is a kind of belief, of an elementary nature or, maybe, of a more complex
type (when you are in the end game, play the king). It is some kind of a rule, a rule
of thumb, that tells us how to proceed to an eventual inference or decision in a given
context, where the context itself is, generally speaking, a greatly complex one if we try to
get down to describe it in the minutest of details, so much so that an actual description
of it may be a task that is computationally intractable. But the heuristic guides us
nevertheless, drawing from the context and pointing the way to a judgment, a decision,
or an action. And, inductive inferences typically involve a hierarchy of judgments and
decisions (‘actions’, in the general sense of the term). The success, as also the fallibility,
of induction rests on the fact that it typically proceeds through a maze of beliefs.
The role of heuristics in inference making — especially in inductive inference — will be
repeatedly referred to in this book, especially in chapter 6, where it will be addressed in
greater details (see this section, and this too).
Induction: beliefs emotions and affects
Beliefs form a great and complex web in the mind of a person. Many of the beliefs hang
together with other beliefs in the web, one set of beliefs supporting and often reinforcing
another, while some others are less coherent and may even be outright inconsistent
when judged against many other beliefs in the web. In other words, one harbors within
one's mind a belief system with a rich, interconnected, and often strange or curious
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structure where there results a complex and dynamic pattern of tensions, pulls and
pushes among the various components of that structure.
What is more, beliefs are sheltered in the unconscious mind where they reside and
interact with other small and large beliefs of various descriptions, defying basic norms
of rationality to a great extent.
“The vast majority of beliefs, however, are not likely to be conscious or reportable, but
instead simply taken as granted without reflection or awareness. Such beliefs may be
inferred from a subject's behavior, but otherwise remain unconscious and enacted [in]
largely involuntary [manner].”, [24].
A mother believes one of her two children to be more intelligent than the other, based,
perhaps, on a single long-forgotten incident in the past and refuses stubbornly to heed
to more recent evidence to the contrary while, at the same time, never letting go of even
a tiny piece of ‘evidence’ in favor of her own belief. Perhaps, too, her belief finds support
from some other beliefs hiding in her subconscious mind, relating to bodily features
(blue eyes, sharp nose) that she takes to be indicative of intelligence. Not that she is
happy in her belief — on the contrary, she may be relatively more loving to the child
she takes to be weaker in the mind. Many of one's beliefs one is aware of are in the
conscious mind only to some extent, being entrenched within the unconscious like the
submerged portion of an iceberg.
There has been a lot of philosophical work on how belief compares with knowledge and,
to what extent beliefs can be said to be true or false. Knowledge is supposed to be justi-
fied true belief, but questions of justification and truth are notoriously problematic ones.
We will adopt here the ‘commonsense’ or the ‘folk psychological’ view of belief, truth, and
knowledge, in which truth is seen not as an absolute but a context-dependent concept,
and knowledge is seen as belief that has been accepted as true in a given context. Beliefs
are constantly in a state of dynamic tension where these are confronted with new facts
of observation, and with requirements of consistency and coherence with regard to one
another. Some of the beliefs entertained by an individual or a community are shielded,
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in a relative sense, from ongoing processes of confirmation and justification, and are
held as sacred, once again in a relative sense. Others do not enjoy a similar degree of
shielding and are subjected to processes of justification, correction and revision.
Depending on the degree of effort expended towards the justification of a belief in terms
of consistency with other beliefs and of facts of observation, these can be imagined to
be arranged in a scale where, at one end of the scale are the beliefs that are protected
and guarded most zealously while at the other are those beliefs that are checked and
counter-checked conscientiously, and are eventually accepted as ‘knowledge’. The ones
that are certified as knowledge are then spared further efforts at justification till there
takes place a change of context where new yardsticks of justification and confirmation
make their appearance so that a big chunk in the erstwhile web of beliefs undergoes a
surgical operation and a new set of beliefs gain the certification of knowledge.
Looking at the set of beliefs that are not confirmed or justified as knowledge in a given
context, some are actively defended against justification and count as dogma (beliefs
that have gained the status of knowledge also constitute dogma, but in a different sense)
while others are not so defended, and are in the nature of ‘informed guesses’.
In other words, we have, roughly speaking, three sets of beliefs — the ones that are
frozen into dogma, others that are in the nature of informed guesses and are subject
to processes of confirmation and justification and, finally, those that have gained the
status of knowledge. However, this is only a very partial description of the web of belief,
to which one has to add the other aspect, namely, that of the depth of a belief. This
relates to whether the belief, with all its associated psychological components, resides
principally in the conscious mind or whether it has unconscious moorings, due to which
it acquires a distinct significance.
Complementary to this structural view of the web of beliefs, is the functional view that
informs us of the roles that the various beliefs play in the great laboratory of the mind.
Stated briefly, our set of beliefs provides us with an exhaustive map to help us navigate
in a highly complex, confusing, difficult, and uncertain world (or, in a world which, in
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some sense, is perceived to be such). But the map is a very tentative one, made up in a
long series of guesses, trials and errors during which it is put through an innumerable
succession of small and big tests. It is corrected and patched up from time to time, and
has been found to be reliable in respect of only a few landmarks (and that too, barring
earthquakes!). As to the rest of its vast collection of indications, warnings and flagpoles,
they are not reliable, but these are all that we have. We navigate with their help, we
fail, we make a patchwork of improvement here and an improvement there which we
are ourselves not sure of and, in the midst of all this, we succeed in making a number
of good landings, some of those breathtakingly good. This process of navigation involves
the making of deductive and inductive inferences — on the one hand, making good use
of the map and, on the other, making continual revisions in the map itself.
The functional aspect of beliefs includes a psychological one wherein these make each
of us face the world (and ourselves too!) as a unique individual, equipped with a unique
collection of psychological traits — an infinite number of finely tuned defenses, stances,
approaches, conflicts, weaknesses, and strengths. And it is here that beliefs and their
complex dynamics are linked with emotions, affects, feelings, and moods — a number
of factors that are, in small or large part, rooted in our physiology. This makes beliefs
essentially connected with and woven into a vastly more complex psychosomatic system
that is, in a large measure, beyond our conscious control, at least in the short run. The
logic of inductive inference, if there is one, is to be sought by looking into this exquisitely
complex arena where the drama of cognition unfolds.
While speaking of the role of beliefs in providing meanings and explanations to ideas
and events, Connors and Halligan, in their valuable paper on a cognitive account of
belief [24], make the following observation:
“Given that any search for meaning will largely depend on pre-existing beliefs and
knowledge, the outcome is likely to be highly personal and idiosyncratic. Overarch-
ing narratives that are implicit in subjects’ pre-existing beliefs may be particularly
influential in determining the outcome of the search. In addition, subjects may adopt
particular attributional styles — habitual tendencies to explain events in certain ways
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..... — whilst also relying on heuristics to save on cognitive effort .... Subjects’ emotion
and mood may also be relevant influences at this stage. Explanations may be selected
because they are congruent with a prevailing emotion or dominant mood. Anxiety, for
example, may foster explanations involving threat or danger, whereas happiness might
prompt more benign explanations. Alternatively, explanations may be selected based
on their affective consequences ...... . Explanations, for example, that offer certainty
and comfort or maintain self-esteem and internal consistency are more likely to be
selected over other explanations that do not provide these benefits, providing they are
sufficiently plausible and can be rationalized. Motivation and emotion may constitute
a particularly powerful determinant of evaluative beliefs ..... ”.
Within the spectrum of loosely and solidly grounded beliefs are to be found — the heuris-
tics (refer to the above paragraph from [24]. These are beliefs (guess-works, really) that
are especially active in cognition or — to be more specific — in inductive inference and,
like all other beliefs, are themselves the product of an ongoing process of cognitive infer-
ence — at times goal-directed and at times apparently without identifiable goals. Once
formed, these are used as building blocks for further inferential activity, a good part of
which is inductive and goal-directed in nature. It is in this sense that inductive infer-
ence can be said to be a hierarchical process — one stage of inference feeding into the
next, where smaller guesses are made use of in making up broader guesses, and where
there takes place a concomitant process of verification, confirmation, and justification
all along, the latter being an equally fine-tuned and fantastic one, giving the process of
inductive inference a unique flavor and efficacy.
And, much of this continuing process of guessing and verifying goes on within the un-
conscious mind, with the involvement of emotions, affects and feelings. While a huge
store of heuristics of innumerable descriptions supplies the building blocks for induc-
tive inference, these heuristics, considered all by themselves, are still not sufficient for
explaining the basic act of guessing because of the fundamental fact that guessing in-
volves a decision by means of which a choice is made between available alternatives.
This is where the context comes in, in the form of background knowledge (prior expe-
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rience, beliefs, heuristics, unconsciously stored cues), which fundamentally constrains
the inductive process, providing a relatively small number of alternatives to choose
from, and then arises the really crucial step — choosing from among these alternatives.
Background knowledge is not of direct help here, because what one needs to compare in
order to choose are disparate entities, with qualities that cannot be reduced to a common
denominator.
You have to choose between two students, one of whom has a great literary flair, and
the other a remarkable depth of comprehension, there being no other academic crite-
rion that can help you fix your choice. You are at a loss what to decide. There is no
logical criterion available on which to base your choice, because literary flair and depth
of comprehension are disparate qualities. It is here that extra-logical factors come in
and make themselves felt — factors that include affects, emotions, and feelings. One of
the students belongs to a socially neglected and poor background, while the other to an
affluent one. Perhaps you have some sympathy for the socially neglected and deprived
people, believing them to be more deserving of your attention. Perhaps you yourself have
risen from such a background, and your belief has an emotional counterpart, generat-
ing a pleasurable affect in you, without any conscious awareness, as you contemplate
choosing the less fortunate of the two students, and — you make the choice, based on
this remote belief of yours (relating to your natural sympathy for the less privileged) that
has an emotional content. It is much like making use of a pole in order to a take a vault
— your emotions and affects act as your pole or as your psychological springboard in
making a mental leap. This, however, raises a question: the use of psychological props
such as beliefs, not directly relevant to the issue on which a decision is being sought,
and ones such as emotions and affects, appears like having recourse to a coin toss in
making a decision. Making decisions is of vital importance in reasoning and inference
making. Can it then be said that reasoning and decision making are guided by events
of an essentially random nature. The answer has to be, No! But arriving at the answer
involves going to great depths. At such depths, however, nothing is clear anymore. Still,
we will take a plunge into these uncharted depths in chapter 6 in a spirit of fun and
adventure.
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Inductive inference: summary
I will now summarize these few opening observations on inductive inference that I have
brought up in this chapter, adding a few concluding comments for the sake of clarity.
Inductive inference is an all-pervasive cognitive act where one starts from a set of in-
puts, and proceeds to solve a ‘problem’, where the urge to solve the problem arises from
some sort of ‘trigger’ among the set of inputs (baby feeling a pang of hunger, too quiet
all round, something unusual, where is mother?). The quest to arrive at a solution to the
problem involves a cognitive journey where there takes place a sequential processing of
‘information’ in which, at each stage of processing, information is drawn from environ-
mental inputs and from a vastly rich internal store generated in experience and prior
acts of processing (in addition to a repertoire of innate capacities produced by evolu-
tionary means — more on this later). The information, moreover, is not amenable to
description in terms of a fixed ‘alphabet’ (i.e., a specific set of symbols) and possesses a
syntactic as also a semantic content, the latter depending on the context in which the
processing of the information occurs. In this, inferential processes taking place in the
human mind differs from computational processing of a comparatively simple kind.
At some of the stages of information processing, rules learnt in prior experience are
made use of, where these rules resulted in successful solutions to relevant problems in
the past though, in spite of history of prior success, few of these rules are foolproof. In
the remaining stages of the inferential process there arises the need to adopt a choice
between possible alternatives where environmental cues and stored information are not
of direct help, as a result of which there arises the necessity of a logical leap. And here,
unknown to you, apparently remote beliefs (so remote as not be counted as relevant
information in the context of your problem) linked with emotion and affect help you as
psychological springboards in leaping across the logical gap. The resulting inferential
process may be one among a wide range of possible types. It may be a generalization
from a number of observed facts (all ravens are black), the recognition of a pattern (this
looks like the round figure I saw earlier, though with a few kinks at some points) or a face
(oh, mom, this must be you when you were at school), or the production of a remarkable
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scientific hypothesis (the missing energy in the decay process of the nuclei must be carried
by a mass-less particle that eludes detection).
An inductive inference differs from a deductive one, depending on whether the con-
clusion arrived at is necessarily true in the given context of available information or
whether the inference expands the information base by adopting a choice from among
alternatives, all consistent with the context one started from. Very few inferential acts
are strictly deductive in that the starting premises (the overt ‘context’) are not precisely
defined and may have slightly varying alternative interpretations, a large number of
premises (possible ones in the given context) having only slight relevance in the context
of the problem at hand are ignored, and so on. And, in addition, the rules invoked
for the sequential processing of information may not be rigorously tested and precisely
defined ones.
Inductive inferences are, basically, informed guesses and are ubiquitous in individual
and social life, as also in specialized scientific inquiry, being almost co-extensive with
cognition itself. Most of these inferential acts are carried out, in a great measure in the
arena of the cognitive unconscious, in apparent defiance of norms of rationality, with
the help of heuristics — half-baked inferences themselves — where one set of heuristics
are used to build another, more complex one in a hierarchical process. The heuristics
form a part of a vast web of beliefs of various descriptions, where different sets of beliefs
have distinct psychological roles to play in the cognitive process. On the whole, the web
of beliefs acts as a map for the mind to navigate in a complex and uncertain world, at
times sheltering it by making it refuse to accept unsettling facts and, at other times,
by spurring it on to take difficult decisions. Beliefs — even relatively remote ones — in
conjunction with emotions, affects, and feelings, vastly expand the context of an infer-
ential act that often goes unrecognized, especially since the cognitive subject remains
mostly unaware of these. It is this expanded context that constrains and guides the
inferential act to its desired conclusion. A completed act of inference involves innumer-
able sequential steps, many of which are branched and tangled, but not many of those
follow definite rules that can be assessed in terms of extrinsic normative principles of
rationality.
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The role of context in inference making will be emphasized time and again in this book,
where context will be seen to have two aspects to it — the external and the internal ones.
The external context is set by the environmental inputs entering into the inferential
process, and is essentially of an inter-subjective nature. For instance, the plaintive
cries of a sick child may initiate inferential processes in both of its parents. Here the
childs sickness, its past history, its plaintive cries, the household circumstances, the
availability or otherwise of a physician on call, all these make up the external context,
both the parents being almost equally cognizant of it. On the other hand, the inferential
process and the conclusions drawn by them are likely to differ greatly, depending on how
they make use of their internal psychological resources. The latter include such diverse
things as recollections of past experience, knowledge base, belief system, reasoning
ability, emotional makeup and current mood of the two individuals involved. It is to
be mentioned, at the same time, that cues from the external context are picked up
differently, and to varying degrees, by different individuals, depending ultimately on
their internal psychological resources and, moreover, the assimilation of many of these
cues occurs tacitly. This is how the external and internal contexts of an inference merge
with each other, of which more later.
Within the internal context, factors of a deeply personal nature exert their influence
upon the inferential process, mostly in the form of rules by means of which information
is processed within the mind of an individual. Some of the rules used in an inferential
process may be universal ones (such as the rules of mathematics), but most are likely to
be of a less general nature. Among these latter, there can be found a gradation in respect
of the degree to which the rules are specific to an individual. For instance, some of the
rules may be in the nature of heuristics or beliefs shared by various different persons
(if an assumption fails to produce a satisfactory result, TRY THE OPPOSITE) while many
others arise in a specifically personal context (my kid brother is deficient in mental skill,
and I must protect him). What with the huge internal context involved in an inferential
process and the non-universal nature of the rules made use of in the process, inference
making in general and the making of an inductive inference in particular, is possessed
of great complexity and depth, most of which goes unnoticed.
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The term ‘background knowledge’ used by Leighton (in [81]) and other cognitive scien-
tists is an indicator to the internal context of an inferential process.
As I have mentioned, the role of context in the human inferential process, and that of
rules constitute recurrent themes in this essay. You will find a summary relating to
these two at the end of chapter 7 at this section, as also this.
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Chapter 5
The cognitive unconscious
Hidden cognition
You ignore the realm of unconscious meaning at your peril.
Jonathan Lear in [80]
I begin this chapter by quoting the opening paragraph of a relatively recent book on the
cognitive unconscious:
“Over the past decade or two, a new picture of unconscious processes has
emerged from a variety of disciplines that are broadly part of cognitive sci-
ence. Unconscious processes seem to be capable of doing many things that
were, not so long ago, thought of as requiring mental resources and con-
scious processes. These range from complex information processing through
behavior to goal pursuit and self-regulation.”, [122].
A widely circulated story (relating to the purported advertisement of Coke in a movie
theatre) on subliminal priming, which later turned out not to be based on facts, was an
early indication of the importance of the role of subliminal stimuli (i.e., ones received
without awareness on the part of the recipient) in modifying a persons behavior. Investi-
gations have now established that unconscious pattern recognition based on priming (an
effect where exposure to a stimulus modifies subsequent response to related stimuli)
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can indeed occur under certain circumstances ( [125], p238-241). In recent years there
has taken place a veritable explosion of evidence and data collected in psychological and
neuro-physiological investigations on what can be referred to as unconscious cognitive
action.
The unconscious has been acknowledged since antiquity in folklore, literature, phi-
losophy, and anecdotal introspective reports by a number of scientists on their own
creative processes, as also in early psychological studies and investigations, and was
finally made the basis of a theory of psychology by Sigmund Freud. That theory was
subsequently banished from the mainstream of academic psychology for a variety of
reasons but continued as a parallel psychological theory and practice, while academic
psychology itself was dominated by the point of view of behaviorism which looked upon
the unconscious (as well as the conscious) mind as a mere ‘construct’ on the part of
the psychologists that, along with most of the concepts in folk psychology, has to be
swept aside for the science of psychology to progress and flourish. Behaviorism, how-
ever, went through a rapid decline, to be followed by the so-called cognitive revolution
where mental processes like memory storage and retrieval, and the making of inferences,
judgments, and decisions were acknowledged as ones of focal interest, and the inter-
disciplinary subject of cognitive science began to take shape. A major impetus to the
‘revolution’ came from the field of economics, including investigations on consumer be-
havior (and studies in the management of business enterprises). The rapidly expanding
area of computer science, and the burgeoning field of artificial intelligence constituted
the other major ingredient of the subject of cognitive science, which provided for the
production of computational models of human mental processes. This entire complex
process of paradigm shift ran parallel to new currents in the field of history and philos-
ophy of science that had an almost unrecognized beginning in Polanyi and that found a
definitive expression in Thomas Kuhn.
The psychology of the unconscious was brought in within the area of focal interest in
cognitive science during the late sixties and early seventies of the last century, and
became a trend to reckon with in cognitive psychology during the eighties and early
nineties through works of the likes of Arthur S. Reber, Axel Cleeremans, and John F.
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Kihlstrom.
Rebers work started from a recognition of insights harvested from Polanyi that led to
studies on implicit learning and implicit knowledge where, significantly, considerations
in evolutionary biology were of focal relevance ( [103], chapter 3), and where the latter
underlined the antiquity of the origin of the basic, unconscious, learning mechanisms in
the human mind. Cleeremans focused on the neural and computational underpinnings
of unconscious cognitive processes [21], while Kihlstrom produced the first influential
overall view of the cognitive unconscious [70].
The unconscious as the arena of complex cognitive pro-
cesses
These early works were then followed by broad currents in the field of psychological
investigations in unconscious cognitive processes, and significant areas were opened
up one after another, indicative of the ‘primacy of the unconscious’ ( [103], p 88). As
Kihlstrom summarized the early phase of the work in the area, numerous findings of
major significance were already indicative of a broad range of activities of the cogni-
tive unconscious, including the execution of automatic processes, based on apparently
innate procedural knowledge, subliminal perception (processing of subliminal stimuli),
implicit memory, with indications that implicit learning was also a distinct possibility,
and hypnotic alterations of consciousness.
Subsequent work has made it progressively clear that much of human cognitive func-
tioning that was so long ascribed to conscious, attentive, and deliberative mental activ-
ity, was actually carried out in the realm of the unconscious, since the latter was capa-
ble of a great deal of complex psychological processing. In other words, there has taken
place a gradual shift of paradigm in which the ‘old’ cognitive unconscious has been
replaced with a ‘new’ cognitive unconscious, where the latter appeared to be capable
of even such self-regularity features as intention, motivation, and self-reference [122].
These developments were the result of a multitude of methods and practices that made
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possible a great deal of concrete investigations, replacing a more speculative approach
of the earlier period.
The unconscious versus the conscious
An issue of fundamental significance that has come up in the wake of this paradigm shift
relates to the very concepts of the ‘conscious’ and the ‘unconscious’, since the ongoing
work in the field has the tendency of making earlier concepts inadequate. Even the
early pioneers were aware that a simple conceptual dichotomy between the conscious
and the unconscious was likely to prove misleading ( [103], chapter2, chapter 4, [22]).
Kihlstrom outlined an early ‘map’ for the ‘substratum’ of the mind by distinguishing
between the unconscious, preconscious, and the subconscious [70]. A few authors
prefer to use a general term such as ‘nonconscious’ [56], perhaps implying that more
specific terms may be needed to describe the structure of what is commonly referred to
as the unconscious.
In this book, I will refer frequently to unconscious cognitive processes in the context of
inference-making in general, and the making of inductive inferences in particular. As
in the case of a number of other psychological concepts, I will entirely confine myself
to the discourse of folk psychology, in so far as such concepts are not inconsistent with
findings of rigorous psychological investigations (refer to [114] where Stephen Stitch
elaborates upon the view that the folk psychology of belief does not deserve a place in
cognitive science; contrary views are to be found in [5] and [59]). One has to remember
that psychology is itself a subject where, in spite of a vast body of meticulous work,
conceptual homogeneity is not of the same order as in physics or chemistry, and var-
ious different points of view coexist within the discipline (an analogous, though not
comparable, situation in a branch of physics is to be found in the area where quan-
tum theory is sought to be integrated with the theory of gravitation). This leaves room
for speculations where, however, there has to be consistency with the massive body of
findings of an evidential nature. Reber famously used the phrase ‘sensible speculation’
( [103], chapter 3) in the context of discourse on implicit learning in relation to evo-
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lutionary theory, because he based all his speculative observations on findings from
the current body of investigations over a wide area. This book of mine contains, at
places, speculations of a much more dubious nature since I have had little direct ac-
quaintance with journal articles, which pour out by hundreds every day, in the fields
of cognitive psychology and philosophy of science, and I base most of my observations
on monographs in the fields, taking care not to be inconsistent with these. I will say
no more since I know that disclaimers are odious.
Unconscious cognition: the role of emotions
My aim in the present chapter has been to highlight that, according to current views
on the subject, the unconscious mind is capable of a great deal of complex cognitive
activities, including ones where ‘cold’ cognition is intimately blended with emotion-based
factors (giving rise to what is, at times, referred to as‘hot thought’ [118]. There exists a
large body of literature on the possible role of emotions in cognition, based on evidence
of substantial value, and part of that literature pertains to emotions and affects in the
workings of the cognitive unconscious (see, for instance, [35], [34]). Much of this book
is focused on the possible role of beliefs, emotions and affects, operating within the
realm of the unconscious, in inference-making in general, and in inductive inference in
particular (see chapter 6).
The unconscious detection of similarity
One particular focus of interest will relate to hypothesis-building, conceptual transfor-
mations, and creative episodes in science which, within the framework presented in
this book, constitute a very special kind of inductive inference (see chapter 8). The
emergence of hypotheses depends crucially on an important organizing factor in the es-
tablishment of correlations among apparently remote ideas, and in the building of novel
conceptual structures out of these, principally by means of the detection of similarity at
the unconscious level.
Similarity is a notion of great relevance in cognition (refer, once again, to chapter 8).
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The detection of similarity between perceptual inputs and the formation of appropriate
inferences on the basis of such similarity is a basic mechanism in survival and natural
selection. The mechanism underlying the capacity of such similarity detection is, per-
haps, of an elementary nature based on associative covariation detection between the
perceptual inputs. However, it is likely that the cognitive mechanism has the ability
to induce rules of inference in a hierarchical manner, where rules at a lower level of
complexity are made use of to induce those at a higher level, and where the associative
detection of covariation among a series of successive perceptual inputs is likely to be one
among the rules of inference at the lowest level. Based on the elementary capacity of
detection of similarity of a coarse nature between objects in the environment, more com-
plex and fine-tuned rules of similarity detection, first among objects, and then among
concepts, are likely to be induced by the cognitive unconscious, resulting in a height-
ened capacity for the formation of novel conceptual structures the hypotheses that
germinate into theories in the ongoing process of scientific exploration (for background,
refer to [62]).
The ‘rationality’ of the unconscious
The cognitive unconscious is commonly contrasted with the conscious mind, and un-
derstandably so. While spontaneous information processing activity within the uncon-
scious mind of an individual continues without awareness and without overt intention
on her part, conscious processes are supposed to be executed deliberately and inten-
tionally, within the horizon of awareness of hers. Indeed the two-process theory of
human cognition and rationality (see chapter 7 below) is based on the assumption of
two types of processes being involved, where the two types correspond to contrary and
complementary features of inferential activity reminiscent of those commonly ascribed
to the unconscious and the conscious levels of the mind. However, this approach,
along with the concomitant use of terms like ‘levels’ or ‘strata’ (the unconscious being
a ‘substratum’ of the conscious), constitutes no more than a convenient description of
processes that is, in all likelihood, a somewhat simplistic one ( [103], chapter2, chapter
4, [22]), though convenient and useful too. One has to mention at the same time that
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the proponents of the two-process theory do not always associate the two processes
with unconscious and conscious cognitive activities, confining themselves more to the
consideration of computational features of the two.
In this context, a number of relatively recent findings shed a new light on the so-called
conscious-unconscious divide that may prove to have far-reaching implications. Briefly
stated, the conceptual attributes of consciousness may need substantial revision. As
the body of findings continued to grow on the capabilities of the unconscious mind for
various types of complex cognitive processing, it appeared that what goes by the name of
consciousness has a correspondingly small role to play in cognition as a whole, namely
one confined to control and regulation of the cognitive process. For instance, within the
framework of the two-process approach, it may conceivably play the role of a ‘decision-
making entity’ performing the job of planning and review, such a decision-making job
being compatible with the commonly held view that the conscious mind is capable of
setting goals, and of working on the basis of an intentionality.
One central issue of the conscious-unconscious divide relates to the computational
question of the role of a working memory. It has so long been a basic assumption
that the conscious mind differs fundamentally from the unconscious from a compu-
tational point of view, where the former involves a working memory that sets goals
within a serial information processing framework, based on more or less well defined
rules or principles, and that such processing requires attention, as also intention ( [68],
p65- 66, [125], chapter 2). By contrast, the processes within the cognitive unconscious
were assumed to be based on distributed transitions of an associative nature, without
the involvement of a working memory. It now appears that, from the point of view of
functionality, the unconscious mind possesses the ability to set goals and to hold infor-
mation, resembling the role played by working memory [122], [55], [115]. In particular,
the parallel distributed processing (PDP) model (or the connectionist model), based on the
computational abilities of neural networks offers a great many features, including those
relating to a working memory, even without the necessity of assuming the existence of a
separate specialized memory unit. Though the PDP Model ( [21], [10], [11]) is basically a
computational one and does not enjoy firm backing within the tradition of psychological
107
CHAPTER 5. THE COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUS
research, it can nevertheless be used as a good metaphor, providing pointers to a host
of possible functional features of the human cognitive process, including the ‘rationality
of the unconscious’ (see, for instance, [91], [44]).
CAUTION! The note of warning that I want to record here is that the ideas on un-
conscious cognitive activity are not part of a solidly based theory, and much of these
are conjectures and plausible speculations though, at the same time, parts are indeed
based on conscientious experimental findings. There is an an ongoing controversy
on how much of the theory of unconscious thought is admissible on evidence and
how much is not. The framework for a theory of inductive inference that I seek to
outline in this book does contain conjectures and speculations that are in the na-
ture of interpretations on my part, not inconsistent with more disciplined theoretical
and experimental findings. I have stuck my neck out, without regard to whether the
guillotine of the science of cognitive psychology will descend on it and chop it off.
An instance of the ongoing controversy on unconscious thought theory referred to
above is to be found in [65].
Neuropsychological studies over the last few decades have revealed, and continue to
reveal, a great many facets of neuronal activity bearing upon complex psychological
processes that appear to be predominantly unconscious. These relate to affects, emo-
tions, and feelings on the one hand, and cognitive processes like belief-formation,
decision-making and planning on the other. A number of neural aggregates of early
evolutionary origin, responsible (in conjunction with a number of chemical secretions
in the brain) for the generation of pleasure, reward, and aversion have been found to
play a crucial role in these complex psychological processes (see, among an extensive
literature, [89], [8], [31]). Finally, consciousness appears as an epiphenomenon of
sorts, resulting in capacities such as the ones of awareness, intention, and introspec-
tion, where large scale synchronized neuronal activity along with the mediating action
of a set of neurotransmitters are of central relevance [3], [4].
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Unconscious cognition: how ‘hot’ is it?
I close this chapter with a few words on the possible relation between the cognitive
unconscious and the Freudian, or psychoanalytic, unconscious. In this book, I will not
make overt reference to the latter, in deference to the major part of literature in cognitive
science which has a tendency to maintain a distance with the Freudian framework,
perhaps because the latter is still felt to be too ‘hot’ — too infected with concepts of a
primitive nature and with the idea of a primeval mind — to be accommodated within a
respectable cognitive theory. The early phase of development of cognitive science was
indeed one where it had a ‘cold’ and ‘respectable’ face. However, developments of a more
recent vintage have made it imperative to take seriously to the idea that human cognition
is crucially dependent on affects and emotions, and is therefore not as ‘cold’ as one
would like it to be ( [118]; [68], chapters 5,6). Even when one discounts a considerable
part of the Freudian picture of the unconscious — the one that has turned out not to be
solidly grounded — the psychoanalytic point of view may still prove to be useful in the
working out of an integrated view of the cognitive unconscious, where a wide range of
human emotions, including motives, desires and drives of various descriptions (where,
moreover, ‘pleasure’ and ‘reward’ centers in the brain play their role, aided by a number
of chemical secretions) are involved in a cognitive process whose ‘rationality’ will have
to be interpreted anew.
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Chapter 6
The process of inference: beliefs
and emotions
The belief-laden quest
Remember that all perceptions, judgments, and beliefs
are inferences and not direct readouts of reality.
Richard Nisbett in [91]
Beliefs and belief systems
Inductive inference is, essentially, the formation of belief. Myriads of external and in-
ternal stimuli impinge upon one’s perceptual mind every moment, of which some are
selected out, in keeping with the context, and processed in association with the latter,
to be eventually transformed into beliefs and to be incorporated into the belief system
of the person concerned.
Incidentally, the issue of context is of great relevance in inference, decision-making
(which I will count essentially as a form of inference), and the formation of belief, and
has already made its appearance in various different places (various different contexts,
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I am tempted to say) in this book. Broadly speaking, context can be of the external
or internal type, analogous to stimuli received by the mind. When I am looking at
a beautiful portrait, the canvass, the gallery, the people around me, the artist, the
occasion of my visiting the gallery and viewing the portrait, and a thousand other things
make up the external context of my act of viewing and appreciating. On the other
hand, my past recollection of portraits of a similar kind, my admiration for the artist,
the faint similarity of the face drawn in the portrait with my mother's, my slight feeling
of discomfort at the color contrast in one part of the portrait, my elation at the sense
of vitality and jubilation expressed through the portrait, my current mood of anxiety
and depression, and a million other things in my mind and my emotions constitute the
internal context.
Many of these things, in some form or other, will make the content of my future memory
of the portrait and of my act of viewing it, and will be blended into my subsequent
recollection of that memory. And, interestingly, that recollection will again depend on
the external and internal context of the act of recollection. In addition, my viewing of
the portrait, may lead to the formation of a belief to the effect, for instance, that age is
finally catching up with the artist I admire as one of the foremost among the current
generation. Here again, the belief is formed in a process of great complexity occurring
amidst the external and internal context I mention above. The complex issue of the
context in an inferential act has been and will be a recurring concern of ours in this
book.
To come back to the question of beliefs and belief systems, beliefs constitute a most
elusive entity in cognitive science [24], even as our entire mental life is permeated with
beliefs that relate to almost all aspects of our thought process. Beliefs can be of various
kinds and various shades, ranging from mild predisposition to virulent dogma, from
unconscious mental states to consciously held points of view, and from justified and
true ones to overtly inconsistent stands on issues of various degrees of relevance in
our life. Beliefs are arrived at in response to situations that a person or a group of
persons faces, and are used as guide maps in subsequent response of that person or
group to situations and scenarios that come up from time to time. Our belief system is
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our map to navigate in this largely unknown world [2] and as such, the beliefs have to
have an optimum degree of permanence. If all our beliefs get revised under the slightest
challenge from the world around us, then the belief system will be a very poor map
indeed, and we would face disaster in trying to navigate with its help. If, on the other
hand, all our beliefs were rigid and resistant to revision, then again these would be of
no use because these would then prove unequal to the task of making us aware of the
complex and changing realities of the world. In fact, some of our beliefs are extremely
resistant to revision while some others are easily revised under the impact of facts of
the world and of rules of tested efficacy learnt from past experience (to be precise,
these rules are also mostly in the nature of beliefs) and eventually gain the status of
knowledge.
In the present section we will mostly be concerned with beliefs and belief systems of indi-
viduals. Beliefs of an inter-subjective nature are also of great relevance in the collective
life of communities and entire societies, where these form integral parts of culture, re-
ligion, folklore, rituals, and taboo. Communities of scientists also carry their beliefs in
various forms. This raises the question as to how much of scientific theories are in the
nature of social constructs. Or, to take up a much broader issue, how much of science
in our times is socially determined? We will look at some of these issues in subsequent
sections in this book.
Belief, knowledge, and inference
It is of some interest to examine the relation of beliefs to conclusions drawn in acts
of inference and, also, to items of knowledge. Of these, let us have a brief look at
the latter relation first. It is sometimes said that knowledge is justified true belief,
and I will not join issue with this point of view, though the questions of justification
and truth are contentious ones. As I have mentioned, knowledge emerges out of an
evolutionary process from belief in the course of revision of the latter under the impact
of reality. However, we have already had a glimpse into the layered structure of reality,
which makes it a fathomless entity, and there can, truly speaking, never be anything
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like ultimate knowledge (more of this later, because this is a central issue in scientific
realism). With this little rider on the concept of knowledge, I should like to draw your
attention to another, more subtle, aspect of the relation between belief and knowledge,
and that happens to be, in a sense, a psychological one. Beliefs mostly remain inactive
or latent in our mind, and become active when we ourselves need to act in some way
or other, say, under the impulse of fear, or craving for recognition, or of any other
cause. The course we adopt in embarking on an action (which may, under special
circumstances, even be an act of inference) is shaped by a set of beliefs becoming active
and guiding us through in that course. Beliefs propel us into action (the tyrant is the root
of all evil) and guide us through (smash the palace), but knowledge has no such role. In
the course of evolution of belief into knowledge the latter, in a manner of speaking, gets
sterilized and cannot infect the mind with germs that make it febrile and pro-active. We
make use of knowledge in the course of action, but we are not spurred on by it. That role
is vested in belief. Looked at another way, beliefs are, generally speaking, associated
with emotions (more of this below) and, in the process of evolving into knowledge, get
divested of these emotions.
Indeed, the web of beliefs in a persons mind, along with the associated network of
emotions, can be said to identify the self of that person. In contrast, knowledge is
like an encyclopedia that she carries along with her and makes use of as the necessity
arises. Our closest and most intimate beliefs are tied to our innermost selves by
means of emotions. These are as completely resistant to revision as our own selves
are to change.
An inferential act is an act of a special kind where we are activated toward a goal or
a purpose such as the purpose of solving a puzzle or a problem (how to calculate the
energy of binding of this crystal?) where, generally speaking, the purpose is shaped by
some event or situation that acts as the trigger for the action (have to have a Ph.D.).
The trigger makes us aware of the necessity to solve a problem or to achieve a goal
or purpose, and this sets in motion the mental process of making an inference. The
process needs a number of inputs to proceed to its desired end. These are commonly
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referred to as the premises, while the end point of the process often appears in the form
of a conclusion. For instance,
I am feeling indisposed / physicians need be consulted when one feels indisposed /there
is a physician nearby whose telephone number I have in my diary / the physician is to be
called over the phone.
This is a particularly simple form of an inference, where the inputs are in the form
of propositions, and there is a well defined line of reasoning that leads me from the
premises to the conclusion which is, strictly speaking, one in the form of an implied
belief (he will cure me — a belief that activates me to make a phone call) but is, within
the given context, a justified one.
Not all inferences, however, are of this simple type indeed, very few are. Instead of
propositional premises, the inferential process starts with external and internal mental
inputs, possibly in the form of some kind of representations in the mind, and these are
then processed (i.e., taken through a succession of transformations) so as to lead to the
‘conclusion’ which is again, more often than not, in the form of a mental representation
or mental state rather than of a proposition. This mental state is, generally speaking,
in the nature of a belief that, at times, sets one in the course of some action. This
said, I must add that not all beliefs are formed by way of inferences aimed at achieving
some goal or other. Beliefs are also formed passively as an individual (I have already
mentioned that the beliefs of groups or communities will not be explicitly referred to
for now) passes through experiences or situations. On finding an ailing old man lying
by the roadside, I walk by him and find that others are doing the same, and a belief is
formed, to the effect that this world is a heartless one. The only difference between the
formation of this belief and a process of inference as sketched above is that here the
belief is formed without an apparent purpose. While I highlight this distinction here,
it is an arguable one since some underlying purpose or relevance may still be there,
perhaps at an unconscious level, without being apparent (incidentally, heuristics are
also little beliefs that are often formed spontaneously, without apparent purpose, by way
of association of environmental stimuli or of ideas, mostly in the unconscious mind, to
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be made use of in future inferential acts). One other point of distinction characterizing
the instance under consideration is that the belief is formed as a latent one, without
setting me on to a course of action, though it may be instrumental in doing so at some
future point of time. On the other hand, a belief and an inference are both produced by
a processing of information in the mind. At the risk of some controversy, I may say that
the end product of an inference is a belief, while a belief is not necessarily arrived at by
way of an overt inferential act.
In particular, beliefs and belief systems are intimately associated with acts of inductive
inference. In an inductive inference, the mind works in a halting, groping way, without
being guided in a clear-cut manner by rules, where the rules may be of a precise, logical
nature or may be more diffuse ones, arrived at on the basis of prior experience and
knowledge. A rule-driven process will be referred to as reasoning and is one where
there is relatively less scope for guesswork that takes one beyond what follows from the
starting premises by the application of the rules. In reality, no inferential process is
completely rule-driven (we have seen how even mathematical reasoning, or reasoning
acts of a deductive nature, involve informed guesswork typical of inductive inference) or
is totally unassisted by rules. In other words, inferences are part deductive and part
inductive, which is why the end product of an inference is, generally speaking, a belief
— one that is fallible (or, is non-monotonic, if I may use a jargon), is arrived at by a
mental process in the nature of a guesswork, and makes use of the context in a manner
that is largely indeterminate. And, the other area of relevance of beliefs in inductive
inference, relates to this question of context.
As I have tried to indicate in earlier paragraphs in this book, the context of an inference
is a highly complex matrix made up of diverse factors. We will be concerned here with
the internal context of an inference, which assumes relevance when the mind does not
have clear-cut rules to make use of while being engaged in an inferential act. It then
falls back upon the hidden context, the resources available within its own tucked-away
treasure house, howsoever remote these might apparently be. What are the resources
that can possibly be of relevance? Here the list is virtually inexhaustible and it is here
that we face a very deep issue.
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While walking on a broken road, you are likely to come across a breach on which no
plank or temporary bridge has been set for your benefit. What would you do to navigate
the breach? You will jump across it or, if the breach is too wide for that, you get hold of
a stick or a pole or of a branch of tree, whatever comes in handy, and you leap across,
using it as a prop for propelling yourself. Likewise in inference. The mind gropes for a
prop and makes use of whatever comes in handy — most likely, some belief or other,
since beliefs are always there in abundance, associated with one another in a vast web,
much like a social network where you just have to cry out for help and somebody or
other, though perhaps of dubious credentials, comes forward.
Beliefs and emotions
What is more, beliefs are often associated with emotions. It is precisely this association
that makes a belief a device for spurring an individual into action — whether an act
of aggression or one of submission, or one of a different kind, i.e., more generally, into
taking a decision and acting upon it. And it is this association that makes emotions
play a vital role, both in a positive and in a negative sense, in cognition. The stronger
the emotional association, the more resistant to revision is the belief while, on the other
hand, this very association helps the owner of the belief in her cognitive act of adopting
decisions, possibly without conscious awareness, in the course of making an inference.
Aspects of the complex relation between emotions and beliefs have been discussed
in [41]; [39] speaks of beliefs as being located ‘at the interface of affective and cognitive
processes’.
An inferential act in real life differs from a conventional computer program in that de-
cisions are to be adopted at several points in the course of the inference, based on
judgments, for which sufficiently compelling inputs are not available. A judgment is,
fundamentally, an extra-logical act because it involves the comparison of disparate and,
possibly, conflicting items that cannot be reduced to a common denominator. I have
a limited amount of money at my disposal as I enter a departmental store and debate
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whether to purchase a cosmetic item for my wife or a toy for my child. The two options
are disparate, and my judgment and consequent decision can never be logically sound
— indeed it has to be dictated by incidental factors such as, for instance, how much
more I value the smiling face of my child than that of my wife. In other words, it is my
emotional make-up that plays proxy to my reason.
So, here is a likely scenario. As I proceed in the course of making an inference, there
occurs a processing of information that builds around a sequential application of rules,
where the rules can be of various types and descriptions — mostly heuristic ones that
have been formed by past experience in inference-making or, in other words, in inter-
preting the world we find ourselves in. However, the sequence is not a neat, linear one
but is tangled in a complex way, where there are branchings, backtrackings, and inter-
connections between parallel processing sequences. Within this complex and tangled
information processing scenario, I face from time to time, an impasse, where my reper-
toire of rules and reason prove inadequate in the task of helping me along in making
a judgment and adopting a decision. I inwardly grope for some clue, something in the
storehouse of my mind that I can use as a support in my mental leap through the im-
passe, and I try to choose from a set of heuristics of, perhaps, dubious value for the task
at hand. I make a number of trials with these and in each such trial I seek the help of
background beliefs for guidance, and a wide web of beliefs presents itself. As I am about
to apply one or more heuristic rules, one or more of these beliefs come forward to either
approve or disapprove of my impending act, by invoking an insidious emotional reaction
— related to some kind of pre-conscious affect. This reaction or affect acts as a signal,
of either a positive or a negative nature, and helps me navigate through the impasse
by either proceeding forward or backtracking and making a renewed effort. Neither the
belief nor the affect is an infallible guide in my decision-making and I may eventually
err in my inference. But inferences are never foolproof. What is important is to be able
to arrive at an inference because, once arrived at, the inference can be tried, tested
and improved upon or, in the worst-case scenario, may be rejected out of hand, to be
replaced with a new inference — a new belief if you like. Shorn of the evaluative action
of our beliefs and emotions as the cognitive mind invokes heuristics in bridging a logical
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gap, cognition gets paralyzed in its inference-making efforts.
Significantly, the fact that our inferences are guided by heuristics, beliefs, and emotions
of dubious authenticity, does not make the inferences entirely devoid of credibility and
validity, since all these heuristics, beliefs, and emotions are products of past experience.
While some of these are well founded and some others are distorted interpretations of
reality, their overall effect is to make us capable of an inference that is, frequently, not
far from the truth. Inferences never cease. Once formed, an inference is not consigned
to the cold storage. It continues to be tested and modified, if not within the visible space
of conscious awareness, then most certainly in the invisible world of the unconscious.
It is applied upon the world out there or subjected to consistency checks with our
knowledge base and with the existing web of beliefs. In other words, our knowledge
base, our beliefs, our inferences, and our emotional set-up are in a constant state of
dynamic interaction — interaction among themselves and interaction with the world
around us. The upshot is an enrichment of our knowledge base, an enrichment of
the vast storehouse of heuristics, and a rebuilding of the great web of beliefs, with
some of the beliefs acquiring the credibility of knowledge, some remaining in a state of
suspension as ones of uncertain credentials, and some transformed into weird dogma.
Human cognition is an ever-active process — and is complex indeed.
Inference is not and, indeed, cannot be a neat linear sequence of information processing
because such a sequence is possible only when the cognitive system is certain that it
will lead to the desired conclusion. Real-life inferences are never made that way, except
in the arithmetic class-room. Instead, at every step of reasoning and inference-making,
the cognitive mind fans out in the form of parallel processing of information — much
as the experienced general sends out groups of detachments so as to locate and pin
down the enemy. In pursuing all these parallel branches of information processing,
each by means of an application of clusters of heuristics, the cognitive mind continually
carries out consistency checks against bits of stored knowledge and against heuristics,
beliefs, and reason, thereby approving of or discarding one or more of these branches
with a view to achieving some desired goal or purpose. In other words, there operates
an ‘internal censorship’ in every inferential process, as Medawar tells us in the following
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passage:
“In real life, of course, just as the crudest inductive observations will always be limited
by some unspoken criterion of relevance, so also the hypotheses that enter our minds
will as a rule be plausible and not, as in theory they could be, idiotic. But this implies
the existence of some internal censorship which restricts hypotheses to those that are
not absurd, and the internal circuitry of this process is quite unknown. The critical
process in scientific reasoning is not therefore wholly logical in character, though it
can be made to appear so when we look back upon a completed episode of thought.”,
( [88], p 53).
The internal censorship that Medawar speaks of is not really ‘quite unknown’, since
much is now known about the ‘reward’ and ‘value’ systems, based on neural aggre-
gates, in the brain [31], [8].
In the process of parallel exploration and concomitant evaluation of inferential possibili-
ties, branches get connected and tangled, with the tangle eventually assuming the form
of an inference — an inference that is seldom a sharply defined proposition since it is
mostly in the nature of a hazy concept associated with other concepts and beliefs in the
mind, though sufficiently defined so as to be made use of in acting upon the external or
the internal world.
Imagine yourself engaged in some complex mathematical derivation, where you apply
the universal rules of mathematics and logic but have to decide from time to time as
to which of several alternative courses of application of the various rules known to you
are to be applied so as to successfully complete the derivation. Strictly speaking, you
cannot examine all possible courses of application of these rules, if only because that
would entail a prohibitively complex enumeration of the possibilities, and you allow
your mathematical instinct to come to your help where the instinctual help comes in the
form of a large number of heuristics, mostly bits and pieces of mathematical reasoning
themselves, floating about in your unconscious mind. While you are proceeding with
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the derivation, the cognitive unconscious is not sitting idle, since it is engaged in small
excursions and forays in parallel to your main line of derivation so as to tell you which
course to adopt whenever a decision is to be taken. But now imagine that you have got
yourself blocked at an impasse where your storehouse of mathematical knowledge and
your repertoire of heuristics of a mathematical nature fail to bail you out.
If you are circumspect by nature, and rely too much on secure mathematical reason-
ing, you will stare and stare at your worksheet, unable to proceed further. But your
unconscious mind is not circumspect, and it does not sit back staring. It turns and
looks at beliefs. In some distant past, you came across a derivation made by a peer in a
remotely related area where the problem at hand, when looked at from the point of view
of a higher dimensional space, got solved in an unexpected manner. You now make use
of a heuristic that launches you on to a higher dimensional space, and you get the nod
of approval from your belief that what the peer did would bring dividend to you as well.
Luckily, your hunch does pay dividends, but the more important point is, it got you
released from your mental block so that even if the hunch were to prove unproductive,
you would backtrack and then make good use of some other hunch. This is a hypothet-
ical instance that I include here to bring home the point that the reasoning we employ
in an inference does not always involve rules of the same degree of rigor — while some
of it is made up of universal rules of mathematics or logic, some may be of an ‘inferior’
quality, and may even be in the nature of loosely woven beliefs, but it is the web of belief
that keeps the inferential process going when reasoning of more reputable pedigree fails,
and, through excursions, forays, and parallel processing, helps the process to reach a
destination, somewhat like a drunken person finding home (perhaps his own) at dead of
night. The cognitive mind is opportunistic by nature and does not hesitate to get drunk
with disreputable stuff.
As all of you must be aware of from your own experience, the formation of a belief is
often associated with an emotion specific to the situation in which it originates and, so
is its activation at a subsequent point of time. And, emotion and affect are not merely
psychological entities, since they involve physiological and somatic factors as well. One
thus has a highly complex system to look for when the question of the context of an
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inferential process comes up.
Emotions and affects are all-pervasive in the mental life of a person. These find expres-
sion as responses of the entire mental and bodily system to situations of diverse types
— responses at times intense and at times barely sensed. Likewise, a person's web of
belief is based on neural co-ordination on a large scale is not localized in this or that
neural aggregate ( on the other hand, beliefs of various kinds, such as those evoking
responses of assent and dissent, are possibly associated with corresponding neural ag-
gregates; see [107] for a number of interesting observations) — it permeates his entire
psychological being, weaving through the entire body of his conscious and unconscious
thoughts. And this entire system of enormous complexity is potentially the ‘context’ of
an inferential act. It is from here that the mind draws its ingredients and springboards
for negotiating and vaulting over the logical chasms it encounters in the course of an
inferential act.
Thus, in other words, an act of inference has strange and hidden aspects to it that
cannot be captured in commonly invoked norms of rationality. The deeper and the
more complex the substratum of the cognitive mind an inferential process gets drawn
into, the more deviant it appears from reconstructions based on extrinsic rules by which
the process is appraised and evaluated.
The role of emotions in cognition is a topic under extensive investigation, and has now
generated a quite voluminous literature, inclusive of [1], [63], [100], [79], and [47] (in
addition to references already mentioned).
Heuristics in the inferential process: the dual role of be-
liefs
Speaking of the ‘hidden logic’ of an inferential process, one comes face to face with the
role of heuristics in inference making. Heuristics, as I have mentioned, are rules of
thumb that the mind makes use of in making judgments and decisions and in forming
121
CHAPTER 6. THE PROCESS OF INFERENCE: BELIEFS AND EMOTIONS
inferences, in which process it is often rewarded with success, but failure is not ruled
out either. Heuristics are little beliefs of ours that keep on being formed, at times,
without conscious awareness on our part, though we may subsequently become aware
of some of those and even make use of those (in the endgame, play the king) while solving
problems or making inferences. The scope of applicability of a heuristic may be limited to
only some specific problem situation or may be a comparatively extended one spanning
a whole class of problem situations. And, heuristics often work in tandem with one
another, and in clusters, helping and prodding us along in the course of an inference.
Heuristics are, in a manner of speaking, hidden rules operative within the mind, though
mostly of an intrinsic nature, many of those specific to an individual — specific to her
developmental history, to her response to innumerable real life situations in the past,
and to her repertoire of experience tied to emotions and feelings.
From a computational point of view (this is the view adopted in the theory and practice
of artificial intelligence that tries to capture various aspects of human thought, learn-
ing, reasoning, and intelligence, thereby shedding light on human cognition at large),
heuristics are the counterparts of rules and rule clusters made use of in computer real-
izations of inductive inference as described, for instance, in [61], where a rule typically
operates upon mental representations of the internal and the external world, and can
typically be described as an if-then operation upon such representations. The rules op-
erate hierarchically, where an intermediate inference, arrived at on the basis of one set
of rules, itself acts a rule for the next stage of inference, thereby realizing a complex and
tangled sequence of ‘information processing’ whose ‘code’ is formed and lodged within
inaccessible recesses of the mind.
Heuristics are in the nature of clues to solutions of problems — typically, clues picked
up from the context within which a problem is defined, where both internal and external
contexts are made use of by the reasoning mind, mostly in a tacit manner. As I have
already mentioned, an inferential process involves the operation of rules more or less
independent of the context specific to the reasoning individual, as also clues generated
from the context that is specific to the individual. A heuristic is a rule, mostly of a
tentative nature, that can be of either of the two types. Thus, there are heuristics made
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use of by most individuals in some given situation (dont ever argue with the boss), while
there are others that do not transcend the individual and are not shared by others, the
latter being, mostly, heuristics lodged in the unconscious mind.
In a manner of speaking, heuristics can be described as beliefs that are made use of
as ingredients in inferential processes and, commonly, are ones that are subjected to
consistency checks to a greater extent as compared with many other beliefs that are
resistant to revision. It is this fluidity of the heuristics that makes them useful in the
generation of valid inferences. These are clues often produced ‘on the fly’ as the process
of inference progresses, and some of these are also discarded in a similar manner as
they fail to guide the reasoning mind properly toward an acceptable solution to the
problem.
But how can it be ascertained whether an inference is progressing toward an accept-
able solution at an intermediate stage of the process even before that solution is arrived
at? Again adopting a computational point of view, one can conjecture that a process of
inference is not just one single sequence of information processing, but a large number
of sequences proceeding in parallel, as the mind tries out a number of alternative in-
ferential pathways simultaneously, with diverse sets of clues of objective and subjective
natures (the former being clues shared by different individuals in a given situation, and
the latter specific to the internal context of an individual). Most of these parallel paths
of inference are discarded as it transpires, through consistency checks of various kinds
(where such consistency checks often involve counterfactual thinking [27]), that these
are not leading to any satisfactory solution to the problem at hand ( this approach is
getting too complicated — leave it and try something simpler), while the remaining ones
are pursued till one or a few of these seem to engender a solution, or a number of al-
ternative candidates for a solution, appropriate to the need of the hour. This must be
how the mind ‘scents’ the right path to the solution of a problem at hand. At every stage
of an inferential process, and at each step of all the parallel inferential paths adopted
in the process, the reasoning mind has to judge and to decide between alternatives in
the context of a set of consistency conditions that an acceptable solution to the problem
should meet with. However, these conditions are not always determined in a clear-cut
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manner in terms of subject-independent ones.
And here, as I have briefly explained above, is to be found a second, distinct, role of
beliefs in the inferential process, a role that is intimately associated with emotions and
affects. Thus, at times, as the mind prepares to take a logical leap, some belief lodged
in it comes forward as an arbiter or evaluator as to whether that course is an ‘accept-
able’ one. If the course of inference is at variance with the belief then a warning bell is
sounded whereby the mind shrinks from pursuing the course in question by experienc-
ing a negative affect. What is of relevance here is that the clamor of the metaphorical
warning bell comes into being as a consequence of emotions associated with the belief
that comes forward for the appraisal as to whether the inference is proceeding in the
right direction. At times, the belief in question appears to be in consonance with the
course of the inferential process, the direction in which the mind is ready to leap for
making possible the onward progress of the process, when a pleasurable affect waves
the process on. This entire thing is, of course, contrary to what goes by the name of
logic since, in terms of logic, the belief that appears in the role of arbiter or evaluator
may not even be of direct relevance to the problem at hand. Suppose, in the course of
deciding upon the number of invitees in a party, the number twelve comes up as a possi-
bility, but the person in charge making the decision has an abhorrence for that number
— an abhorrence of an entirely personal nature (perhaps his son died on the twelfth of
a certain calendar month) that has got nothing to do logically with the considerations
necessary for making the party a success. Still, the prospective host recoils from the
number and looks for ways to extend or to shorten the list of invitees (the case would
have been different if the number in question were thirteen instead of twelve because
then the dread of that number, though still an ‘illogical’ one, would have been in the
nature of a ‘rule’ shared by many individuals, and would resemble a ‘logic’, based on a
rule).
A traumatic experience like the one mentioned here often generates a set of beliefs,
associated with emotions of an elemental nature, that have an overriding influence in
setting the course of an inference, to which these beliefs have even a remote relevance.
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Though, in the present instance of application of a rule (either an inter-subjective or a
person-specific one — these terms are further explained below), the drawing up of a list
of invitees does not have to satisfy the needs of some objective truth, still it illustrates
how ‘rules’ of diverse kinds make inroads in our inferential process.
More generally, inferences are made necessary so as to guess at ‘truths’ of the world
or to decide upon a course of action in order that some goal or purpose is achieved. In
order that the desired goal is actually arrived at, inferences must have a commitment
to the external reality — to correctly grasp some aspect of that reality. Rules of various
kinds are routinely invoked in the cognitive mind to guess at such truths.
Briefly stated, as a juncture is reached in a process of inference where the reasoning
mind is poised for a decision as to the possible efficacy of a heuristic in bridging a logical
gap, the likely consequence following from the adoption of that heuristic (or of a cluster
of heuristics) is judged against a belief (or, again, against a set of beliefs), where the
result of the judgment appears as an affect or a feeling of either a positive or a nega-
tive kind, in virtue of some associated emotion. An emotion, generally speaking, is an
amplifying mechanism designed to make a subject sensitive to a situation, whereby she
can either take evasive action or one of engaging into the situation with a positive frame
of mind. It is this amplifying and evaluative mechanism involving beliefs tagged with
emotions that is possibly of crucial relevance in helping the reasoning mind navigate
logical gaps in the course of an inferential process.
In summary, beliefs play a dual role in inferential processes in general, and in inductive
inferences in particular. First, they are used in the form of heuristics in the step-wise
progress of an inferential process, much in the same way as logical rules are made
use of in a mathematical derivation, with the great difference that these are themselves
in the nature of products of guesswork, and are often of dubious efficacy and, above
all, may be highly subjective in their origin. The other role of beliefs is that of acting as
evaluators and arbiters (‘internal censorship’) in the inferential process when judgments
and decisions (involving a choice between disparate and conflicting alternatives) are to
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be made in navigating across gaps in which the use of heuristics, just by themselves,
is not sufficient for the success of the inferential act. Here a belief, in conjunction with
the associated emotions, makes the reasoning mind alert as to whether the course it is
going to adopt is about to bring it nearer to the desired goal or to take it further away.
This role of beliefs is a curious one since the belief in question may not be of direct
relevance to the goal that the inferential process is to culminate in, but is still made use
of as part of an overall strategy in a broader context.
For instance, here is a hypothetical situation that I include more as a metaphor than
as an illustration. Suppose that a mother is playing a game with her child, asking her
to search out an object which she, the mother, has hidden somewhere around. At one
stage in her exploring spree, the child comes to a momentary halt, unable to make up
her mind as to whether to enter into the kitchen or into the drawing room, when her
mother issues a shrill command that she is not to go into the kitchen. Here, it is quite
logical for the child to assume that the kitchen may be a possible hiding place, but the
mother's admonition has a different relevance, in a context broader than the issue at
hand.
Deterministic but unpredictable
The mind is a system of great complexity. One can look at an inferential process, or any
process in which the mind participates, as a trajectory in a state space of an enormous
number of dimensions (I will come back to this idea of exploration of a conceptual
space at greater length in chapter 9). Arguably, the trajectory remains confined to a
subspace (in a loose sense) of a smaller number of dimensions in any specific process of
reasoning and inference, but that process may still be dynamically complex in the sense
of being unpredictable while still being deterministic, where the latter term is used in
a broad sense, meaning a process that is predominantly driven causally from one step
to another by rules, though the latter may be rules that have a specifically subjective
component, and ones that are fallible.
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Heuristics as inter-subjective and person-specific rules
Two terms that assume relevance in this context, and have featured in earlier para-
graphs, are: inter-subjective and person-specific. Thus, rules of an inter-subjective
nature are ones that are shared by individuals going through an inferential process
defined by a given external context (external inputs, triggers, and goals). Referring back
to an earlier example (a completely hypothetical one), if a number of persons are asked
to draw up plans, each in an individual capacity, for arranging a party, several of them
may avoid the thirteenth day of the month as the projected day on which the party is to
be held, though that same day may come up as a likely possibility as a result of a few
other considerations (it may, for instance, be a national holiday). Here the abhorrence
for the number thirteen is a belief of an inter-subjective nature (which, however, may
still not be a universal one; rules may differ in their degree of universality). On the
other hand, one particular individual may have an abhorrence for the number twelve
because of a tragedy of a deeply personal nature that is associated with the recollec-
tion of the twelfth day of a month, and he may even prefer the thirteenth day over the
twelfth for that reason. What is important to note here is that both inter-subjective and
person-specific rules are, under most circumstance, fallible in nature, being products of
guesswork and of prior beliefs which, however, does not prevent the reasoning subject
from making use of these in his reasoning and inference-making.
The question as to their efficacy in arriving at ‘truths’ is a deep one; even though
fallible, the rules are linked to past experience and, when used in conjunction with
rules of greater efficacy and the ‘internal censorship’ in our mind, they often guide the
cognitive process to a point not very far from a successful conclusion.
The issue of ‘rules’ in inferential processes has been addressed by Reber in [103] in a
manner at once subtle and nuanced.
According to the framework outlined above, heuristics play the role of inter-subjective
and person-specific rules made use of by the reasoning mind in the course of an inferen-
tial process, while, generally speaking, a number of inter-subjective and person-specific
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beliefs are also involved in the process for the purpose of judgment and evaluation at
various stages of the process, resulting in the decision as to whether the use of this or
that heuristic in the bridging of a logical gap is ‘acceptable’ or not. This latter purpose is
served, in a large measure, by psychological and somatic signals generated by emotions
associated with the beliefs.
Antonio R. Damasio has famously spoken of the role of somatic markers in the making
of decisions and inferences in [30], mostly based on neuro-physiological and neuro-
pathological observations.
The fact that inter-subjective and person-specific beliefs are often associated with emo-
tions that act as amplifying mechanisms in the mind is of likely relevance in making
some mental processes sensitive to initial conditions and, generally speaking, unpre-
dictable, in spite of being deterministic. This is an issue we will take up later in this
book, in chapter 9.
I close this section by emphasizing that beliefs in general, including the heuristics made
use of in inferential processes, are mostly lodged in the unconscious mind, without
the reasoning subject being aware of the action of these (incidentally, the commonly
used connotation of the term inter-subjective implies a conscious sharing of ideas or
thoughts, which means that our present use of the term is an extension of this common
usage). In other words, inferences are predominantly carried out by ‘hidden logic’ where
we have now stretched the meaning of the term ‘logic’ far beyond its commonly accepted
connotation. More specifically, we will occasionally be using this term to mean any set
of rules — whether inter-subjective or person-specific, and whether unconsciously or
consciously invoked — that may be made use of in an inferential process. The set of
‘rules’, moreover, may not be a consistent one and may result in an inferential act involv-
ing a network of branches and cross-links, making it a tangled process with complex
and contrary features.
The mechanism, outlined in the present chapter, relating to the possible role of beliefs
and emotions in inference is in the nature of a speculation without direct empirical
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support — though one that appears to me to be plausible enough so as to be accepted
as a working hypothesis. It is not inconsistent with views of experts in the field of
cognitive science as revealed, for instance, in comments in [112], chapter 1, where
Stanovich, by way of quoting the social and political theorist Jon Elster, speaks of the
distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘broad’ theories of rationality (the ‘rationality issue’ will
be addressed in the next chapter). The so-called thin theory “leaves un-examined the
beliefs and the desires that form the reasons for the action whose rationality we are
assessing”, while, in reality, “we need a broader theory of rationality that goes beyond
the exclusively formal considerations ... and that allows a scrutiny of the substantive
nature of the desires and beliefs in action.” Here Elster (and Stanovich too) wants
‘desires’ to be included in an adequate appraisal of rationality, in addition to ‘beliefs’.
I have not included desires in building up, in the above paragraphs, a hypothetical
scenario as to how the inferential process can actually proceed in the human mind,
where beliefs and emotions play a vital role (incidentally, desires are associated with
emotions too). The inclusion of desires is essential when one goes on to examine the
values governing the inferential process (I comment on this once again in the next
chapter). This book pleads incompleteness in opting to steer clear of this all-important
question of values in so far as these set the goals and purposes of inferential processes
in everyday life and in scientific explorations. Instead, I look at the inferential process
in the human mind as it proceeds with an aim to meet with given goals (earning a
Ph.D., or, winning a war).
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Chapter 7
Reasoning and rationality: the
intrinsic and the extrinsic
Epistemic irrationality
“Though this be madness, yet there is method in it.”
Starting from the mid-sixties of the last century, there has been a great profusion of
investigations, journal articles, books, critical analyses, and polemics in the literature
in cognitive psychology on the so-called rationality issue. What does it mean to say that,
in making an inference, a judgment, or a decision, a person is being rational, or else, is
deviating from standards of rationality?
Standards of rationality rest on evaluation in terms of sets of normative rules. An act
of inference (or one of making a judgment or decision) made in conformity with a set
of such rules then earns the accolade of being rational. The question, however, comes
up as to whether the rules are of an intrinsic or extrinsic nature. The actual process of
inference followed by an individual may involve the use of intrinsic rules specific to that
individual or of inter-subjective rules that may differ from the rules invoked to evaluate
his standard of rationality. In cases that the rules are of an inter-subjective nature,
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they may or may not be universal ones like, for instance, the rules of logic. The rules
that the individual makes use of can, moreover, vary from one inferential act to another
similar one and, what is more, may not even be fully known to that individual, since
they may operate tacitly. Indeed the ‘rules’ may be so diffuse as to be quite unlike what
goes by the name of rules. This raises the question of the extent to which the process of
reasoning and inference-making can be described and evaluated, by persons other than
the individual drawing the inference, in terms of a set of explicit rules invoked for the
purpose of evaluation.
All this is sometimes expressed by saying that normative accounts of reasoning and
decision making may differ from descriptive ones. However, this raises a subtle residual
problem: can the internal psychological process in a person making an inference or a
decision be at all amenable to a descriptive account by either the individual concerned
or by some other person attempting the description?
Before engaging with these questions of central relevance, I’ll relate to you in a few
sketchy paragraphs as to what type of norms the cognitive psychologists have had in
mind in conducting their psychological investigations by means of tests conducted on
individuals as also on groups of individuals in the context of various types of ‘tasks’
given to them. It turns out that the performance of the subjects of these investigations
is, generally speaking, rather ordinary, indicative of a rather low level of ‘rationality’ of
these individuals. This makes necessary a re-examination of the concept of rationality
that these investigations seek to reveal.
The rationality issue: a brief overview
For the purpose of the present discussion, I will use the term inference-making to in-
clude such psychological processes as deductive and inductive reasoning, making de-
cisions involving choices between available options, and making judgments as to the
relative probabilities of beliefs in the face of available evidence. Evidently, the processes
mentioned in this list are not sharply differentiated from one another, since there ex-
ists a good deal of diffuseness in the definition of each of these and, at the same time,
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a good deal of overlap. For instance, it is only appropriate that the term ‘reasoning’
should refer to processes involving the use of rules to some considerable degree where
the rules should be inter-subjective or, more preferably, universal ones like the rules of
logic. By this token, making a deductive inference should qualify as an act of reason-
ing. An inductive inference, on the other hand, is essentially one of informed guessing,
where rules are defined much less sharply and the term reasoning is of dubious validity,
though an act of inductive inference does involve the processing of information. On the
other hand, an inductive inference involves the formation of new beliefs or the revision
of our judgment as to how probable our beliefs are when faced with one or more new
items of evidence. In the same vein, decision making involves the making of a number
of inferences where one has to weigh the consequences of choosing between a set of
alternatives.
Let us consider deductive reasoning first since it is a form of inference where one ex-
pects that people will be most ‘logical’, and will conform to normative or evaluative rules
to a large extent. Mathematical deduction is taken to be the ultimate form of deductive
reasoning, but most psychological tests are performed with much more simple forms
closer to our everyday exercises in deduction, one widely studied form being syllogistic
reasoning where a few premises are supplied and the subject is asked to check whether
a proposed conclusion follows from these. In most cases, the answer is uniquely ob-
tained by the application of modus ponens (‘affirming the antecedent’) or modus tollens
(‘denying the consequent’) or combinations of these, or else (in the case of more complex
syllogistic tasks), by the use of Euler diagrams ([85], chapter 2), where these constitute
the normative rules for this form of inference making. However, people do not always
follow the normative rules (which, incidentally, are universal ones in that these do not
involve inter-subjective rules of limited validity, or person-specific rules) and are com-
monly found to arrive at erroneous conclusions. In particular, errors are quite frequent
in the case of syllogisms or logical tasks posed in abstract terms. Subjects perform bet-
ter when the tasks are posed in terms of concrete themes and concepts that they can
relate to, but then they appear not to follow consistently the valid rules of syllogistic
reasoning, but to respond contextually, i.e., by relying heavily on their interpretation of
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the tasks and by referring to their prior knowledge, concepts, and beliefs. For instance,
they are found to exhibit belief bias ([81], [85], chapter 4, [125], chapter 11) i.e., they
tend to avoid logically valid conclusions if these go against firmly entrenched beliefs of
theirs and, conversely, favor invalid conclusions if these are supported by their prior
beliefs.
Refer to our previous discussion of belief as an evaluative element in inference. Inci-
dentally, a rule that says that people often make inferences in syllogistic reasoning by
weighting these with their beliefs held in common with others (a fear of the number
thirteen, for instance), itself constitutes an instance of an inter-subjective but non-
universal rule since it is not sanctioned by universal rules of logic but is still found to
be used commonly while assessing the performance of subjects in psychological tests.
In other words, as far as the psychological processing of information goes, people often
convert deductive tasks to ones resembling inductive inference (recall our earlier dis-
cussion of ‘problem view’ and ‘process view’ in chapter 4) and arrive at conclusions that
are fallible and are not strictly necessary consequences of the given premises.
The next type of inferential tasks we will consider is decision making. Recall that we
have used the term inference-making in a broad setting, where it includes the making
of decisions. Suppose you are in a gambling frame of mind and have two gambling
options open, each with some specific probability of win and an associated pay-off in
money terms, and you want to decide as to which of the two gambles to accept. In real
life, we continually face such ‘gambles’ where we have to choose from a set of uncertain
outcomes, with each outcome associated with consequences that may or may not be
preferred by us when compared with the consequences of the other possible outcomes.
In order to make a successful choice one needs to do some reasoning and inferring.
More generally, most reasoning and inference-making tasks in real life involve a lot of
implicit decision-making in that the sequence of information processing steps through
which an inference proceeds require decisions to be made (mostly without conscious
awareness) as to which of several alternate courses to follow in order to arrive at a
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successful conclusion. Psychological tests on decision making, however, are performed
on explicit decision making tasks such as a concretely specified gambling situation.
The normative theory one starts with in gambling tasks is the ‘expected value’ theory
where one calculates the expected values associated with the various possible choices in
accordance with their respective probabilities and value outcomes, and then makes the
choice with the maximum expected value. However, for the sake of generality, monetary
value is to be replaced with subjective utility, where the latter is based on a subjective
scale of preference that may not be amenable to specification in quantitative terms
([112], chapter 2). Further, the probabilities associated with the various different choices
cannot, generally speaking, be assigned specific values. Still, a normative theory can be
postulated in terms of a set of axioms of choice ([112], chapter 2), where a subject can be
said to make rational decisions if she consistently adheres to these axioms. Consistency
with these axioms then constitutes the normative principle of decision making.
For instance, the transitivity axiom tells us that if choice A is preferred over choice B
and, in turn, choice B is preferred over choice C, then choice A has to be preferred over
choice C. While this appears to be unexceptionable enough as a requirement for ratio-
nality, actual psychological tests have shown that people’s choice is often stamped with
context effects when it comes to the transitivity axiom or other equally logical axioms of
choice. Thus, unknown to the cognitive psychologist, the question of choice between A
and C may bring in subtle context effects in the form of associations from past experi-
ence that result in C being preferred over A . For instance, to take a hypothetical and
unlikely example just for the sake of illustration, a person may have a preference of even
numbers over odd numbers and, among odd numbers, a preference of those divisible
by thee over those that are not, as a result of which she prefers 12 over 9, and 9 over
5, but when it comes to the question of choosing between 12 and 5 she expresses a
preference for the latter number for a completely different reason (perhaps in a recently
held ‘lucky draw’ she was asked to choose between these two numbers, when the choice
of the number 5 proved to be lucky for her). Once again, the normative principle may
be overridden by or conjoined with beliefs held by people, and the choices that people
actually make in psychological tests of decision making deviate notably from what is
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assumed by cognitive psychologists to be the norm in decision tasks ([112], chapter 2,
[125], chapter 11).
I will conclude by briefly outlining a similar deviation from the normative principles
relating to belief revision. Do people correctly judge their beliefs to be true or false?
Are the beliefs consistent with one another? Do people correctly update their beliefs
when confronted with new evidence? In short, do the beliefs held by an individual
correctly reflect the state of the world as perceived by her? All of these relate to what
can be termed the epistemic rationality of a subject ([112], chapter 1). If beliefs are all
we go by when making inferences (which, in the present context, includes the making
of decisions), then a necessary condition for the inferences to be on the right track is
that the beliefs should have a good measure of correspondence with the actual state of
affairs ‘out there’, since the world at large is the ultimate source from which the beliefs
are formed and, moreover, is the source of the ‘premises’ on which these beliefs are made
to operate (many of the premises are themselves in the nature of beliefs). Indeed, beliefs
are the end results of inductive inference in the context of novel or salient situations,
which implies that an act of inductive inference can be interpreted, in a broad sense, as
one of belief revision by means of available evidence.
The normative principle for such belief revision is made up of the axioms of probability
theory, along with a number of logical deductions from it, notably the principle known
as Bayes’ theorem — a mathematical formula relating the ‘prior probability’ of a belief or
a hypothesis (say, H), to its ‘revised probability’ resulting from an ‘evidence’ (E) coming
to light. The revised probability represents the degree of belief in H, given that E is true
(i.e., is observed for a fact), and may be denoted by the symbol P(H|E) while the prior
probability P(H) is the degree of belief in H without regard to E. The formula involves two
other probabilities, namely, P(E|H), i.e., the likelihood of E occurring as a consequence
of H and, in addition, the probability P(E|∼ H), i.e., the likelihood that E occurs as a con-
sequence of any and every hypothesis other than H, the two taken together determining
P(E), the unconditional probability of E being true.
Epistemic rationality is said to obtain if a subject updates her degree of belief in a hy-
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pothesis (I avoid the clumsy phrase ‘degree of belief in a belief’) in conformity with Bayes’
formula. The question that immediately comes up is, can one ever hope to assign re-
liable values to all these various probabilities? However, it has been argued that exact
probability values are, in effect, not as important as consistency with the formula: what
one needs to do in order to be counted as a rational agent is to be consistent with
Bayes’ formula in a qualitative sense ([112], chapter 3; see also [105], chapter 5, where
Rosenberg examines the question of rationality in respect of scientific hypotheses and
theories), without regard to exact probability values. In order to test how rational a sub-
ject is, a cognitive psychologist provides a subject with values of the probabilities P(E),
P(H), and P(E|H) (or values from which these probabilities can be worked out), and asks
him to estimate what the value of P(H|E) would be. In large numbers of tests of various
descriptions of this type, it has been found that people deviate in substantial measure
from the axioms of probability theory (recall that Bayes’ theorem is a logical corollary
of the basic probability axioms). For instance, subjects often neglect to consider the
base rates, i.e., the unconditional probabilities of hypotheses and, at times, tend to
place P(H|E) on the same footing as P(E|H). Generally speaking, a number of deviations
from Bayes’ principle can be interpreted as implying that people assign a greater degree
of significance to concrete evidence than to abstract statistical information which, in a
sense, is a context effect over again. In other words, people pick out what is more salient
to them with reference to their information base while ignoring information less salient
in their perception. However, salience is perception-dependent and is determined sub-
stantially by the belief structure of an individual, which goes to show that the way we
set about to revise our beliefs when confronted with evidence, is itself dependent on our
existing belief structure.
One other major deviation from the basic logic underlying Bayes’ principle relates to
‘ignoring the alternatives’, i.e., not paying adequate attention to P(E|∼ H), the likelihood
of the evidence E being true under hypotheses other than the hypothesis H under con-
sideration. In other words, we tend to revise our beliefs in a ‘dogmatic’ manner — while
focusing on some particular belief H (which is more often than not made salient by a set
of existing beliefs), we tend not to examine how likely it is that the evidence concerned
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can be explained in terms of alternative hypotheses: we are biased by our existing be-
liefs.
All these deviations in probabilistic inference notwithstanding, humans are found to
be pretty good detectors of frequencies of occurrence of various kinds of stimuli re-
ceived as inputs from the environment, and of degrees of covariation between groups
of stimuli (see [112], [103]), where much of this ability of frequency detection seems to
have been acquired in the process of biological evolution, and is in the nature of an
innate or unconscious one.
Significantly, the same Bayesian approach is commonly assumed to provide the nor-
mative basis of how scientific theories are confirmed by evidence coming up through
experimentation and observation, because theories are based on hypotheses that are
arrived at by inductive inference (one belonging to a special category, namely, abduc-
tion). The confirmation of scientific theories is a widely discussed and debated issue
in the philosophy of science where there have been many attempts at working out a
normative principle of confirmation. No such logically sound normative principle has
been arrived at (refer to [105], chapter 5, mentioned above), paralleling the fact that no
normative principle of belief revision can be formulated that describes with any degree
of universality the actual inferential processes of individuals.
Rationality: misplaced notions
I will not dwell further upon how and to what extent actual inference-making by in-
dividuals deviates from normative principles made use of by cognitive psychologists in
evaluating the level of rationality commonly achieved by people (see, for instance, [37],
[36], in addition to references mentioned above) . Indeed, the entire complex of cognitive
processes in individuals is heavily context-driven. For instance, the process of memory
recall, one of great importance in inference-making, is biased by relevance which, in
turn, is influenced by the immediate goal or purpose, and by available data, informa-
tion, pieces of knowledge, associations, and beliefs (i.e., in other words, memory recall
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is, to a large extent, a ‘top-down’ process), since an unbiased search of the entire ‘data
base’ in memory constitutes a computational task of enormous proportions ([125], chap-
ter 3) . Whichever way one looks at it, inference-making by individuals appears to be
non-ideal and less-than-rational, having only a limited correspondence with objective
normative principles supposed to be infallible guides to successful reasoning.
It is only rarely that people base their reasoning exclusively on deductive logic or axioms
of probability, or axioms of choice, or strategies in game theory. Instead, they guess,
mostly under situations of uncertainty, and make copious use of their beliefs and of
an enormous store of heuristics — thumb rules, hunches, and clues — in arriving at
inferences. And, remarkably, this entire complex process of inference-making is largely
carried out by the cognitive unconscious.
Significantly, the process of inference making turns out to be, on the whole, epistem-
ically authentic in spite of the deviation of the inferential processes from normative
principles, as discussed above. This is to be explained by referring to the fact that the
belief-driven inferential process is heavily influenced by past experience, in which past
successes play a positive role as compared with past failures, and also to the fact that
inferences are subjected to incessant tests and checks, this time against rules that are
relatively more solidly grounded ones.
The large body of data accumulated over the years from rationality tests of varied types,
has been interpreted differently by different groups of cognitive psychologists. One ma-
jor interpretation involves the viewpoint that human inference-making is a fundamen-
tally flawed process, biased by beliefs and heuristics, the latter, according to this point
of view, being the vehicles that take human reasoning away from normative efficiency.
In contrast there is an alternative point of view that there is no question of any fun-
damental flaw being there in human reasoning which is, on the contrary, effective and
adaptive. Human rationality, instead of being flawed or biased, is bounded [110], [45]
in the face of the fact that most real life inferential tasks are, computationally speaking,
of unbounded complexity. Moreover, most inferential tasks are necessarily carried out
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under uncertainty and on the basis of incomplete data where, in the specific context
of any particular task, the probabilistic and choice-theoretic approaches do not make
much sense, and guessing becomes a necessity. In other words, because of uncertain-
ties inherent in most situations, and of limitations of available data, and also because
of bounded rationality in the face of unbounded complexity of most inferential tasks,
humans have to place a high value on being effective rather than normative, where the
effectiveness is achieved mostly at the level of the unconscious, by means of acquired be-
liefs and heuristics that make possible fast and frugal reasoning [86]. Concurrently, the
cognitive process draws upon biologically evolved capacities of the mind (refer to [103],
chapter 3, mentioned earlier in chapter 5 of this book; we will again refer to ideas gained
from evolutionary psychology in respect inferential processes in later sections).
Based on bounded rationality, the cognitive system makes effective use of its elementary
inferential abilities (detection of patterns of covariance and similarities in environmental
inputs) developed in a long evolutionary process — abilities that get diversified and
sharpened in the developmental process of the individual, where communications with
other individuals in a community sharing a common culture play a vital role. All this
results in an effective inferential ability of an adaptive nature. The cognitive system
of bounded abilities focuses on and makes use of the essential features of the inputs
received from the environment, depending on its immediate goals, without entering into
an unbounded search process when faced with a complex setting. Its belief system,
along with emotional mechanisms of amplification helps in the ‘selection’ of an effective
inferential path.
The less-than-ideal and bounded rationality is, in essence, a strength since it limits the
search for relevance and meaning in the multitude of environmental inputs and makes
the search effective. In order to be able to judge and compare, a system has to be able
to make a ‘meaningful selection’.
It is now time to collect what we have come up with so far so as to put together a
plausible framework of the way the inferential process can conceivably be carried out in
the human mind.
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In so far as an inference involves a processing of information in the mind, it is in the
nature of a sequential application of rules — broadly speaking, rules of implication
— where, however, the rules are not of uniform measure of generality. At the top of the
ladder are the universal rules of logic and mathematics — ones that are independent
of context (i.e., the state of the world within which the inferential process is carried
out), including the specific context defined by the web of beliefs of the individual, with
her associated emotional referents, and the more general context of inter-subjective
beliefs. Then comes the less general class of rules that are of an inter-subjective nature
— ones that are not specific to an individual, but are still based on shared beliefs of
a class of inference-making subjects. And, finally, one has to reckon with person-
specific rules that are relevant within the inferential process of the individual but have
no broader significance. Among these, the inter-subjective and the person-specific rules
are context-dependent — not only the belief-laden psychological context of the individual
or of groups of individuals, but the more general contextual setting as well, the state
of the world if you like, within which the inferential problem is defined, including its
‘inputs’ and the desired ‘output’.
The ‘rules’ (the universal ones and the inter-subjective and person-specific ones of a
belief-laden, heuristic nature) operate upon beliefs that get involved in the various stages
of the inferential process, and make use of the knowledge base, memories of past experi-
ence, and the tangled mass of other beliefs, along with their associated emotional links.
In this, the inferential process proceeds in the form of a bundle of a tangled sequences
of ‘information processing’ executed in parallel, eventually ending up in a ‘conclusion’
or an ‘output’ that is more often than not a more or less diffuse bundle of concepts
and beliefs (either newly formed ones or ones produced by modification or revision of
previously formed beliefs) itself.
And what is more, the rules are seldom of an explicit nature in that they cannot be
formulated or described with any degree of completeness by the individual engaged in
the inferential act, or by an external agency — by, say, the cognitive psychologist. The
reason lies in two things — first, the person-specific or group-specific, non-universal
nature of the rules and of the context defining the inferential process (‘personal knowl-
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edge’); and, secondly, the predominantly tacit nature of the process, where most of the
processing is carried out within the unconscious stratum of the cognitive mind.
When looked at within this complex setting, the mass of psychological data telling us
of the less-than-rational status of human inferential act does not appear surprising
because the norms or evaluative standards invoked for the purpose of judging rationality
are at odds with the actual manner in which the mind engages in inference-making. It
is within such a complex setting that the rationality issue is to be addressed for an
adequate resolution. Any simplification by restriction to a less complex setting is likely
to result in an incomplete and misleading idea of rationality.
This, in essence, is indicative of the naturalist approach to the rationality issue. How-
ever, the naturalist point of view cannot be limited to just the question of how the
cognitive inferential processes actually occur in the human mind, because that, even
when amenable to being addressed meaningfully, amounts to just a plain description.
Of equally vital relevance are the issues of sharing of abilities between individuals and
communities so as to develop and improve upon the currently existing inferential fac-
ulties, and of examining the goals and values underlying the inferential processes. All
this refers to broader ethical and moral questions relating to human reasoning, in-
ference, and decision making, and to the question of responsible decision in a social
context. The naturalist approach has to address all these issues to be a really effective
and useful one. These broader questions will not be addressed in this book because
of essential limitations on the part of its author, due to which he feels inadequate for
such an undertaking.
The dual-process theory
It is here that I want to draw your attention to a currently favored view of the nature of
information processing in the human mind — the dual-process theory. This is a view
subscribed to by a good number of exponents in cognitive science and is based on the
assumption, consistent with a large body of literature, that human cognitive process
involves two distinct streams — process-one and process-two. Of the two, the former is
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a fast, non-deliberative, massively parallel and autonomous process, while the latter is
a slow and deliberative one, predominantly based on sequential processing that makes
copious use of working memory. Significantly, process-two is perceived as being capable
of acting as the control of the cognitive process as a whole.
The question of control is a complex and non-trivial one, though. Commonly, the
controlling action of cognitive processes is assumed to be exercised by the conscious
mind. However, it is not unlikely that much of the controlling action is, in fact, exe-
cuted without overt awareness [124].
The dual-process theory is fundamentally in the nature of a suggestive and fruitful hy-
pothesis — somewhat in the nature of a metaphor — a prototype theory that provides a
framework for interpreting and explaining quite a large body of observations and infor-
mation. As in many other areas of cognitive science, it is a useful heuristic itself.
Process-two operates on the basis of rules of relatively more general scope such as the
universal ones of mathematics and logic, and the inter-subjective ones that some rela-
tively large group of individuals make use of while being aware of these as reasonably
reliable beliefs, though not foolproof ones (a number of chess heuristics, for instance,
or a few — too few? — of the heuristics that stockbrokers make use of). Process-one on
the other hand, is based on ‘rules’ of a more primitive kind operating, in the main, in
the unconscious recesses of the cognitive mind — the person-specific ones and the rela-
tively more fallible ones of the inter-subjective type, along with heuristics of some proven
worth. While process-two is executed with at least some measure of focal awareness,
process-one is more tacit and is in the nature of a default. While the rules in process-
two are, broadly speaking, those of implication, those in process-one are less distinctly
so, being based, to a larger extent, on processes of association. Finally, process-one is of
an adaptive nature, where it is required to be effective in achieving some useful purpose
or goal in the specific environment in which it operates while process-two is a delibera-
tive one where epistemic goals acquire relevance. In other words, process-one is geared
to achieving what is referred to as instrumental rationality, in contrast to process-two
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in which epistemic rationality (‘what is the world like?’) is of greater relevance ([112],
chapter 1).
What is of great significance is the manner in which these two process types interact
in the course of an inference. This, of course, is a matter of speculation though, once
again, one that may prove to be useful and suggestive in some considerable measure.
It seems likely that both the processes run simultaneously though process-two has
periods of relative latency while, at the same time, there occurs a continual transfer of
control to it when it evaluates, by means of comparatively secure rules of implication,
some intermediate idea, concept, or belief produced in the course of activity of process-
one, and passes on the ‘result’ of that evaluation to the latter which is then used as an
ingredient in the further processing of information carried out autonomously of process-
two. In this, process-two is likely to contribute its own quota of information processing
(apart from evaluating and justifying what process-one has handed over to it), handing
back a more ‘finished output’ to process-one.
Medawar speaks of “a rapid reciprocation between an imaginative and a critical pro-
cess, between imaginative conjecture and critical evaluation” ([88], p 44) in the context
of the so-called hypothetico-deductive method of science, championed by Popper. The
hypothetico-deductive method presupposes a distinction between phases of ‘discovery’
and ‘justification’ in scientific exploration. The two, however, can be distinguished only
notionally since they are but two aspects of the same inferential process. The dual-
process theory speaks of a more intimate mix of the ‘imaginative’ and the ‘critical’
processes where it need not even be necessary that there be two separate processes
involved. A more likely scenario is that the inferential process is a single complex one
involving ‘imaginative’ leaps and rule-driven ‘critical’ sequences. The latter picture of
the inferential process is not inconsistent with the one hinted at in this book.
The ‘context of discovery’ is seldom addressed and analyzed in logical and philosoph-
ical discourse, since it is assumed to belong to the realm of psychology. However,
psychology is no exception to the ‘logic’ engendered by the operation of causal connec-
tions. The ‘logic’ of the cognitive unconscious may be something completely different
143
CHAPTER 7. REASONING AND RATIONALITY: THE INTRINSIC AND THE EXTRINSIC
from the logic found in textbooks, but it does operate on the basis of ‘rules’ neverthe-
less — rules of less than universal validity. In particular, as repeatedly hinted at in
this book, the rules may have deep moorings in beliefs and emotions of a personal na-
ture. The apathy, found in conventional logical and philosophical discourse, towards
an analysis of the context of discovery was questioned by Hanson, who looked for a
‘logic of discovery’, thereby contributing important insights into the process of abduc-
tion. Hanson, however, fell short of analyzing the deeply psychological roots of the
logic of discovery [52], [53]. In particular, it is likely that the ‘evaluation’ of an inferen-
tial process is carried out, in a large measure, within process-one itself, through the
involvement of neural aggregates operating as ‘pleasure centers’ in the brain. These
neural aggregates are of early evolutionary origin but are co-opted, in a manner of
speaking, in complex inferential and cognitive activities of the mind.
It is in this transfer of process control from process-one to process-two and back (the
“restless to-and-fro motion of thought” spoken of by Medawar in [88], p 48) where one
is likely to find the clue to the way the reasoning capacity of an individual evolves in
the course of his or her developmental history, and to the remarkable difference in the
reasoning capacities of individuals as also to the difference in modes of reasoning of
individuals and across cultures.
To be more specific, there are, in all likelihood, two things involved here, one dependent
on the other. First, the quantity and quality of the vast repertoire of beliefs and heuris-
tics that one can draw from in the course of an inference. And, secondly, the manner
and the frequency of transfer of control from process-one to process-two as mentioned
above or, speaking in more general terms, the manner of interaction between the two
processes. When one stops to think of it, there can be an infinite range of variation in
the mode and efficacy of the inferential process, depending on the interplay of these two
factors. But one cannot say more since one has to draw a line here before indulging in
dangerously unfounded speculation.
Emotion-driven processes play a great role in leading to remarkable variations in the
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reasoning capacities among individuals, and to the progressive development of the
reasoning capacity of a single individual. Success in an inferential act is a potent
emotional factor that inspires enhanced performance in subsequent acts of inference
of related kinds. Success elicits recognition and acknowledgment from peers, and
public approval as well — all of these intoxicating indeed. No less intoxicating is the
internally generated affect relating to success, and the resulting sense of confidence,
of which a likely consequence is a heightened ability to explore possible alternatives
in an inferential process — picking up cues in profusion from environmental inputs
and making remarkable use of heuristics made available by the cognitive unconscious
under the amplifying action of favorable emotions. In other words, emotions have an
amplifying psychological role that may produce dramatic effects in the development of
cognitive skills.
Numerous exponents of the dual-process theory converge on the opinion that process-
one is of more ancient evolutionary origin than process-two, and there also appears to
be a widespread acceptance of the view that the cognitive system, especially the one
involved in process-one inference, comes equipped with a considerably developed tool-
kit for adaptive thinking that has emerged in the course of biological evolution. While
the ‘tool-kit’ is of an innate nature, it gets expressed [29] in the course of individual
developmental process — a process greatly influenced by the cultural environment of
the individual. However, it is no less likely that the innate inferential capacity of evo-
lutionary vintage is supplemented with capacities not originating in biological evolution
but ones developing in a secondary process in the course of the inferential history of
the individual, though this is once again a point where speculation is apt to become too
nebulous.
In any case, it is not unlikely that the dual-process viewpoint is a pointer in the right
direction, though it is still somewhat in the nature of a suggestive hypothesis. While nu-
merous psychological experiments seem to support the viewpoint and appear to make
the distinction between process-one and process-two reasonably sharp and well de-
fined, evidence from neuroscience is less direct, since it seems unlikely that there exist
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clearly demarcated neural aggregates devoted to the two types of processing. It may, for
instance, turn out that the dual-process point of view will be supplanted by a more elab-
orate theory involving an integrated but complex processing system, with the inferential
process circulating between various ‘depths’ of this system. But that, for now, is beside
the point. What really matters is that the dual-process view is not in discernible con-
flict with known facts, is consistent with numerous psychological tests, and is a richly
suggestive one, providing clues to a more enriched understanding of human cognition.
The distinction between process-one and process-two has an intriguing parallel with
that between inductive and deductive inference, since it seems but natural to surmise
that induction and deduction are based predominantly in process-one and process-
two respectively. The observation that every inference has aspects of deduction and
induction intertwined with each other is then consistent with the one that process-one
and process-two are deeply enmeshed in everlasting interaction with each other as well.
Put differently, the dual-process point of view provides an enriched understanding of
inferential processes in general and of inductive inference in particular.
Finally, the dual-process hypothesis supplies an appropriate and enlightening perspec-
tive to the ‘rationality issue’. Commonly invoked norms of rationality are capable, in
some measure, of evaluating the performance of process-two but not of process-one
which occurs mostly outside the domain of focal awareness and makes use of hidden
resources presumably replete with heuristics, beliefs, and emotional links of a deeply
personal nature. There exists a proposal that instead of one single rationality, one has
to think in terms of two types of rationality, as espoused by Evans and Over ( [37], p 8):
a ‘personal rationality’, and an ‘impersonal rationality’. In a manner analogous to the
dual-process view, it tells us that the rationality issue is more complex than what it has
been supposed to be.
I will wind up this section by pointing out that there is speculation in two directions
here: speculation that cognition in general and inferential acts in particular involve two
streams of processing of information at the psychological level — namely, process-one
and process-two that have distinct and complementary characteristics; and specula-
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tion that cognition and inference-making are based on person-specific resources and
resources of an inter-subjective nature that have a kinship with person-specific ones.
The former is a hypothesis shared by a good number of experts in cognitive psychology
and is acknowledged to be a richly suggestive point of view that is likely to pave the way
to a more complete and meaningful theory of cognition. The latter, on the other hand,
is more of a speculation, but one that dovetails rather seamlessly with the dual-process
view and gives it substance. But, at the same time, it increases the complexity of the
problem of understanding human inference-making by one clear notch.
Complexity
Does it pay to make a problem more complex than it at first appears to be? Shouldn’t
one rather look for simplifications so as to reach at the heart of the problem? One does
not really hope to have a compelling answer to this, as there is no compelling answer
to the ultimately right method to be followed in science. We will have more to ponder
over this question in chapters to follow. But one can safely say that it does not really
pay to make a problem too complex by bringing in all the innumerable details that may
conceivably be relevant to it, because too much of details stands in the way of building
up a meaningful theory. However, the question of complexity is of relevance at a deeper
level of theory building. When looked at from such a deeper level, the question of the
relevance of person-specific psychological resources in inference-making does appear
to deserve attention. Related to this is the question of a basic non-determinability in
psychological processes that is likely to have a bearing on the issue at hand.
The unpredictable
Consider a dynamical system that is known to be of a deterministic nature, having some
well defined causal rules of evolution of its own. Several questions at a deeper level
now come up and demand attention. First, even if the system in question does have
a well defined set of causal rules of evolution of its own, can those rules be known to
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us? Can we fathom out what the rules are? Or, are there hidden substrata to the
system that have an essential control over its behavior, ones that stand in the way of an
external agency (the cognitive psychologist and the neuroscientist in the present context)
fathoming out the rule(s) of causal evolution of mental states? The history of science
provides us with a partial answer to this question that we will be presently having a
look at. Secondly, how important is the role of the context in which the behavior of the
system is observed — what is the role of the environment in which the system is made
to evolve? As far as the course of an inferential act is concerned, this is linked with the
first question posed above, in that the internal context based on hidden psychological
resources of an individual does seem likely to have an essential role in the dynamics of
the cognitive system and so, we will now have to concentrate on the possibility of the
external context having a role in the cognitive process. And, finally, even disregarding
the question of context and that of the rules determining the system behavior being
hidden from us, does a deterministic system dynamics guarantee that the behavior of
the system is determinable?
All these are questions of vital relevance for our purpose. Starting with the third of the
above questions first, the answer is already known to be a big no. An overwhelmingly
large set of dynamical systems obeying even simple dynamical laws of a determinis-
tic nature are known to be non-determinable, where the lack of determinability arises
from sensitivity to initial conditions ([11], chapter 9) engendered by an essential nonlin-
earity in the system behavior. There may, however, exist large domains of observation
where this non-determinability does not appear to be of essential relevance. A very big
chunk of physics, for instance, rests on the linear behavior of the harmonic oscillator
and on the nonlinear but deterministic dynamics of two bodies interacting by means
of the gravitational interaction, where results of stupendous relevance have been ar-
rived at. At the same time, there exist well defined approximation schemes where weak
nonlinearities of the oscillator and weak perturbations over the two-body gravitational
interaction can be taken into account in arriving at remarkable results over an even
broader range of observations, without any of the non-determinability coming to the
fore. In other words, just the possibility of non-determinability does not necessarily
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mean that the non-determinability is relevant. This, however, does not tell us the whole
story. There remain entire areas of observation where the non-determinability does
acquire relevance. While a linear oscillator behaves in a determinable manner under
a periodic external perturbation, the behavior of a nonlinear oscillator is of a wholly
different nature, being, under certain circumstances, chaotic in nature. A similar in-
cursion of chaos occurs in the behavior of three gravitating bodies under quite realistic
conditions. One finds here that the question of non-determinable (but deterministic)
dynamics is linked up with that of the context-dependence of system behavior, where
the effect of the environment comes to the fore.
Even for a system with a chaotic dynamics, many coarse-grained features of the sys-
tem behavior may be amenable to description and explanation.
The essential role of the context
Speaking in general terms, there is, of course, nothing new in the observation that the
environment influences system behavior. There does remain the possibility, though, of
something deeply intriguing in a certain kind of context-dependence, of which the fore-
most example is that of a quantum mechanical system, where the idea of the system
having some pre-determined value of an observable quantity regardless of measure-
ments performed on it to reveal that value, is not a valid one. Here the very context
of measurement determines which of a possible set of values comes up with what de-
gree of likelihood. The case of the psychological state of an individual has an uncanny
similarity with the quantum situation, though the context-dependence of psychological
states we are now looking at has little to do with quantum indeterminacy. The psy-
chological state of an individual is often indeterminate without reference to his or her
external context (the internal context, on the other hand, is implicit in the very idea
of a psychological state). Consider, for instance, a simple situation when an individual
is to choose sequentially (choice between A and B, B and C, C and A) from among a
set of alternatives. Does there exist a prior order of preference for the alternatives in
the psychological state of the individual regardless of the context in which the choice
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is exercised? Not necessarily, because, for one thing, he does not always conform to
the axioms of choice, of which the transitivity axiom is one (refer back to this sction for
a brief outline). Consider, in a similar vein, a number of consumer items, with speci-
fied prices, available to a housewife in the market. But the mere availability with their
price tags (along with a given set of internal beliefs, desires, and necessities of hers)
may not suffice in uniquely determining her choice in a marketing expedition since the
beliefs, desires, et cetera, find different expressions towards different sets of things and
in different situations external to her.
The question of context in the making of inferences in general, and of making an induc-
tive inference in particular, is a deep and broad one, needing reference to ‘external’ and
‘internal’ aspects of the context, as I indicated in chapter 2 (see section entitled All ob-
servations and theories are contextual) while referring to the contextuality of scientific
concepts and theories. More generally, any inferential act is constrained and condi-
tioned by external and internal contexts in a complex manner. The external context
includes signals received from the environment that set the purpose of the inferential
act in question, including the ones that trigger the process of inference. The internal
context, on the other hand, is made up by the mental resources that are brought to bear
in realizing the course of the inferential process.
What is important to realize is that these two aspects are not independent of each other
and are deeply intertwined, and that neither can be made explicit in terms of a set of
symbols having specific connotations. The external context, for instance, includes sig-
nals picked up by the cognitive mind — but, how does the cognitive mind decide which
signals to pick out from among the infinite number of signals sent out from the envi-
ronment at any given instant? Evidently, the decision depends on some kind of salience
and relevance with reference to the purpose of the inferential process under consider-
ation. But, salience and relevance are matters of judgment that, in turn, require a set
of inferential processes where internal resources of the cognitive mind are activated.
Moreover, a vast number of cues are picked up, at any given point of time, from the
environment by way of tacit or implicit cognition. Some of these implicitly received in-
puts are made use of in the currently activated inferential process, while some others
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are stored in some form or other for use on future occasions. Myriads of cues picked
up from the environment (mostly unconsciously) are made use of by the cognitive mind
so as to make up the store of heuristics that act as rules in the inferential process (see
below), again, mostly at an unconscious level. The rules constitute a major part of the
internal context of the inferential process.
The internal resources of the cognitive mind mentioned above, some of which are brought
to bear in any given inferential task, thereby setting the internal context of the latter,
make up a vast canvass. This includes the belief system of the individual concerned,
her knowledge base and memory of past experiences and, over and above all this, her
emotions and affects that play a crucial role in her inference making. Most of these
internal resources are made use of within the unconscious strata of the cognitive mind,
in the form of rules or, more generally, as causal links in the process of inference. Rules
made use of in inference are referred to throughout this book in a variety of contexts.
I summarize below a number of major considerations underlying the idea of inferential
rules.
The rules of inference-making
The process of inference is not a random or sporadic one. It has a point of origin in one
or more mental representations that constitute the premises of the inference, as also a
second set of representations making up the conclusion. In between, the cognitive mind
proceeds through a series of intermediate sets of representations, where the transition
from one set of intermediate representations to the next can be thought of as being
effected by means of rules that operate in a manner analogous to ‘if — then’ clauses
used in everyday linguistic expressions and also in computational processes. In a more
general description, the transition from one set of intermediate representations to the
next may be said to occur due to a set of causal mechanisms.
Of course, one cannot rule out some involvement of sporadic processes in an inferen-
tial act, since the cognitive mind remains forever engaged in processes of an associative
nature, with associations being established between elements of thought without any
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specific purpose. Indeed, this apparently aimless but incessant process of associa-
tion may be assumed to result in a vast repertoire of heuristics, to be made use of in
diverse inferential acts as the necessity arises.
A second qualification that seems necessary here is that the sequence of transitions
in an inferential process need not form a well defined linear one where intermediate
premises are passed through one after another. More plausibly, the intermediate
representations form a clumsy tangle where the sequence branches out, backtracks,
and is crossed with many sub-sequences that arise from ‘trials and errors’ on the part
of the cognitive mind.
Finally, as I summarize below, the rules and causal mechanisms cover a wide spec-
trum as regards their structure, ranging from universal rules at one end to deeply
person-specific ones at the other, where emotions and feelings make their presence
felt. Possibly, some of the person-specific rules are so diffuse and implicit that it may
be quite impossible to identify these as causal links. However, I adopt the position that
the cognitive process is predominantly a causal one, though the network of causation,
in all likelihood, is vast, diffuse, and enormously complex.
As mentioned several times in the foregoing chapters, the spectrum of rules acting as
the causal links in an inferential process can, at a rough reckoning, be described as
being made up of universal rules, inter-subjective but not universal ones, and finally,
the person-specific rules. The universal rules include those of logic and mathematics
and, in addition, rules that have gained universal acceptance by the force of experience
and have been incorporated as knowledge (if a liquid is heated, it will eventually turn
into vapor). While universal rues are inter-subjective, not all inter-subjective rules are
universal, notable among which are the ones imbibed from some particular cultural
environment (old men are not to be relied upon; women are of a delicate mental make-
up; the number thirteen brings in bad luck). Finally, person-specific rules can be more
or less transparent ones (Mr. X has had a divorce recently; consequently, Mr. X avoids
women) or, at the other extreme, may have their roots buried in some remote past,
perhaps within a mass of forgotten experiences (memory of an unpleasant encounter
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with a certain person in long-forgotten past causing an avoidance of contact with persons
with a similar facial appearance). The latter are of such a diffuse nature as to have, at
times, only a vague or weak causal role. It is, however, a hypothesis worth entertaining
that person-specific rules play a quite considerable role in inference making. On the
face of it, person-specific rules can only lead to errors in an inferential act. However, at
times these can be effective ones, being in the nature of heuristics formed out of cues
picked up from the environment at varied points of time. For instance, a good physicist
is likely to have a larger repertoire of heuristics of a mathematical and physical nature
(perhaps being half-formed intuitive ideas generated from a minute study of some set of
natural phenomena and also picked up from the scientific literature) than others around
her.
The majority of rules are in the nature of heuristics and beliefs, mostly operative within
the cognitive unconscious. These constitute a part of the internal context of an infer-
ential act. Another large part of the internal context is constituted by emotions and
feelings, many of which are associated with diverse beliefs of an individual. Together,
these make for a vast complexity characterizing the inner mechanisms of the cognitive
mind.
It was Ludwig Wittgenstein who famously pointed out that, speaking on logical grounds,
rules can never be formulated in unambiguous terms — there always remains the
problem of interpreting and understanding what a rule says, and any finite number of
examples of application of a rule and any finite algorithm for expressing what the rule
is meant to say, has to be ambiguous. Saul Kripke [75] has interpreted Wittgenstein's
take on rules in the field of language. According to Wittgenstein and Kripke, there has
to be a tacit inter-subjective agreement on the universal application of a rule, defined
by means of examples and algorithms. While Wittgenstein's and Kripke's approach
to the rule-following paradox can be described as being an essentially logical-analytic
one, it points to the deeply cognitive roots of how people come to follow rules. In-
deed, rules are always interpreted from examples or algorithms in an inductive manner
which is why they are, from a strictly logical point of view, always ambiguous. We come
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to make effective use of rules by interpreting them within some given context where
the context exercises a constraint in effectively removing the ambiguity. In this sense,
even the universal rules of mathematics are, strictly speaking, ambiguous, and make
sense to a mathematician only within the context set by her prolonged and continuing
exposure to rule-following practices of a very special kind.
Guessing at the inner mechanisms of a complex system
This finally brings us to the first of the questions listed above (refer back to section en-
titled The unpredictable). How completely can we know the inner psychological mech-
anisms that operate in the making of an inductive inference, or in the making of infer-
ences in general, by an individual? Given the complexities of the external and internal
contexts involved in inferential acts as outlined in the present chapter and in the last,
the tenor of the answer is already evident — our knowledge of the inner mechanisms of
an inferential act is indeed necessarily incomplete.
But, does this incompleteness imply that any attempt to guess at these hidden mech-
anisms is futile and doomed to failure? Can it be that the guess is destined to be
fundamentally wrong? This is not the fate that generally awaits hypotheses and theo-
ries in science despite the fact that all of these are in the nature of guesses — some more
solidly supported by evidence than others, and all are based on incomplete knowledge
of the underlying mechanisms. Even when a hypothesis or a theory is incorrect, it is
seldom fundamentally wrong since more often than not it does correctly capture some
aspect or other of the workings of the system it is supposed to model.
The same goes for informed guesses relating to hidden mechanisms in inference-making.
These do tell us something important about these hidden mechanisms in inference and
in cognition, namely, that there exist processes and resources in a substratum of our
psyche, as a result of which the commonly invoked descriptive and normative accounts
of inference making miss out on aspects of essential relevance, and, at the same time,
provide us with significant pointers as to what these processes and resources may be.
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The hypothetical account of how the processes of inference-making (especially, the pro-
cess of making an inductive inference), set out in the above paragraphs, proceed in
the human mind, also point the way to a resolution of apparently conflicting points
of view relating to rationality, i.e., to the integrated capacity for reasoning and for the
making of inferences (including the making of judgments and decisions) in the human
mind. It tells us that our reasoning is indeed biased, but also tells us that the bias does
not make the reasoning fundamentally flawed since a bias may, under circumstances,
be more productive than strict neutrality in the judging of evidence, and may have an
adaptive value. It tells us, in a similar vein, that the use of heuristics in reasoning
and inference is indeed not a logically sound practice but, at the same time, may be an
effective one. It is the context that makes the biases and heuristics of the human mind
lead to confusion and error and also the context that, otherwise, makes these appear
as resources possessed of a considerable degree of effectiveness. The same hypotheti-
cal account also tells us that the task of formulating descriptive and causal principles
of inference-making through successive stages of improvement is not a hopeless one,
much as the task of describing and explaining the world at large is not a hopeless one,
acknowledging, at the same time, that the successive stages are not likely to make a
neat linear progression toward an ultimate truth since it may, in all probabilities, involve
sweeping changes in perspective as, indeed, all scientific journey does. But, we will
have to wait a bit before we take up the issue of the course of evolution of scientific
theories in general.
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Chapter 8
Abduction: theory in emergence
The enigma of hypothesis formation
The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash.
It is an act of insight, though of extremely fallible insight.
Charles Sanders Peirce
Abduction is, in the main, the formation of hypotheses. Hypotheses, in turn, are needed
for the purpose of providing explanations. Hypotheses, in other words, are germs of
theories.
Abduction has been described as ‘reasoning in reverse’ (Johan van Benthems foreword
in [40]). Knowing that your wife has gone out, you can explain the crying of your
newborn baby, who is dissatisfied with the attentions of her nanny, and also the absence
of the familiar sound of the radio playing, both of which you detect before entering home
on returning from your office. On the other hand, supposing that your wife has gone out
before having had an opportunity of informing you beforehand, you reason ‘in reverse’
to explain the sound of crying of your baby and the absence of the sound of the radio
playing, and come up with the hypothesis that your wife has gone out, so as to explain
these two observations of yours. The hypothesis subsequently proves to be correct, but
it was arrived at by guessing, since both the observations of yours could have had some
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other causal origin (perhaps your wife has fallen asleep, or perhaps she has upset the
baby for some reason and the battery of the radio has run out).
This is an instance of abduction, though not of theory in emergence. Here there is
no revision of belief, only the inessential addition of new belief, and no new rule of
operation on the beliefs. This is in the nature of an elementary hypothesis-making;
the newly formed belief will shortly attain the status of knowledge, and will be stored
as such, perhaps in the short-term memory. Hypotheses in science are vastly more
complex and more intriguing.
The making of hypotheses lies at the heart of abduction, and hypothesis is informed
guesswork, where the vast background of knowledge, beliefs, and emotions is made
use of.
“A dominant further factor, in solid science as in daily life, is hypothesis. In a word,
hypothesis is guesswork; but it can be enlightened guesswork” ([102], p 65).
The method of science has been described as the ‘hypothetico-deductive’ one ([88], p 45),
where there is a constant interplay between processes of forming hypotheses, deducing
the logical consequences of the hypotheses, testing these consequences against facts of
observation, and revising the hypotheses to ones with a greater explanatory power (the
acts of testing and revising are based on what are commonly referred to as the ‘logic
of confirmation’ and ‘logic of refutation’). This seems to be a fairly good description of
the scientific method, though the question of ‘explanation’ and that of the ‘scientific
method’ are contentious ones. While the actual practice in scientific enquiry does not
always fit with this scheme of things, it provides us with a convenient notional framework
for discussing various aspects of the scientific process. For instance, as indicated by
Medawar, a number of salient features of the scientific process are explained in terms
of the hypothetico-deductive scheme.
The issue of explanation in science has been a widely and critically examined one,
with a large body of literature devoted to it. A big part of that literature is analytical
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and logical in nature, dating from Hempel and Oppenheim's influential paper [58] that
introduced the so-called Deductive-Nomological (‘D-N’) model of explanation. Hempel
and others subsequently revised the model in several stages, but the D-N model grad-
ually lost appeal, as it was realized that explanation has more aspects to it than can
be subsumed under a monolithic logical account. For instance, the relation of expla-
nation and causation has for ever been a contentious issue. Pragmatist, naturalist,
and cognitive-psychological approaches have been tried so as to have a coherent un-
derstanding of the idea of explanation, where elements of the D-N model also find
their place, and a substantive understanding now appears to be within sight (for an
introduction, see[64], [129]). In this book, however, I will go only by the common-sense
meaning of the term ‘explanation’.
The topic of ‘scientific method’ has also been a hotly debated one. We will have a brief
look at it in the next and the final chapters of this book. In particular, the hypothetico-
deductive method is crucially dependent on the idea of confirmation or corroboration of
scientific theories where confirmation, in turn, relates to the judgment as to how and
to what extent a theory reveals truths about nature. Theories of confirmation, how-
ever, quite frequently run into troubled waters precisely because scientific theories are
arrived at principally by the route of inductive inference (see [28] for the idea under-
lying the hypothetico-deductive approach; see also [109], chapter 5, [105], chapter 4,
for background). The hypothetico-deductive method, while of notional value, does not
describe science as it is actually done.
The generation of hypotheses: an adventure into the mys-
tery world of psychology
The hypothetico-deductive scheme as conceived by Popper and others, while acknowl-
edging the psychological origin of hypotheses, actually gives it a wide birth owing to
the fact that the psychological process of generation of hypotheses cannot be probed by
philosophy and by logic.
“[Philosophical views of hypothesis generation] All aim at demonstrating that the ac-
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tivity of generating hypotheses is paradoxical, either illusory or obscure, implicit, and
not analyzable.”, [82], p 1.
The naturalist approach to philosophy, on the other hand, takes a hard look at what
scientific practice itself has to say of this psychological process of hypothesis generation,
where cognitive psychology makes a close scrutiny of this process as it is found to
occur in individuals, and itself forms hypotheses as to the inner mechanisms underlying
this process. In this, cognitive psychology gets a good measure of help from artificial
intelligence where various aspects of hypothesis formation are realized by means of
computer programming. At the end of the day, though, it remains to be seen whether
the process of hypothesis generation, while being, in the main, a causally determined
one, is also fully determinable.
Hypothesis formation is, of course, not something that is specific to science. The forma-
tion of hypotheses in some form or other, is a necessary adjunct to every act of inductive
inference since, in the latter, the ‘conclusion’ or the ‘output’ is never a necessary conse-
quence of the ‘inputs’ one starts from. An inductive inference is rarely, if ever, a one-shot
process where one straightaway forms a conclusion by some divine inspiration, but is
one that has to go through several stages of reverse reasoning where hypotheses are
formed and discarded, though one is not usually aware of such trials and errors (at
times, the cognitive mind takes advantage of past trials and errors available to it in the
form of recalled experiences and of relevant heuristics). With abduction being thus as-
sociated, at one end, with mundane acts of inductive inference of everyday occurrence,
it assumes the form of the remarkable and awe-inspiring phenomenon of creativity at
the other. In between, it provides the scientist with her staple food of the intellectual
variety, namely, hypotheses of various degrees of plausibility from which emerge the
models and theories in the sciences.
Abduction and novelty
In other words, abduction covers an extensive spectrum of psychological acts, where
there is a corresponding spectrum of the degree of novelty associated with an act of
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abduction. When a child gleefully toddles to a nearby cupboard to retrieve a toy that
her mother had previously hidden as a challenge, and then jumps to the mothers lap
for appreciation, she has definitely done something novel, as the mother is always the
first to appreciate. And this first success in meeting the playful challenge of the mother
transforms the world of the child (and that of the mother too!) as only a novelty can
do. Then again, as a Ph.D. student forms a hypothesis regarding the mathematical
calculation of the bond energy of a complex molecule which later is proven to be a
useful one in the context of her dissertation, she has achieved something novel, that her
supervisor happily appreciates. These are, however, not commonly appreciated as being
remarkable except, perhaps, by a few intimate observers because the transformations
resulting from these novelties do not cover a ‘conceptual space’ of a wide span. What
brings out a really ecstatic and overflowing appreciation from a great number of people
is that supreme creative act of a van Gogh or an Einstein. Leaving aside, in the context
of this book, the creativity of van Gogh, that of Einstein is reflected in the observation
that, as the theory of relativity emerged in the form of hypotheses in Einstein’s mind,
the latter impacted on the entire edifice of theoretical physics to send a great number
of previously entrenched concepts topsy-turvy and paved the way to a host of new ideas
and concepts.
The idea of the conceptual space is used here in the same spirit as in [11]. Roughly
speaking, it stands for the entire set of concepts in the mind of an individual. However,
concepts are interconnected thought entities, and the conceptual space is endowed
with a rich structure. The whole of the conceptual space is, strictly speaking, of little
relevance since what makes more sense in any given context is some sub-space (in
a loose sense) made up of concepts meaningfully related to the context. In an act of
producing a hypothesis of some novelty, the relevant part of the conceptual space is
restructured and enlarged, with new combinations of earlier concepts being formed
and, in addition, strange and new concepts getting included in an expanded concep-
tual space. It is the multitude of concepts in a conceptual space that get combined
into beliefs, some of which get transformed into knowledge.
While the idea of conceptual spaces is used in this book in a rather loose and intu-
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itively defined manner, these are referred to in more concrete terms in various contexts
in artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and in semantics and linguistics (see, for in-
stance, [42]).
Briefly stated, when our beliefs and working rules of inference, including those of rig-
orous logic, fail to make appropriate predictions or to explain a body of evidence, a
hypothesis is called for wherein a new combination of beliefs, or an altogether new set
of beliefs is formed, and a new rule of operation in our conceptual space emerges (more
commonly, however, a new evidence is explained with the help of the existing belief
structure and existing rules, by way of adding beliefs by simple combination or mod-
ification). Now, what we refer to as ‘new’ or ‘novel’ is, in a sense, only seemingly so
since the germ of the new must have been there within the womb of the old. Thus, new
life is created from existing life by the dissociations and combinations of molecules, in
accordance with chemical rules operating in the world of those molecules. The creation
of new life is a novelty principally because we are not fully aware of the actual mode
of operation of these rules and of the complex dissociations and associations that take
place (I do not mean to make a prediction as to whether these will eventually be known
at some point of time in the future), and the process continues to elude conceptualiza-
tion on the basis of the existing conceptual structure even after great efforts. Scientists
know a great deal about the process, but they cannot re-create it.
Paralleling the process of creative hypothesis-making by an individual, there takes
place the process of conceptual change and emergence of an entire new theory in
the collective mind of a scientific community. In the former process the hypothesis
emerges by way of receiving a certificate, so to say, from the ‘internal censorship’
within the mind of that very individual, perhaps operating unconsciously. In the case
of a scientific community, a new theory emerges and is accepted as one in a complex
process. There are deep parallels in the two processes, since neither the emergence
of a hypothesis in the mind of an individual, nor the emergence and acceptance of a
novel theory in the collective mind of a scientific community is a simple or a straight-
forward process. Neither is driven by logic alone. Both depend on the belief system,
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mostly operating, in one case, within the unconscious mind of an individual and, in
the other within the substratum of the collective consciousness of the community.
The substratum in the latter case is constituted, precisely by individuals and groups
within the community under consideration. The beliefs and desires — even conscious
ones — of individuals and various groups within the community circulate within the
latter as latent resources in its collective consciousness. Once a hypothesis emerges
that impacts upon an entire conceptual edifice, it is acknowledged as a novelty by
larger groups of people, and even by the person or the community that produced the
hypothesis in the first place.
In other words, the novelty is as much in the process itself as in the surprise and lack of
comprehension of the beholder. Einstein’s thought process did not cause as much of a
precipitous change in his own conceptual world as it shook the conceptual world of the
physicists of his time and it is this, more than anything else that made his hypotheses
so novel. And this, in turn, relates to the fact that the mechanisms underlying the for-
mation and emergence of the hypotheses were, by their very nature, not explicit to the
physics community at large and perhaps not explicit, in a large measure, to Einstein
himself. Most of these mechanisms operated in a substratum of his mind, where a large
number of heuristics and beliefs relating to ideas in physics and mathematics went
through a prolonged process of association and dissociation, of feverish activity and
relative latency, the exact nature of which may not be fully known to cognitive psychol-
ogy in days to come. And it is fundamentally the same hidden nature of mechanisms
operating in a substratum of the human mind that lies at the heart of novelty in the
child's discovery of the hidden toy and in the Ph.D. dissertation where a new method of
calculating the bonding energy of a complex molecule is presented.
The child's feat, on the other hand, involves primarily a restructuring of her own world
of possibilities of action and thought and is a novelty in so far as her mother cannot
imagine how this could come about — the child herself has little awareness of novelty.
Her unconscious feeling of novelty finds expression in a sense of joy in her new-found
ability.
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There is, of course, a commonly (and, informally) perceived scale of novelty. The childs
feat is appreciated as novel by only a few other than her mother because such feat is
observed routinely in almost all children. The Ph. D. dissertation is also a rather routine
one unless it gives the community of chemists something that has a sweeping efficacy.
But a restructuring of almost the entire world of theoretical physics is rare indeed, and
is perceived as a mind-boggling novelty.
In other words, novelty has two aspects to it: a transformation in the structure of a con-
ceptual space whose mechanism is not explicit but is hidden within some unobserved
substratum, and the extent and impact of that transformation. Added to this is the po-
tential (and subsequently realized) ability to cause a further expansion of the conceptual
space. A successful hypothesis is indeed possessed of novelty in this latter sense — it
brings in new concepts, a new way of making sense of those concepts, new explanations
and predictions, and an expanded scope of making sense of the world around us and,
over and above all this, is obscure as to its mechanism of emergence.
Abduction: the naturalist point of view
This hidden mechanism of the emergence of a hypothesis is precisely what the naturalist
approach to the philosophy of science is interested in. While concrete investigations in
cognitive psychology and in artificial intelligence struggle to understand aspects of this
mechanism bit by painstaking bit, naturalist philosophy picks out cues from the results
of these investigations to make generalizations so as to add meaning to our yearning (a
fundamental yearning of mankind, if you like) to understand this world of ours, as also
the world within ourselves, wherein epistemological questions in philosophy appear in
a new light.
It is this hidden mechanism that the dual-process hypothesis of human cognition and
the hypothesis relating to role of heuristics, beliefs, and emotions — mostly entrenched
in the cognitive unconscious — in inductive inference in general, aim at making a little
more intelligible, and a little less obscure.
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Abduction: the crucial link in science
Abduction constitutes the crucial link between cognitive psychological processes taking
place in the hidden recesses of the mind of the individual and that stupendous product
of the collective intellect of humankind, the response of Mankind to the mysteries of
Nature, that ‘legend’ we call Science. It is crucial not only because of its importance
and relevance to the scientific process, but more because it is enigmatic in nature, and
mankind does not know how exactly the conjectures of science well up from within its
own bosom. It is a helpless admirer of its own product of awesome fecundity, unable to
reproduce it at will or even to comprehend it by means of logic or philosophy.
Abduction, in so far as it constitutes the most crucial link in the scientific process,
concatenates, on one side, conjectures and hypothesis coming up, mostly, from within
the substratum of awareness of the individual, and collective deliberative powers of
entire scientific communities on the other. In this, abduction may be said to constitute
the link between the context of discovery and the context of justification.
The two terms have been greatly discussed ones in the philosophy of science, where
‘context of discovery’ refers to the psychological process by which novel ideas are ar-
rived at while ‘context of justification’ refers to the process where an idea is tested
against facts of observation and also against other ideas. Reichenbach, the noted
philosopher of science, is commonly credited with introducing the two terms into the
discourse relating to scientific method. Historical and philosophical perspectives on
the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification can be
found in [108].
The process of abduction: exploration of a conceptual
space
The context of discovery lies within the mind of the individual, made up of the enor-
mously complex mosaic of knowledge base, combined with the vast repertoire of heuris-
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tics, beliefs, emotions and motivations of that individual, and is truly and specifically,
personal. The individual, on being motivated, by means of stimuli coming from the
world at large, in relation to some problem that does not find a solution within the con-
ceptual framework of existing theories (‘how to explain the regularities of the hydrogen
spectrum’), looks at it from the vantage of this context, and lets it digest within the
chemistry going on within the substratum of her own mind where there takes place an
extraordinary churning of all the ingredients of inferential activity. It is in this sense
that abduction is a top-down process, like much of cognition at large, and differs from
a ‘bottom-up’ one that is principally driven by continual perceptual inputs. To be sure,
the mind does draw in conceptual inputs (and perceptual ones too, especially in the case
of experimental science), but these do not drive the process of abduction on their own
strength, becoming effective mostly by first being integrated within the contextual mo-
saic of the mind and probably providing the latter with a fresh supply of heuristics. The
inferential activity proceeds within process-one, but is continually referred to process-
two as well where, in both the processes, there take place an effective ‘censorship’,
preventing the inferential exploration from venturing too capriciously.
More specifically, inferences in general and abductions in particular, have two aspects
to them, as we have seen on earlier occasions in this essay. One is the aspect of an
apparently spontaneous process of association between ideas circulating in the mind
— once again, mostly in the unconscious hinterland in it — one that never ceases and
that goes on producing new ideas, new hunches, new beliefs, even without any overt
guiding purpose. And the other is that of the ‘censorship’, and the harnessing of the
spontaneous process with the help of rules. The vast set of rules is mostly of a person-
specific nature, but also has impersonal elements (inter-subjective and logical ones)
finely woven into it where most of the rules are, strictly speaking, beliefs of a specific
type, some of which are relevant in the context of the problem at hand and impart a
direction to the inferential process. How the cognitive mind makes an effective whole of
these two contrary aspects of the inferential process, is the great mystery that cognitive
science is to explore and unravel in days to come, though a fundamental element of
non-determinability or unpredictability is likely to come up in the process.
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The fundamental importance of the role played by the association between thought
elements in the process of making of inferences constitutes a basic idea in cognitive
psychology that I have based on in this book and forms part of what is broadly re-
ferred to as ‘associationism’, which has had a long history with a great deal of critical
appraisal both for and against. An account of associationism is to be found in [84].
Amplifying mechanisms, instabilities, and parallel explo-
rations
We have had a brief look at the inferential process in chapters 6 and 7. The process
of hypothesis generation is but an inferential process of a special kind. Inferential pro-
cesses, in turn, constitute a component of cognitive processes in general that take place
within the overall dynamics of the human mind. And this dynamics is of a computation-
ally complex nature. It is fundamentally nonlinear, made up of feedback loops, and has
an immense number of relevant dimensions to it. Even as one tries to restrict the dimen-
sion by way of posing the problem of inference and of abduction in more or less specific
terms, the reduced problem, in order to be meaningful, is likely to inherit the computa-
tional complexity of the human mind at large. For instance, there is a great likelihood
that the dynamics, even restricted to the problem of hypothesis-making is possessed of
‘sensitivity to initial conditions’, the essential pre-requisite of non-determinability, being
symptomatic of an essential element of instability in the dynamics. Thus, a psychologi-
cal process driven predominantly by rules proceeds along some specific trajectory in the
conceptual space and is, on the whole, a stable one in that it does not deviate apprecia-
bly from that trajectory. On the other hand, a process of inductive inference continually
branches out from the stable rule-driven trajectory and follows a course of a globally
exploratory nature because of instabilities being operative from time to time at certain
junctures on a rule-driven trajectory. Once a trajectory branches out along new courses,
there subsequently appear fresh rule-driven trajectories, again of a stable nature, till the
occurrence of further branching(s) owing to instabilities. An instability is essentially an
amplifying mechanism that aggravates an initial deviation from a stable trajectory (‘sen-
sitivity to initial conditions’) whereby that deviation, instead of being smothered and
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corrected, eventually results in a globally distinct trajectory in the conceptual space.
In other words, a rule-driven process of inference is of a step-by-step local (more specif-
ically, locally stable) nature, where, at any point of time, the next step in the process is
determined by the application of some specific rule(s) on the results of only a few earlier
steps (typically, on the current psychological state of relevance) and, in this, the rules
may fail to lead to any result based on the resources available in the current state. It is
here that resources other than the currently operative rules become relevant, these be-
ing, precisely, beliefs and heuristics that are, in the context of the current psychological
state, relatively remote ones. The reason why the psychological resources of a remote
relevance get involved in the inferential process is that associative processes never cease
in the human mind, and spontaneously and incessantly bring together resources from
remote recesses within the conceptual space. As an impasse or a psychological gap is
arrived at, at some point on a rule-driven trajectory within the conceptual space, these
associations create new possibilities in the form of local perturbations over the trajec-
tory, one or more of which may now be amplified so as to result in a fresh trajectory or a
set of trajectories along which the inferential process proceeds once again on the basis
of rules where, perhaps, one or more new rules have now become operative.
Inferential processes are, thus, of an immense vitality, where a major contribution to
this vitality comes from the operation of relevant emotions and affects, because these
emotions and affects are among the basic mechanisms underlying the processes of am-
plification within the human mind (interestingly, emotions and affects also play a stabi-
lizing role when needed). When, at critical junctures in an inferential process, the need
of fresh conceptual explorations arises, a likely thing to occur is that a set of relatively
remote beliefs and heuristics become involved by means of spontaneous processes of
association, some of which acquire relevance and introduce a local instability through a
set of associated emotions and affects, thereby initiating fresh branches of rule-driven
trajectories. The affects can be, broadly speaking, of two types — positive and negative
ones, of which the former give rise to the instabilities while the latter have the effect
of smothering of perturbations whereby the inferential process continues to retain its
local character. In other words, certain beliefs, with their associated emotions, assume
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the role of evaluators, either ‘approving of’ or ‘frowning upon’ perturbations around a
trajectory.
An inferential act is an exploration. It consists of an exploration of the conceptual
space made up of ideas and concepts by proceeding along a trajectory in that space,
where the trajectory is generated by the operation of rules of various types. However,
the conceptual space is one of an immense size, with a large number of dimensions
to it where these ‘dimensions’ are linked with the diversity of the external reality that
is captured by the cognitive mind. In any act of inference- or hypothesis-making, the
conceptual space has to be necessarily truncated to some manageable size where only
a limited set of relevant ideas and concepts make up the space to be explored, but even
so a rule-driven trajectory of a simple type may not be effective in the exploration of
that truncated space. There are two aspects here that need to be examined. One is the
effective ‘size’ of the truncated space that is to be explored, while the other is the efficacy
of the process by which that space is actually explored.
Evidently, the effective size of the conceptual space that needs to be explored in guess-
ing at the reason why the baby is throwing a tantrum is quite negligible compared to
the size and the ‘dimension’ required for guessing at an explanation of the black body
spectrum. In cases such as the latter, the need may, moreover, arise whereby the ‘size’
and ‘dimension’ of the space one starts with has to be substantially increased midway
during the process of abduction since the earlier size proves to be inadequate in produc-
ing a hypothesis of requisite explanatory power. It is here that the idea of proliferation
of the inferential trajectory in the conceptual space comes up.
Trajectories proliferate in the conceptual space by mean of local instabilities whereby
a single rule-driven trajectory branches out into more than one trajectories of a simi-
lar nature but where new sets of rules and a larger repertoire of beliefs and heuristics
are brought into the process of exploration. The reasoning process, in other words,
fans out along parallel trajectories (where the cognitive mind engages in counterfactual
thinking, or thinking by imagination), some of which may later be found to move further
and further away from any satisfactory solution to the problem at hand while others
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may run along more favorable courses and may, in turn, give rise to further episodes
of branching, and so on. In trying to form an effective hypothesis the mind starts with
some general idea as to what is needed in order to arrive at a satisfactory explanation
of the phenomena in question or, in other words, what, generally speaking, would con-
stitute a solution to the problem at hand. For instance, it may be necessary to find a
formula that fits a graph, or a number of graphs, obtained from experimental observa-
tions, where a formula obtained from an existing theory is found to deviate considerably
from the graph. If, at an intermediate stage of exploration, a tentative hypothesis results
in some formula that deviates from the graph to an even larger extent than the initial
one, then the line of reasoning leading to that intermediate hypothesis has to be aban-
doned or kept in abeyance while, on the other hand a better fit with the graph would be
indicative of an acceptable line of reasoning.
A mundane act of inference-making or abduction involves a conceptual space of rela-
tively small size, and the trajectory resulting from a line of reasoning needs to fan out to
only a small extent before a reasonably acceptable hypothesis is arrived at. To be sure,
even such a mundane instance of abduction involves some episodes of branching and
some vaulting over logical gaps, and this constitutes novelty of an embryonic type. But
further along the scale are those acts of hypothesis building in which local instabilities
and branchings occur in abundance so that all the parallel branches along which the
reasoning process proceeds make a highly effective search of the conceptual space and
also transforms the conceptual space itself by drawing in concepts and ideas that were
earlier left outside the confines of the truncated space the process started with. The
newly inducted ideas, beliefs and concepts then enter into the never-ceasing process
of association and eventually cause further proliferation of the process of exploration,
ending up, in rare instances, in a veritable implosion and the emergence of a radically
novel hypothesis.
The question of scientific creativity has been analyzed and examined from various
different angles in [11], [106], [83].
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Abduction: the setting up of new correlations
The association between fleeting ideas and the resulting involvement of some of these
in the inferential process may be looked upon as events whereby correlations are es-
tablished between seemingly remote ideas, beliefs and heuristics with reference to the
goal or purpose (finding a hypothesis that will lead to a formula fitting a graph) towards
which the process has been set in motion. It is conceivable that this process of setting
up of correlations within a conceptual space may feed upon itself, resulting in a grand
correlation centered around some nuclear conglomerate of relevant concepts, whereby
a remarkable conceptual structure of stupendous novelty emerges for the whole world
to see and admire. In this, the reasoning process gets transformed from the local ex-
ploration of a limited conceptual space to a highly correlated global exploration of a
greatly enlarged one where, in all probability, the rules of exploration get transformed in
stages to more and more efficacious ones (perhaps approaching rules of more and more
general applicability). Such a process, resembling a phase transition in a macroscopic
aggregate of molecular units (such as the transition from a disordered gaseous state to
a much more ordered liquid state) would then count as one of abduction located at the
other extreme of the spectrum of novelty as compared to a mundane act of abduction of
daily occurrence. The spectrum is indicative of the fact that, while acts of inference and
abduction performed during the daily routine of an individual involve logical leaps in
common with creative abductions of great significance in science, the latter is a process
of rare occurrence indeed, involving the setting up of correlations between remote ideas
and concepts wherein these ideas cohere to give rise to a hypothesis of remarkable nov-
elty. In this, a great scientific hypothesis resembles great poetry or great music where
remote, varied, and disparate feelings and emotions are brought together into a creation
of supreme beauty that, at the same time, is elusive too.
What is spontaneous and elusive in a scientific hypothesis produced in a creative act
of abduction in the mind of an individual is subsequently captured, at least in some
tangible measure, in the scientific practice of an entire community of scientists where
the latent possibilities in a hypothesis are now realized by deliberative analysis, by
the detailed working out of ideas, and by means of experimentation and observation.
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The drama now moves over, in a manner of speaking, to the arena of the context of
justification.
The reasoning individual: an atom in a cosmos, and a
product of evolution
The individual is not an isolated atom removed from the rest of the universe. Howsoever
withdrawn she may appear to be while a hypothesis brews in her mind and she confines
herself within the cocoon of her own mental world, she is but a microcosm of society
at large, encapsulating within herself an enormously large set of greatly varied inputs
from the latter in the form of beliefs, ideas, and ideologies, most of which are tacitly
acquired without awareness on her part. Within this matrix of ideas and beliefs imbibed
from the world around her, she is acutely focused — again, perhaps, without being
fully aware of it — on some of the unresolved conflicts and problems in that world,
among which one or a few belonging to a common family may set her mind, principally
the unconscious hinterland of it, to frenetic activity. Why and how some particular
unresolved problem activates the mind of an individual is again a matter of psychological
chemistry, where her prior developmental history that determines her existing body of
beliefs, motivations, and psychological propensities acquires relevance. Given the right
fit between these propensities and some particular problem that ‘appeals’ to her, her
cognitive mind, aided by the amplifying role of her emotions and affects, takes over. The
rest will, perhaps, be history.
Along with ideas, beliefs and motivations imbibed from the world around her, the indi-
vidual inherits a large number of inclinations and capabilities of a psychological nature
from the unfolding history of biological evolution, of which she is a product. These appear
as innate psychological capabilities in her. The processes of spontaneous association of
ideas of an embryonic nature, and a number of embryonic ‘rules’ of inference are, in
all likelihood, part of such inheritance. Further rules of inference and a vast repertoire
of heuristics are subsequently added in the course of the developmental history of the
individual under consideration.
171
CHAPTER 8. ABDUCTION: THEORY IN EMERGENCE
The parable of the two children
Here is a hypothetical, though, perhaps, not wholly unfamiliar, example of how a ‘sensi-
tivity to initial conditions’, and a resulting local instability may play a determining role in
the developmental history alluded to above. Imagine two children of nearly the same age
growing within the common environment of a family and receiving similar training and
instructions. One day the two are asked to solve a number of arithmetic exercises when
one of them receives a bit of extra praise and appreciation from a number of elders in
the family on her performance while the other, by default, felt slighted in some measure.
This seemingly insignificant event may trigger a course of development of far-reaching
consequences, when the first child engages feverishly in mathematically oriented ac-
tivities and self-training, eventually developing a great mathematical ability, while the
second child shies away from mathematics and becomes indifferent to exercising his
mental faculties. This can be taken as an apt metaphor for what actually happens in
the mental world of an individual because here the role of emotions in amplifying the
response to an event of psychological relevance is in evidence.
Analogy: the great organizing principle
I will wind up this chapter by way of dwelling upon a number of factors that often play
a great role in inferential processes of individuals, especially in processes of abduction
resulting in the formation of scientific hypotheses. Of these, the foremost is the idea
of similarity. Sensing the similarity between ideas and concepts belonging to disparate
parts of the conceptual space is one of the great faculties of the mind that has, in all
likelihood, evolutionary roots, and that is capable of playing the role of a uniquely effi-
cacious organizing factor in a conceptual space. The psychological ability of sensing of
similarities between perceptual inputs (a certain habitat somehow appearing to be simi-
lar to one of an earlier experience, where a predator was discovered hiding) is, of course,
possessed of a distinct adaptive value for individuals and may therefore have been fixed
as a heritable trait in the course of evolution of species. As this faculty gets enhanced
in the course of the developmental history of an individual by means of explorations
of an inferential and abductional nature, where the ability of sensing of similarities be-
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tween perceptual inputs gets transformed into the ability of sensing similarities between
conceptual constructs and then blossoms into a unique psychological ability, it creates
correlations between concepts residing in far-flung recesses of the mind, and thereby
enlarges the conceptual space explored in the course of the formation of a hypothesis,
making a coherent whole of a great number of apparently disparate ideas. In the pro-
cess, new ideas get woven into the conceptual edifice of earlier vintage, which is now
pruned of a number of obsolete and burdensome concepts belonging to it. The new-
found conceptual structure is now the embryo of a theory, to be taken up and developed
by an entire community of scientists.
One of Douglas Hofstadters great aphorisms: “...analogy is the fuel and fire of think-
ing” [60].
Further principles: simplicity and elegance
The other organizing factors of relevance are simplicity and elegance of hypotheses. The
faculty of developing hypotheses having a quality of simplicity is again, arguably, of evo-
lutionary origin where it facilitates the economical production of efficacious hypotheses
and saves wasteful exploration of the conceptual space. The idea of elegance is, in
all likelihood, a derived one but is capable of effecting a correlation within a concep-
tual space and also an enlargement of that space, whereby new ideas are inducted in
that make a coherent whole with ones belonging to the limited space of earlier vintage.
However, the beneficial role of the belief that ideas of simplicity and elegance have an
inherent ability to generate useful hypotheses leads to the further belief that the mech-
anisms underlying the external reality — to which all hypotheses are ultimately directed
— are also of an essentially simple nature. Such beliefs are inductive inferences at a
higher level, made use of in the processes of abduction in diverse specific areas, and
may not correspond to the external reality at large. In other words, the useful orga-
nizing principle of hypothesis-building, to the effect that hypotheses should be simple
and elegant in keeping with the nature of the reality that they pertain to is, in all like-
lihood, of limited relevance. A belief in this principle is formed and developed in the
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course of inferential processes conducted within external contexts of relatively simple
structure, and may not be of a deeper relevance, being inadequate in contexts having a
computationally complex and prohibitive structure.
Abduction: the inspiration of science
In summary, acts of abduction cover a wide range inference-making, with a correspond-
ingly wide spectrum of the degree of novelty associated with those. Of special relevance
to the scientific process are the generation of hypotheses in the minds of individuals
that can be either of limited significance in the field of science (a Ph.D. thesis whose
findings do not have a wide impact) or, on the other hand, can be of such great rele-
vance as to initiate a new theory with a novel conceptual structure. Such processes
of creative abduction involve, in all likelihood, a highly efficacious mode of exploration
of a conceptual space where a cascade of local instabilities, resulting from amplifying
mechanisms associated with emotions and affects, lead to a proliferation of inferential
branches running in parallel and where there occurs a transformation of the conceptual
space, with new sets of concepts and new rules of operation in an enlarged conceptual
space getting involved in the process. At the same time, there appears a correlation
among seemingly remote concepts and beliefs, as a result of which the concepts acquire
a new coherence. An organizing principle of great relevance in bringing about such
correlation and coherence is that of similarity.
Simply stated, abduction constitutes the element of inspiration in the progress of science.
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Chapter 9
Suming up: science as an
interpretation of the world
The complexities of truth
Many reflective people read with a sense of bemusement the obituaries
so frequently (and so gleefully) written for scientific realism.
Philip Kitcher
Scientific theories pertaining to the workings of Nature have two interfaces: one with
the minds of individual scientists and of communities of scientists, and the other with
— Nature itself. At the first interface, theories are produced and given a finished form,
since individuals produce hypotheses that are transformed into finished theories in the
hands of communities of scientists. And, at the second interface, a theory looks out to
the world and gives us a perspective view of what lies out there — how wheels move
within wheels.
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Scientific theories: the basic issues of relevance
We have focused on a number of aspects of the processes of inference and abduction
taking place within the minds of individuals, these being predominantly ones of uncon-
scious cognition where beliefs and emotions have a large role to play and where the
mind essentially engages in an act of informed guessing, while at the same time rely-
ing on concomitant processes of testing, checking, and justifying. Further processes
of development, testing, and justification of theories are carried out by communities of
scientists where numerous individuals communicate, compete, and co-operate — finally
producing finished theories that find general acceptance by the scientific community.
We will have more to say on this aspect of scientific theories in this chapter of my book,
before I summarize all our considerations in the next, final chapter.
The question that comes up at this point is: what kind of picture a finished theory draws
of nature? How reliable, complete, and accurate can one expect it to be? In what sense
can a theory be considered to be an improvement over previously developed ones, and
whether a theory can be expected to be so complete and perfect that it can be described
as forming a part of the ultimate frontier of human knowledge? All these pertain to
the second interface that scientific theories come to possess, and will also occupy our
attention in the present chapter.
As for the effect of the scientific community, and of society at large, on the scientific
process, there is once again an entire spectrum of opinions. At one extreme, there is
the point of view that social exchange among scientists and socially monitored scrutiny
of the intellectual output of the individual scientist purges the latter of the stamp of
individual beliefs, attitudes, and idiosyncrasies, and produces theories of a doubly ob-
jective character — objective in the sense of independence from subjective notions of
the individual, and again, in the sense of being a correct and faithful representation of
the mechanisms of nature. And, at the other extreme of the spectrum one finds the
view that it is the society at large that essentially constructs our theories of nature by
mechanisms insidious and pervasive.
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The business of science is to explain — explain whatever is at odds with existing and
established hypotheses and theories, and then to develop applications of the concepts
and theories resulting from the process of abduction, giving rise to explanation over
some specific area of inquiry. In this, science has to seek for truth, for unless it catches
a true picture of some slice of nature, it cannot successfully produce explanations and
make use of the explanations in developing applications of these. This entire matter
of inferring ‘truth’ from success in achieving explanations, and of the sense in which a
successful explanation adds to our knowledge of the world, is fraught with subtle and
conflicting issues of philosophy, both ontological and epistemological. The ontological
questions all relate to the basic one of what the inferences of science are true of — are
these inferences and hypotheses true of a mind-independent world, or do these infer-
ences provide us with just a set of effective means of operation in a phenomenal world
that is the only world we can meaningfully talk about, while all talk of the actual world
is, simply, so much of idle speculation?
The epistemological questions, on the other hand, revolve around the veracity of the
statements that science offers us. Since, in arriving at inferences, the mind operates
on representations of the world out there, everything depends on how these representa-
tions are arrived at. There is an undeniable gap between the representations and the
real world that cannot be bridged in any foundationalist way with no vestige of doubt.
This brings in a fundamental skepticism towards the theories of science that is very
hard to shake loose. One such issue of skepticism questions the attitude of science
towards unobservable entities and theoretical constructs, asserting that ‘truths’ about
those should not, in all honesty, be accorded the status of genuine truths since these
are, at best, nothing more than instruments of manipulation in the world of concepts.
Moreover, the truths of science are defeasible: they are subject to revision from time to
time in the light of new evidence or a new conceptual framework. What sort of truth,
then, does this speak of?
Indeed, the vary rationality or, one can say, the very rationale of science is not immune
to challenge. Does science have a well defined aim? Has there been, in the history
of science, a discernible progress towards the fulfillment of that aim? In what sense
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do the successive theories and the successive waves of conceptual change in the world
of science bear testimony to a cumulative progress made possible by the methods of
scientific exploration? Or, to be yet more insistent, can one at all speak of a specific set
of methodological hallmarks to be found in scientific endeavors, in contrast to those in
other areas of human interest?
Realism or anti-realism?
Volumes have been written on questions alluded to above, and many more will be written
in days to come, since none of these questions admit of a clear-cut answer acceptable to
all. None of the attempts at answering these can be likened to an exercise in arithmetic,
since the way one approaches questions of this sort depends on one's point of view.
One can be a realist or an anti-realist, and even that does not describe one's point of
view completely, since there are so many shades of realism and so many shades of anti-
realism. To be sure, the exchanges between the realists and the ant-realists are not
sterile or wasteful, since these help to throw a number of basic questions in sharp light,
and that light may help one to choose a point of view, since a point of view is not really
a bad thing when one sets out on an intellectual exploration.
The term ‘anti-realism’ has gained currency since the work of Michael Dummett who
was principally concerned with the question of truth (we will address, in our own way,
the complex issues relating to the idea of truth of scientific theories in section en-
titled The two facets of truth below). Can it be said of truth that it either does or
does not apply to a concept? For instance, is it or is it not true that the world exists
independently of our mind? While the realist would say that we certainly can, the
anti-realist would like to understand first as to whether it carries any meaning to ask
such a question: is there a way to know whether the world exists independently of
our mind? This controversy about truth reaches out to far-flung areas of discourse.
For instance, the philosophy of intuitionism in mathematics, to which Dummett sub-
scribed, questions that of the Platonist-realist position regarding the truth-value of
mathematical entities.
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However, a point of view is not so bad only so long as one acknowledges it as such and
does not set out to prove his own point of view as being the right one. Because, that
starts the acrimony. For instance, you cannot ever prove that there exists a real world
out there, to anybody who is bent upon looking the other way, simply because it is not a
matter of pure logic but one of experience, and experience is no logic. Different persons
sum up their experiences differently. In the course of our experience, each of us makes
very many inductive inferences of various kinds and magnitudes. The existence of a
world out there regardless of my thoughts is a matter of one such inference, a huge
generalization (though seemingly a ‘natural’ one), one of an enveloping nature, but a
non-deductive inference nevertheless. You can say that this inference has helped you
in innumerable ways in making further inferences and in moving ahead in life, but
that still does not make it an irrefutable one. ‘Very well, then’, you say — ‘give me
a refutation’. But I can’t do that, you see, because this issue has not been settled to
everybody's satisfaction — not ever, nor can it ever be.
What is more, the response to the basic ontological question need not be a simple yes-
no type answer. For instance, one may admit the existence of entities observable or
unobservable, but may raise doubts about the theories pertaining to those entities,
since inference to the existence of entities is more a matter relating to scientific practice
than to theory. Theory building, in this view, is to be distinguished from the actual
manipulation of natural entities where the latter, rather than theoretically postulated
mechanisms, are of more direct relevance. As we see below, it is indeed of some use to
distinguish between the question of the existence of natural entities — some of which
we can observe more directly than others — and that of the concepts and theories
abstracted from actual existence. This is an issue of some complexity and is related
to the one I address below: to what extent can truth be attained regarding the mind-
independent world, assuming that one exists. At the same time, as I briefly mention
below, the two issues of existence of entities and of the theories of the way these are
correlated with one another, can be separated from each other only conditionally.
Two books widely referred to in this context are [18] and [50].
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Linked with this basic question of the existence of a mind-independent real world, there
arise a lot of other questions, some of which I have hinted at earlier in this chapter. But
here a further set of considerations assume relevance. Once again, the answers to these
other questions depend on one's point of view, but now there arises the tendency of
answering these within a dichotomous framework — with reference to one's position on
the big basic question that lets one think in terms of two distinct camps having contrary
orientations ' the camps of realism and anti-realism. For instance, granting that there
exists a real world, is it possible to progress in a cumulative manner towards a true and
complete description of that reality and of the mechanisms inherent to that reality? This
is a question of understandable relevance, to which I doubt if a final or ultimate answer
can be found, though I do have a point of view, as you may also have (incidentally, my
take on the big question is, yes, there does exists a world out there independent of my
mind or of anybody's mind; indeed, our minds are part of that world). However, this
question of the possibility of progressive attainment of truth about the world needs a
distinct domain of discourse as compared to the one relating to the existence of a mind-
independent world. In other words, even when one subscribes to a positive answer to
the basic ontological question, one may legitimately raise doubts about the nature and
quality of truth that can be attained in describing the mechanisms of the world and
about the way our knowledge about the world advances through successive waves of
conceptual transformations.
This relates to the question, raised above, as to whether one can admit the existence
of unobservable entities of science while, at the same time, denying the legitimacy of
theories about those entities. Indeed, the question of existence of these entities is deeply
linked with that of the theories about these. For instance, the existence of electrons
cannot be de-linked from its properties that tell us how it interacts with other entities in
this world, where the latter, in turn, is linked with theories describing the electron and
all these other entities. Of course, it is possible to imagine that something answering to
the name of an ‘electron’ exists regardless of our current theory of particles and their
interactions. For instance, the concept of the electron is likely to survive in the event of
a possible revision of the standard model of elementary particles (the concept was there
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even before the emergence of the standard model). In a bigger context, this is analogous
to a partial independence of the question of the existence of a mind-independent world
and that of our theories of the world — mind-independent or not.
Theories: from the immediate to the remote
Theories about the world do not come in hermetically sealed packages delivered by di-
vine intervention, but are built up in a long and arduous process of cognitive quest,
where the quest starts with our mundane day-to-day interactions with the parts of the
world immediately accessible to us. The inferences arrived at in the course of that inter-
action are primarily in the nature of inductive ones — tentative, fallible, open to revision
and improvement from time to time, but effective nevertheless. The process of our cogni-
tive quest in the accessible parts of the world is punctuated with events of a substantial
conceptual transformation in one specific domain or another. For instance, we learned
that water does not exist in the liquid phase under all conditions of temperature and
pressure, and that realization must have resulted in a big transformation in our concep-
tual framework while, now that this fact has been incorporated within our conceptual
framework, it does not make us wonder even for a moment. On the other hand, the
question of the properties of water near the critical point, which is a much more spe-
cialized one, has been a matter of very definite concern to the experimentalists and
theoreticians, and have been the subject of a deep and radical theoretical-conceptual
transformation regarding phase transformations. In other words, mundane experiences
and generalizations make way to progressively deeper theories in any domain of experi-
ence about the world. Put differently, the journey from the immediate to the remote in
the world of concepts and theories is, in a sense, a continuous one and, at each stage
of the journey, the cognitive system builds upon what is available and apparent to what
is relatively more remote and inaccessible.
Kitcher explains in [72], chapter 2, how Galileo convinced his critics of the existence
and motion of remote heavenly bodies observed by means of the telescope. His logic
was essentially based on the idea that there was nothing in principle that distin-
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guished between the sighting of a remote earth-bound body and a heavenly body that
could be observed with the naked eye, and similarly, between the latter and a remote
heavenly body that could not be so observed.
Put differently, theories are transformed in successive waves of conceptual transforma-
tion, starting from our mundane day-to-day concepts, and get built up in a hierarchical
process where conceptual layers are built one upon another, and where ‘truths’ per-
taining to one conceptual layer get revised in the succeeding layer. But, a truth that
gets revised is no truth at all, and the currently accepted ‘truth’, that resulted from the
revision of the ‘truth’ belonging to a former conceptual layer, will itself get revised in
days to come and hence, likewise, is no truth at all. This appears to destroy the very
idea of truth.
The two facets of truth
The term truth carries two implications — an implication of inter-subjectivity, and one
of pointing to a perceived (or perceivable) fact of the world. Within a given context, truth,
broadly speaking, refers to a perceived fact, where the perception (with or without the
aid of relevant instruments) does not depend on the perceiving subject (within reason-
able limits of variability of individual perceiving power). As the context changes, the fact
may appear in a new light and may be perceived differently. Suppose that a certain bio-
chemical reaction is found to occur at a constant rate within a given range of physical
conditions. Suppose further that the course of the reaction depends on the temperature
of the medium in which it is made to take place, but that fact was not known or sus-
pected at an earlier state of knowledge. The constancy of the rate of reaction was then a
truth in that state of knowledge. However, imagine that it has subsequently been discov-
ered that at a much higher temperature the course of the reaction becomes oscillatory.
The truth has now become more complex in nature. And, in the future it may assume a
yet more complex form when the currently undetected dependence of the course of the
reaction on some other physical parameter is discovered and recorded. The successive
forms, differing from one another, in which scientific truth appears also depend on the
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currently existing theoretical framework and on the history of its successive transfor-
mations. For instance, scientists, on observing the transition from a constant to an
oscillatory behavior in a class of mechanical systems, may be in an exploratory state of
mind as to the possible nature of the course of a chemical reaction, which may influence
the way they set up their experiments.
The above example is, perhaps, a simplistic one, but it tells us that ‘truth’ is a complex
concept indeed. It is, at times, asserted loosely that truth is a relative concept, but that
does not mean that truth can vary from person to person (since if such a variation is in-
deed found to occur, then it has to be symptomatic of some peculiarity of circumstances
that needs separate investigation). Truth, to be more specific, is relative in the sense
of depending on the context in which facts of observation are recorded, but not in the
sense of being dependent on the perceiving subject.
The context in which the truth of this or that scientific theory is judged keeps on chang-
ing, where the context itself is a concept of some complexity. For instance, it includes
both internal and external factors with reference to which a fact of the world is per-
ceived — internal ones relating to the current state of concepts and theories within a
given domain, and external ones to conditions and circumstances under which the fact
are obtains. Let us consider the external context first, focusing on the domain of obser-
vation, or the horizon within which a theory is constructed and applied. Mendels theory
of inheritance was confined within the domain defined by the phenotypic characteristics
of species, where the molecular unit of inheritance could not be accessed or investigated
within the then current scope of observations, and it was this that set the horizon, or
the context, in which the theory was constructed. The conclusions of the theory, which
were true within the context, were all reformulated in terms of genes and DNA in the
altered context of cell biology, chromosomal studies, and molecular biology. None of
Mendels conclusions were literal truths when looked at from a more recent perspective
and, by the strict, non-contextual definition of truth, these were no truths at all. Nev-
ertheless, these were truths indeed since, by the then current standards of knowledge
and reasoning, these did not require any personal belief to be interpreted and judged
— anyone willing to perform a series of breeding experiments could see the veracity
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of these truths. To be sure, the origin of the theory was within the personal confines
of Mendel's mind, albeit with inputs from contemporary thought and from painstaking
observations over a long period, and the inferential processes responsible for his theory
were most likely of a strange and deeply personal nature, as we have tried to guess at in
chapters 6, 7, and 8. But once formulated, his formulation had the stamp of a genuine
scientific theory precisely because it was now open to all to be verified by experiments
of diverse design and to be checked for consistency with the then established body of
concepts. This is all that a theory needs in order to be accepted as true, and this does
not require truth to be non-contextual or immutable. What is specifically interesting in
this context is that, the transition from Mendels theory of inheritance to the later day
genetic theory involved a sea change in the relevant conceptual framework, where the
true statements of Mendels theory lost their literal significance in the new framework,
but could nevertheless be interpreted as ones being of genuine relevance in the latter.
I will come back to this issue of the context-dependence of scientific theories and truths,
since this is of great relevance regarding the question of the nature of scientific progress.
For now, however, I switch to the question of the extent and manner in which scientific
theories refer to aspects of the real world. Once again, informed discourse on this
question needs subtle and complex considerations but I will be brief and direct here.
A scientific theory is a representation of a part of the world, arrived at by cognitive
processes. The true conclusions of the theory are not literally true since these are
inferences within a representation that refers to some part of reality but is not a facsimile
of that part itself. It is somewhat like a portrait of a lady, where the portrait is a
representation of the lady but not the lady herself. Features of the portrait refer to or,
are indicative of, features of the lady but those features are the result of an interpretation
on the part of the artist, and the relation between the features of the lady and those of
the portrait is not a simple, geometrical one.
There is possibility of some confusion here that needs be clarified: the lady herself
is perceived by the artist as a representation in his mind, while the picture is an
expression of that representation in a different medium. Thus, the representation
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of the lady in the portrait tells us (but again, in a skewed manner) how the lady is
represented in the mind, only partly conscious, of the artist. Apart from the artist
himself, there are three parties to the story: the lady herself, the representation of the
lady in the artists mind, and the the expression of that representation in the portrait
drawn by the artist.
In representing reality, we make categories, comparisons and distinctions. The question
thus arises as to whether analogous schemes of categories, comparisons and distinc-
tions apply to reality itself. In other words, does the representation have a relation of
exact correspondence with reality, on the strength of which one can define truth? Can
one, in the language of mathematics and cartography, make a one-to-one mapping from
the lady to the portrait, setting up this correspondence? This is a question difficult to
answer since ‘reality’ is accessible to us only through the representations, and we are
never sure as to what the ‘features’ of reality are. But the relation between a theory,
which is a consequence of a representation, and the part of reality under consideration,
has to be, in some sense, one of correspondence since, otherwise, the theory could not
have been successful in explaining relevant issues pertaining to reality or in developing
relevant applications. This is once again, the argument of success and effectiveness im-
plying truth in a theory, where ‘truth’ can be interpreted as a correspondence, in some
sense that cannot be made fully explicit, to features of reality.
Features of the portrait of the lady in question do indeed correspond to some of those
possessed by the lady herself, but the correspondence is strange and elusive. A portrait
done by a great artist does strongly resemble the person painted in it, but the strength
of the resemblance does not always lie so much in the physical features of the person
portrayed as in what is commonly termed her ‘personality’. It is the personality that
complements the physical features of the person which the artist captures with an un-
canny vision — a vision in which the inner self of the artist reaches out to that of the
person portrayed, with a great sensitivity. In this sense the portrait is an interpretation
of a person by the artist, where its features refer to those of the person in strange and
elusive ways.
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Representations in science are of a similar nature. The scientist, in making a hypothe-
sis, gets into a strange mode of thought where her inner world reaches out to a part of
the outer world in an intimate communion and she finds a vision not shared by people
around her. This, of course, refers to the complex cognitive processes occurring within
her mind, principally in hidden depths of it, the final outcome of which is a hypothesis
subsequently accepted and worked upon by her peers. The hypothesis is eventually
made into a theory that is now a representation of a part of reality — distinct from the
internal representation within the mind of the scientist, but a representation all the
same. The representation is essentially a model (in this context, see [43], chapter 1;
according to Giere, the model corresponds to reality in the sense of an analogy) of that
part of reality that the scientist and her peers are interested in (this sets the external
context of the representation) that refers to and resembles the reality much as the por-
trait does. But, at the same time, the model is elusive and skewed because it has its
moorings in the internal context defined by un-articulated beliefs and modes of thought
of individuals who, in the final analysis, are microcosms of a community of scientists
and, in a broader sense, of an entire culture. This is what constitutes the dual aspect
of a hypothesis and, eventually, of a theory and, indeed, of any interpretation of reality.
Every child, in the course of her development, makes millions of such interpretations,
makes millions of predictions, based on anticipations, without being aware of those.
Most of these predictions fail in small ways, but many others succeed, and this course
of failures and successes continues throughout her subsequent developmental history.
A theory enjoys only a skewed fit with nature principally because it is a contextual
description of the latter, and necessarily ignores anomalies lurking at remote corners
bearing testimony to hitherto unrecognized aspects of natural reality. Equally respon-
sible for this are the modes of thought of an entire scientific community, and its beliefs
tied to the existing body of knowledge and the existing theoretical framework.
In other words, the duality of ‘truth’ marks all our representations of the world, ranging
from the mundane representations in day-to-day activity, right up to the most rigorously
thought out scientific theories, where imagination mixes with judgment, intuition mixes
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with deliberation, and induction mixes with deduction. The difference between a ‘trivial’
representation and a complex and elaborate one lies in the exact degree and manner
in which these contrary aspects intertwine and interact, giving a unique flavor to each
individual representation conceived by the human mind.
The dual nature of representations gives rise to enigmas and questions. How can a rep-
resentation, which involves aspects of imagination and intuition, be true of the reality it
is meant to represent? Is the truth of a representation a relative one? Is the represen-
tation, infected as it is by beliefs and modes of thought of individuals and communities,
irredeemably committed to giving us a false conception of reality, regardless of where
that reality is situated?
While theories can indeed be false, those that survive and propagate have truth im-
printed in them a truth that is inter-subjective and not relative, but one that is con-
textual — a truth that, at the same time, is conditioned by the modes of thought of
individuals and communities.
If a number of schoolchildren be asked to describe their school building, the descrip-
tions given by most of them will be true representations of the building but will still be
different from one another in the way they make their representations. The difference
will lie not only in the literary styles and the modes of expression, but also in little ways
in the content of each representation. This, of course, means that truth, even though
inter-subjective in nature, is a complex thing. When asked what they find in front of
them, each will say that she finds the school building and, at this level, there is absolute
agreement in the ‘truth’ they speak of. But when it comes to a question of describing the
building, their descriptions will differ in the aspects of the building they focus on. And,
this difference reflects the difference in modes of thought of the children. Depending on
the internal context defined by belief systems and modes of thought of individuals and
communities, different aspects of reality are represented differently in scientific theories
as in the descriptions offered by the schoolchildren.
To summarize, truth is objective (in the dual sense of being inter-subjective and of
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referring to a common reality) but is contextual, and is conditioned by an underlying
subjective world. In other words, truth, a feature of supreme relevance in represen-
tations, is a concept of exquisite complexity, incorporating within itself deep tensions
between contrary facets. The huge turmoil, conflict, and confusion suffered by human
beings in the pursuit of truths of this world are therefore in the nature of a pre-ordained
and unavoidable destiny, for ever throwing men into depths of despair. Truth is not
something given to us that one can sit back and discover passively, but is something
one has to work for, struggle for, and stake one's soul for.
Anti-realists lose no time in focusing on the subjective aspect of the representations
embodying scientific theories, and assert that the theories are socially constructed ones.
And, realists, in a spirit of dichotomous thinking, emphasize on the aspect of truth, often
underplaying the aspect of interpretation. But the truth about truth is more complex,
as I have tried to tell you, and one needs a picture of science where this contrary and
complex nature of truth is included. Of course, the tension between the contrary aspects
of truth shows up in the works of philosophers of science, many of whom express their
concern on this dual nature of truth. Realists do accept that truth is not a simple and
given feature of a theory, and acknowledge that there is a sense in which one can say
that truth is ‘constructed’. And, anti-realists do acknowledge that there is something
like truth in a theory in the sense of the effectiveness of the latter. In other words,
realism and ant-realism are two camps set up by us, the great classifiers that we are,
by force of a dichotomous mode of thought to which we appear to be committed in life,
and the borderline between the two camps is not an indissoluble one.
The descriptions offered by different schoolchildren of their school building are skewed
with respect to one another, and also skewed with respect to the building itself as it
stands as a piece of reality, and this very skewness is a symptom of the fact that each
of the offered descriptions is an interpretation generated in the mind of an individual
student, which is thus somewhat of a misfit when considered in relation to reality — a
representation that refers to and corresponds to a part of reality, but is still not a fac-
simile of it. The correspondence is strange and exotic in the sense that it is conditioned
by the mode of thought peculiar to some particular student or other. The case of a
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scientific theory is of a similar nature.
The two-faceted, tension-ridden and complex nature of truth raises deep questions
for both realists and anti-realists, and people perceiving themselves to belong to one
camp or the other face genuine problems in coming to grips with what exactly it is
that the truth of scientific theories refers to. A case in point is Poppers attempt at
explicating the idea of scientific truth in terms of the concept of ‘verisimilitude’ that he
introduced ([90], see also [25]). The idea of verisimilitude, however, is more of a formal
nature, seeking to capture the complex process of achieving truth in a succession of
stages, than one in line with the cognitive-naturalistic approach where, moreover, one
recognizes that the search for truth is contextual and episodic.
Hypothesis and theory: the individual and the scientific
community
Here we have to contrast the aspects of interpretation and construction inherent in a
hypothesis to those in a theory: the former is conditioned by the mode of thought of
an individual (or a closely-knit group of individuals) and the latter by that of a commu-
nity the scientific community that examines and accepts a hypothesis, and develops
it into a theory. We have had a glimpse into the process of inference and abduction in
the mind of an individual where beliefs and emotions of that individual have a role to
play. However, that role is, in a sense, an indirect and supportive one since the beliefs
and the associated emotions make possible an effective conceptual search and con-
ceptual re-organization without themselves being used as ingredients in the formation
of the concepts and conclusions in the inferential process. It is true that the process
makes use of heuristics that are in the nature of beliefs themselves, but those heuristics
are ones that are constantly tested against evidence and against previously tested con-
cepts, and are revised sequentially so that the final conclusions that emerge, and the
conceptual reorganization that accompanies the inferential process, have a measure of
confirmation, justification, and truth built into these. The stamp of the individual that
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remains in these final inferences and concepts consists of an overall conditioning of the
latter by the mode of thought specific to that individual. For instance, a scientist may
be concerned more with analytical-deductive thinking than with intuitive-explorative
one, which directs her inferential process along a course different from the one that she
would have adopted in case she had a different mode of thought.
The processes of conceptual organization realized by the inferential activity of a commu-
nity of scientists have an analogous character. In trying to understand this, one has to
appreciate that the scientific community, in turn, is a part of a society at large just as
the individual scientist is immersed within the psychological and intellectual ambience
set by the group or community within which she works. The analogy extends further
in so far as the scientific community can be thought of as being a cognitive system
itself. The inferential activity of the individual scientist has a deliberative component
and a component of an intuitive nature, where the latter occurs mostly within the un-
conscious sphere of cognitive activity. This unconscious cognitive activity is, moreover,
based on massively parallel processes in a network of independent neuronal aggregates,
where the communications between the aggregates lend a great variety to the processes
actually taking place in the network ([21], [87]). It is this unconscious substratum that
is the seat of latent beliefs and emotions that, on being activated, make possible the
inferential activities within the mind of the individual. The processes of acceptance,
testing, and development of scientific theories by a scientific community in any specific
area of investigation also has a deliberative component wherein a theory is thoroughly
criticized, analyzed, and tested against available evidence before acceptance as a valid
theory. However, this entire process is conditioned by underlying beliefs and value judg-
ments located in a cognitive substratum, where the substratum is made up precisely of
the individuals of the community who carry within their minds the latent beliefs and val-
ues of the society at large. Analogous to the (computationally) parallel processing within
the cognitive unconscious of an individual, one has an essentially similar process of
exchange and communication among individuals and groups of a scientific community,
based on which the deliberative activity of the community as a whole finally takes shape.
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Ronald N. Giere, in his book [43], draws attention to ‘collective cognition’, or dis-
tributed cognition in modern research establishments such as the European organi-
zation CERN where a large number of individuals, along with computers and various
instruments making up an enormous set-up, form a huge cognitive system. The in-
dividuals operate, to a large extent, in parallel, communicating with one another by
means of language. In reality, cognition may be distributed over wider networks such
as a scientific community or even a more widely spread society sharing a common
culture.
The dominant conditioning effect on the scientific deliberations of a community in some
specific area of investigation is exercised by means of a paradigm ( [76], chapter 5) which
is in the nature of a tacit way of approach or a point of view in the problem area under
consideration. Put differently, a paradigm is a heuristic of major relevance, or an exem-
plar, a tacitly accepted conceptual kernel, that acts like an organizing principle around
which various conceptual elements get crystallized into a coherent whole, thereby giv-
ing rise to a complete theory and its ramifications. While the paradigm is a conditioning
factor, the major active factor in the formation of a theory is, of course, a hypothesis
that initiates the process of theory building and itself acts as the conceptual focus of
the theory. This distinction between a conditioning factor and an active component in a
cognitive process is a useful and relevant one.
Strictly speaking, a major hypothesis or a new theory emerges in violation of a reigning
paradigm whereby a new paradigm is brought into existence. Still, the distinction
between a conditioning factor and an active factor in inference making and theory
building is one of relevance.
Kuhn introduced the idea of a paradigm in a specific sense, namely that of an exemplar
of major significance.
“Close historical investigation of a given specialty at a given time discloses a set of
recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in their conceptual, ob-
servational, and instrumental applications. These are the communitys paradigms,
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revealed in its textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises. By studying them and by
practicing with them, the members of the corresponding community learn their trade”
([76], p 43).
However, it is of considerable value to extend the idea to one of a tacitly held guiding
principle in the broader context of cognitive science and in the study of scientific prac-
tice. Kuhn himself underscored the tacit aspect of a paradigm by asserting that the
latter was not a set of principles that could be spelt out in explicit logical terms. In any
case, the idea of a paradigm is so fertile that it has been stretched, interpreted, and
adapted in a great many ways and in a great many contexts, though always around a
core meaning, namely, the one of a tacitly entertained exemplar. Kuhn himself used
the idea in subtly different ways and I plead guilty to having taken similar, if less de-
served, liberties in the present book. However, in all such usage, I have tried to specify
the meaning by implication to the extent possible.
While the paradigm is a major conditioning factor in the process of theory building by a
scientific community, other latent factors also play a role, where these relate to cultural
influences of the society at large and the social value system. All these latent effects
operate through the cognitive substratum of the community provided by individuals,
institutions, dominant groups, and power structures. Taken together, these make up
the mode of thinking and reasoning of a scientific community and set the goal of scientific
exploration in various areas of inquiry.
The aim and method of science: the question of values
The question often arises as to whether science is a rational enterprise. Rationality
of an activity or an approach involves two considerations — first, a specification of
the aim of the activity, and secondly, an understanding of the method followed in the
activity with reference to the aim, i.e., in other words, an appraisal of whether the
method is appropriate with reference to the aim. The commonly assumed rationale of
mankinds scientific activity is often stated in terms analogous to the way one evaluates
individual inferential and decision-making processes: science, it is said, is motivated by
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a combination of instrumental and epistemic aims. Instrumental rationality is motivated
by the aim of being effective, where the effectiveness is judged with reference to whatever
goals may set the activity — either individual or collective — in motion. Epistemic aim,
on the other hand, relates to the acquisition or use of truth. For instance, investigations
on the toxic effect produced by a certain bacterial specie may be undertaken with the
aim of understanding ways to treat a disease caused by it, and the effectiveness of
the methods followed in these investigations may be judged by checking whether a
means of treating the disease is actually realized in the process. On the other hand, the
epistemic rationality of the investigations is to be judged by checking what new pieces
of knowledge relating to the life processes of the bacterium and to the cellular and
biochemical causes linking the bacterial toxin with the disease in question are gained in
the process. Generally speaking, epistemic virtues reside in an instrumentally effective
inferential and decision-making activity, since effectiveness is rarely achieved without
a good understanding of the relevant part of reality. The commonly cited goal in the
case of science is ‘human welfare’, in the service of which science sets about gaining
knowledge, or a true understanding, of the world. At times, the epistemic aspect is cited
as being the fundamental criterion of doing science, and philosophers and workers in
foundational issues in science are fond of underlining its truth-seeking aim.
In reality, the goals and motivations underlying the scientific enterprise in the modern
world are complex, conflicting and, at times, dark. There is the individual scientist,
there is her superior, there is the institutional head, there is the fund-giving agency,
there are governmental policies, there are dominant interest groups, there is public
opinion, there are media campaigns, and there are factors operating on an international
scale. In every area of human interactions there are, moreover, power relations. Goals
of scientific investigations in various areas of interest are ultimately set by this entire
complex of factors, and often appear in contrary forms, depending on who is viewing the
goals. The individual scientist may look at her research project as a means to gain gen-
uine understanding of the mechanisms underlying some natural phenomenon, which
means that her personal goals are probably epistemic in nature, though these need not
be purely epistemic since there may be admixtures of career ambitions, monetary as-
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pirations, peer rivalry, craving for peer recognition, and similar other ‘worldly’ motives
in her scientific pursuits. The institutional head and the fund-giving authorities, on
the other hand, may have completely different perspectives, not unconnected with in-
terests of dominant power groups. This brings us to the question of values underlying
the business of science. We will return to this later in this essay and will see that there
is no logical or preferred approach to this question as there is no such approach to the
question of rationality of science and of scientific method. Questions relating to science
as an individual and social endeavor are as open as those in any other field of human
concern. One can never sit back and engage in the consultation of charts and graphs to
pronounce on the correctness or otherwise of the course of science.
Interestingly, the epistemic concern continues to remain as one of constant relevance
among all these conflicting pulls and pushes on science. One has to correctly understand
the atomic nucleus in order to drop a bomb. Even in its most worldly and dark pursuits,
science has to go for truth. And truth, as we have seen, rests on interpretation — the
process of basic relevance when cognition confronts the world. On the one hand, truth
has to aim for a correspondence with elements of reality while, on the other, it has to
build upon prior experience of reality, a prior conceptual structure, and prior beliefs and
preferences resulting from individual and social inferential processes. It is a dispropor-
tionate concern with the second, interpretational, aspect of truth that produces the idea
that truth is constructed. Once again we fall prey to a fundamentally dichotomous way
of thinking resulting from our craving for simplicity. In order to avoid the complexity
and strain of examining an issue having conflicting and contrary aspects to it, the mind
tries to grasp the dominant aspect. But the ‘dominant aspect’ is somewhat a myth — it
depends on the point of view.
Science as a telescope: the ‘objective’ and the ‘eyepiece’
The point of view of realism tends to grasp the reality-oriented aspect of truth while the
point of view of anti-realism harps on the cognitive and constructive aspect. An illumi-
nating analogy would be to think of the ‘objective’ and the ‘eye-piece’ of an astronomical
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telescope. In viewing a remote object, the objective lens system of a telescope is aimed at
the object, while the eyepiece lens system focuses the rays on to the eye. The telescope
itself cannot be reduced either to the objective or to the eyepiece. I will now consider in
succession the ‘objective’ and the ‘eye-piece’ of science — its truth-seeking aspect and
its interpretational aspect, keeping in mind the admonition that science is neither the
one nor the other, but a complex whole made up of the two.
The reality-oriented aspect of truth is, moreover, contextual. The truth we learn about
nature is always partial, with ever-expanding scope. Imagine the objective of a tele-
scope — let’s say, of one of Galileos favorites — aimed at various different celestial
bodies, while the magnification and the resolution achieved by means of the instrument
get increased from time to time. In the process, there emerge ever newer pictures of
the firmament, spectacularly causing kaleidoscopic changes in our conception of the
heavens. This, then, can be taken as a metaphor (and, at the same time, an instance) of
how science acts as a telescope designed to probe nature, with its objective constituting
the external context of observations and theory building, seeking to arrive at ‘truth’.
Continuing to refer to the actual telescope (an imagined one, though), the eyepiece
handles the job of collecting the rays passed by the objective and focusing those on to
the eye and, in the process, it introduces aberrations and diffraction effects, whereby
the image formed by the telescope differs from an exact and ideal representation of the
object and only corresponds to it in some complex manner. In terms of the allegorical
telescope representing the probing of nature by science, the aberrations and diffraction
effects that depend on the detailed structure of the eyepiece are indicative of the role
of our existing conceptual framework — the internal context of observations and theory
building — in the process of making up the interpretation of nature that science provides
us with.
As our concepts and our instruments capture newer and newer aspects of nature, scien-
tific theories are said to approximate more and more an ideal and perfect description of
reality ‘out there’. However, the exact sense in which science progresses in its endeavor
to unearth the mechanisms of nature has raised controversy, and some strife.
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Approximations in science: the metaphor of convergent
and divergent series
Imagine a sequence of numbers approximating the irrational number ‘pi’, defined as the
ratio of the circumference and the diameter of a circle. The rational number 3.14 is a
good approximation for many purposes, but a better approximation is provided by the
number 3.1416, where two more decimal places have been added. Even this, however,
does not constitute an accurate description of ‘pi’, and the number 3.14159 constitutes
a still better approximation. The quest for capturing the exact value of ‘pi’ does never
end, since the successive rational approximations never suffice to produce the exact
value which, in the language of mathematics, is an irrational one. What one needs is
to set up a convergent series for ‘pi’ and go on adding up to successive terms of the
series, numerous such convergent series being known for approximating the elusive
number. Interestingly, the number, while being elusive, has an indubitable existence as
an irrational number (and a transcendental number at that), it being only the case that
any attempt at capturing its value in terms of a rational number can never meet with
final success.
Does science approach a description of reality in successive waves of cognitive advance-
ment in an analogous manner? It is often said that science is approaching more and
more towards an ultimate truth about nature, though that truth will forever remain
beyond our grasp. Is the progression of science, then, something analogous to an ap-
proximation of ‘pi’ by means of a convergent series? In reality, the progression is of a
much more complex nature, somewhat analogous to the approximation of a function by
an asymptotic series.
Asymptotic series and singular approximations
Consider a function of one single variable like, for instance, the distance (s) covered
by a car as a function of time (t) where the latter is the independent variable and the
former the dependent one. A complete knowledge of the function would enable us to
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depict the relation between the two by means of a graph. But suppose that such a
complete knowledge is not given to us and that we attempt an approximation by means
of a power series, aiming at a good description of the graph at all points close to some
pre-assigned value of t, say, near t = 0. Now, the power series is in the form of a sum
of an infinite number of terms and one can, for any given value of t (close to t = 0), add
up the successive terms, hoping to approach the corresponding value of the dependent
variable s in a manner analogous to the way the value of ‘pi’ can be approached by
means of a convergent series.
An asymptotic series does provide an approximation, but one of a more complex nature.
As one goes on adding successive terms for any given small value of t, the series at first
appears to converge to some value, but when a good number of terms have been added,
the sum begins to diverge. An excellent approximation to s for some given value of t can
be obtained by summing up, say, the first ten terms of the series, but the quality of
the approximation deteriorates as one sums up the subsequent terms while, for a larger
value of t, a larger number of terms may be needed in order to obtain a reasonably good
approximation.
Scientific investigations often aim at guessing the relations between dependent variables
and relevant sets of independent variables (there may be more than one independent
variables in any given problem) from observed data, and any such relation arrived at by
analysis of the data is typically expressed in the form of a series. However, a relation
depends, in general, on a set of relevant parameters that are indicative of the conditions
under which the proposed relation holds. One can now ask the question as to how
the relation under consideration depends on the value of some parameter, which we
denote by the symbol p? This is of a more involved nature than the one of the graphical
relation between a dependent and an independent variable, since now the graph itself
gets changed as the parameter varies. If the parameter is made to change by a small
amount, the graph also changes, which is commonly expressed by saying that the re-
lation between the dependent and the independent variable gets perturbed to a small
degree by the variation of the parameter. One can again express the perturbation in the
form an approximation by means of a power series where now the power series contains
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terms with successively higher powers of the parameter p.
In numerous instances of practical interest, the power series turns out to be asymptotic
in nature, in which case one is left with a singular perturbation around some reference
value of p, say, p = 0. For instance, when a plane wave of light, corresponding to a
bunch of parallel rays, is made to pass through a circular aperture and then captured
on a screen placed on the other side of the aperture, a distinctive pattern of variation
of light intensity (dependent variable) with distance (independent variable) along any
line passing through the center of the illuminated patch is obtained, where the graph
of the variation is found to be oscillatory in nature, the oscillations being confined to a
narrow region near the border of the illuminated patch. The relevant parameter here
is the ratio p = λa , where λ stands for the wavelength of light used and a for the radius
of the circular aperture. The oscillations are indicative of the wave nature of light, due
to which the parameter p typically has a small but non-zero value. On the other hand,
the limit p = 0 corresponds to an idealization in the description of optical phenomena
that goes by the name of ‘ray optics’ or ‘geometrical optics’. In this ray optic description,
where the wave nature of light is ignored, the variation of light intensity is depicted by a
uniform intensity inside the illuminated patch, which abruptly drops off to zero value at
the border of illumination, with the zero intensity continuing into the shadow region on
the screen. This differs qualitatively from the oscillatory variation that obtains for any
non-zero value of p, however small. This is a well known singular perturbation problem
in physics. It tells us that the description of optical phenomena in terms of the wave
theory is fundamentally different from a description in terms of the ray theory, because
the latter ignores an essential aspect of light.
In an optical experiment of the type indicated above, the ratio p sets the context. In a
large class of experiments the actual value of p is so small that one can assume p to
be zero and still come up with a good number of predictions arrived at with the help
of the ray theory, but all such predictions fail when one focuses on a narrow region
around the border of the illuminated circular patch, where one observes oscillatory
variations in light intensity (it is in this sense that one can say that the ray theory,
while being a useful and effective one within a certain context, enjoys only a skewed
198
CHAPTER 9. SUMING UP: SCIENCE AS AN INTERPRETATION OF THE WORLD
fit with reality). In order to investigate these oscillatory variations, one has to design
experiments with apertures of small radius (in which case the non-zero value of p can
no longer be ignored), which corresponds to observations in a different context — a
context where a new theory is needed beyond ray optics and that theory is commonly
referred to as ‘wave optics’.
This is how the question of context-dependence in the description of reality by scientific
theories comes up. A theory that suffices in a given context is to be replaced with
one of a different foundational structure when the context changes in such a way that
previously ignored aspects can now be ignored no longer, and a consideration of those
aspects makes necessary a modified theory with an altogether new texture. However,
the older theory remains woven into the newer one in a relation of some complexity, as
the ray theory is woven into the wave theory of light, where the complexity often finds
expression in terms of an asymptotic approximation.
Singular reduction from one theory to another
A much discussed case of such singular transition from one theory to a succeeding one
is that from the classical to the quantum mechanical description. In order to illustrate
the singular nature of the relation between the two types of descriptions, it is illumi-
nating to refer to a particle moving along a straight line and encountering a potential
barrier — a region where the classical theory forbids the particle from entering because
of insufficient energy possessed by it. This stricture of classical mechanics is, however,
conditional on the Planck constant (h) being ignored. However, the Planck constant,
though having a small value, cannot be ignored in all contexts, and there do exist situa-
tions where a particle, on encountering a potential barrier, can be seen to tunnel through
it with a small but non-zero probability (the process of emission of alpha particles from
nuclei occurs by means of such quantum mechanical tunneling). The dependence of the
probability of tunneling on the parameter h turns out to be of a singular nature, where
the behavior of the particle for a small non-zero value of h differs qualitatively from its
behavior when h is ignored as not being of any consequence. A similar story, indicative
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of a singular relation between the classical and quantum theories, can be told regarding
the celebrated formula for the black body spectrum first derived by Planck.
The quantum context is thus distinguished from the classical by the non-zero value
of the Planck constant h. In any context in which the Planck constant is negligibly
small compared to the relevant action(s) (a physical quantity characterizing a dynamical
system, analogous to its energy or momentum), a classical description suffices (though,
only conditionally) in describing the behavior of the system, while in an altered context,
where h can no longer be ignored (in the domain of microscopic systems, for instance)
a different description is necessary where, from the mathematical point of view, the
transition from the former description to the latter is singular in nature.
Not all transitions from a more restrictive theory to a less restrictive one (the classical
theory is more restrictive as compared with the quantum theory because it holds in a re-
stricted context where the Planck constant can be ignored as being negligibly small) are
however, of a singular nature. For example, the transition from Newtonian mechanics to
the mechanics based on the special theory of relativity is, from the mathematical point
of view, non-singular, and special relativistic formulas in mechanics go over to Newto-
nian formulas in the limit of relevant velocity ratios (p = vc , where v denotes any relevant
velocity characterizing a dynamical system of interest, and c stands for the velocity of
light in vacuum) going to zero, in a smooth or non-singular manner. In other words, the
behavior of a dynamical system as described by the special theory of relativity for small
but non-zero values of v does not differ qualitatively from its behavior as described in
the Newtonian theory. Still, the special theory of relativity involves a major conceptual
reorganization as compared to the Newtonian theory.
Indeed, a major conceptual restructuring becomes necessary whenever some relevant
aspect of reality, which was ignored in the earlier theory, now assumes significance, in
consequence of which, parts of reality appear in a new light, as if a new dimension is
added to reality. Often, the new ‘dimension’ becomes ‘visible’ in virtue of the fact that
some specific natural parameter (p), which was not taken into account in the old theory
because of a restricted domain of observations, now assumes an essential role in an
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expanded domain. This is the case in optics where the ray theoretic description fails in
a domain in which the finite non-zero value of the ratio p = λa (here a stands for a typical
length scale in the observational context) becomes significant. In quantum theory, on
the other hand, it is the non-zero value of the ratio p = hA (A stands for the typical value of
the action of the dynamical system under consideration) that assumes relevance. And,
in the case of the special theory of relativity, the ratio p = vc plays the corresponding role.
In each of these cases, an attempt to force nature into a straight-jacket by assuming
that p is negligibly small, results in anomalies and inconsistencies whenever the context
of observation needs the non-zero value of p to be taken into account. In other words,
there are certain natural borders that cannot be crossed (from zero to a non-zero value
of p) without an appropriate conceptual restructuring, since a new ‘dimension’ or aspect
of nature is revealed across any such border: nature now appears in a new perspective.
The idea of perspectival realism espoused by Ronald Giere in [43] is analogous to that
underlying the context-dependence of scientific theories.
The crossing of borders: scientific revolutions
Events of restructuring of theories resulting from an alteration in the observational
context and the crossing of such natural borders in various different fields of scientific
investigation are momentous ones. One feels inclined to identify these with the scientific
revolutions that Thomas Kuhn spoke of ([76], chapters 9-13). There have been numer-
ous protestations from philosophers of science questioning the validity of the concept
of scientific revolutions, but many of these are in the nature of logical and analytical
discourse where events in real life, belonging to the real world, are viewed in the ab-
stract, and stringent demands are imposed on the way these are to be analyzed and
classified. Nothing in this world can be described in terms of pure categories, devoid of
conflicting and contrary aspects, and every description is valid only contextually, and
the description of events of conceptual restructuring in science as revolutions is no ex-
ception. For one thing, revolutions occur in all scales. In order to understand this,
one is to look at periods of scientific activity that Kuhn referred to as normal science,
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in contrast to revolutions. As with the idea of scientific revolutions, Kuhns reference
to ‘normal science’ has also raised controversies because of a tendency to assign un-
due and disproportionate significance to the concept of normal science. Normal science
refers to much of the day-to-day activity of scientists where conceptual restructuring
is not needed and where one can discern an unspoken allegiance to some conceptual
paradigm. All these ideas of paradigms, normal science, and scientific revolutions are
nothing more than descriptions, in the spirit of naturalism, of the way things appear
to be in the practice of science, in respect of its epistemic aspect. These tell us how
things are, and are not proclamations of how things ought to be, though the distinction
between the two, which is not always a sharp one, seems to have been disregarded,
at times, by Kuhn himself, perhaps by oversight rather than by design. In particular,
normal science is no subservience to the authority of people who have been responsible,
fortuitously or otherwise, for the introduction of new ideas and concepts in a field.
Normal science: conceptual restructuring at all scales
In real life, one often follows a certain set conceptual pattern till a new and more versatile
pattern makes its appearance. We often benefit from following a set pattern, though the
danger of falling a prey to the pattern is, of course, always there. Indeed, seeds of new
concepts accumulate in an invisible process even as one is engaged in the mundane
practice of following a set conceptual pattern, and what one needs is to recognize these
as they germinate so as to make possible a conceptual reorganization. In other words,
periods of following a set conceptual pattern and events of conceptual reorganization
are inextricably linked with one another, and a distinction between the two can be made
only provisionally and within given contexts.
Indeed, quiescent states in which seeds of new ideas are nurtured, and phases of con-
ceptual restructuring, alternate in various scales. What appears to be a period of normal
science from a bigger perspective, involves definite conceptual changes when looked at
more closely, where, however, concepts undergo a revision on a smaller scale, within a
larger framework that remains unchanged. For instance, within the framework of the
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basic ideas of fluid dynamics, there have been vigorous attempts at introducing new con-
cepts for the understanding of the remarkable phenomenon of turbulence, and a num-
ber of new ideas have indeed been introduced that have had far-reaching consequences
even outside the field of fluid dynamics. Research on turbulence has progressed in the
spirit of normal science within the framework of basic ideas in fluid dynamics (where,
in a manner of speaking, the paradigm is set by what is referred to as the Navier-Stokes
equations), but when looked at more closely, there have taken place conceptual revo-
lutions within the area of turbulence, a notable example of which is constituted by a
number of fundamental ideas of Kolmogorov and others introduced some seventy years
back.
Incidentally, the concept and study of turbulence in fluid dynamics is also associated
with a certain parameter of crucial relevance, namely the Reynolds number (or, in a
different context in fluid flow, the Rayleigh number): as a critical value of the parameter
is crossed, the nature of the flow changes qualitatively and, from a mathematical point
of view, singularly. Once again, the Reynolds number can be said to set the context in
which one investigates the mechanisms and characteristics of fluid flow.
The complex relation between theories: emergent phe-
nomena
As theories succeed one another in any given field of investigation, consequent to con-
textual changes relating to the domain of observation of natural phenomena (such as,
observations for small and large values, respectively, of the parameter λa in optical set-
ups), there occurs a conceptual restructuring where two consecutive conceptual frame-
works do not bear a relation of direct correspondence. Of the two theories in question,
the earlier one usually applies to a more restrictive context (in a relative sense) as com-
pared to the succeeding theory, whose concepts are of a broader scope. It is often the
case that many of the concepts of the earlier theoretical framework do not have counter-
parts in the later theory, though those can be interpreted within the new and expanded
theoretical framework. It is often said that the former theory is reduced by the latter
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(i.e., the later one), or that the latter theory reduces to the former (for instance, in the
case of succession of the classical theory by quantum theory, by restricting the descrip-
tion of phenomena to a domain where the ratio hA , introduced above, can be ignored).
However, the idea of ‘reduction’ often involves considerations of a complex nature, and
is associated with the concept of emergent phenomena (such as the phenomenon of tun-
neling that emerges across the border separating classical and quantum mechanical
descriptions), commonly associated, from the mathematical point of view, with singular-
ities.
Michael V. Berry, the great mathematical physicist, spoke of asymptotics, singular-
ities, and theory reduction in a remarkably suggestive cameo article in his typically
lucid and insightful style.
“In science we strive to integrate our experiences, observations, and experiments into
a single explanatory framework — ‘a theory of everything’. Of course this goal has not
been achieved, and probably never will be. What we have instead are the partial de-
scriptions provided by biology, chemistry, physics, etc., and, within these, the various
sub-fields such as fluid mechanics and quantum mechanics. The different areas of
study do not fit tidily together. Particular difficulties arise when a more general de-
scription is supposed to encompass an older, less general, one, usually by providing
a microscopic explanation of its principles. It is hoped that a less general theory can
thus be ‘reduced’ to a more general one. But this comfortable picture is often spoilt by
certain classes of higher-level, or ‘emergent’, phenomena...... .”, [9].
Berry speaks of the relation between two theories, of which one is supposed to get
reduced to the other in the limit of some parameter (δ) going to zero (analogous to the
parameter p introduced earlier) where, however, this limiting transition is often not a
mooth one.
“We shall see that very often reduction is obstructed by the fact that the limit is highly
singular. Moreover, the type of singularity is important, and the singularities are not
only directly connected to the existence of emergent phenomena but underlie some of
the most difficult and intensively-studied problems in physics today.”
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In this book I have tried to adopt an approach in keeping with the spirit of the ideas
underlined by Berry in this article of his, which is likely to prove to be one of major
importance in the philosophy of science. He considers a number of concrete examples
of the relation of reduction between theories in physics, where the ‘reduction’ is more
complex than what at first appears to be the case.
It is the complex relation between prior and succeeding theories in various fields of
scientific investigation that can be subsumed under the idea of incommensurability of
theoretical frameworks, mooted by Kuhn.
“The normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only
incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which has gone before.”
([76], p 103).
Even as two theories appear to be incommensurable with reference to each other,
there still remains an enveloping language by means of which the two theories can be
examined side by side.
Feyerabend also had much to say on the notion of incommensurability, though not
quite in the same context ([38], chapter 15). Polanyi spoke of incommensurability
in his own terms of reference, and his ideas may have had influenced Kuhn and
Feyerabend in the formulation of their views (see [66]).
As with the other ideas that Kuhn introduced, the one of incommensurability has been
the focus of quite considerable controversy (reviewed in [111], [32]). But, once again, this
idea of Kuhns finds a natural —it resonance with what one feels as one goes through
histories of theories succeeding one another in the annals of science. It is precisely
because of this resonance that Kuhn was able to strike in the minds of men, at a level
deeper than that addressed in much of formal, analytical, and philosophical discourse,
that his work ushered in a new era in the study of science as such. Of course, Kun
did no more than point at the basic idea and did not make it much more explicit,
and the idea itself may get transformed in days to come, but the fact will remain that
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Kuhn did point at something of central relevance in the study of how scientific theories
appearing in succession are related to one another. A number of concepts likely to
be of considerable significance in such a study are the ones relating to contextuality,
reduction, singularity, and emergence (refer to [6], [19], [13]).
The notion of contextuality (as mentioned earlier, this term is used to mean context-
dependence) of scientific theories and of contextual truth that I have tried to outline in
the present essay can now be summed up.
Contextuality in science: summing up
In any sphere of scientific investigation and at any stage of evolution of scientific ideas,
some part of reality is studied within some definite context that is, typically, not rec-
ognized explicitly by the investigators, since there remain transitional borders that go
unnoticed. With an expansion of the domain of observation of facts and phenomena,
and with the gradual evolution of ideas within a given theoretical framework, an altered
context emerges where previously unrecognized borders are recognized and crossed,
new aspects or ‘dimensions’ of nature are revealed, a new perspective emerges, and
the texture of the relevant theory gets transformed. There results an altered concep-
tual structure in which many of the concepts of the previous theory are replaced with
new ones, though these former concepts can be interpreted from the vantage point of
the newly emerging theory. The earlier theory is often subsumed within or reduced by
the succeeding one where singularities and emergent phenomena are commonly met
with. In a sense, the earlier and the later theories are incommensurate with each other.
Though incommensurate, both are of epistemic value within their respective contexts.
The truth of either theory is contextual but not relative in the sense of being principally
a matter of arbitrary interpretation by individuals or communities.
This last notion of truth as being relative to interpretation or construction, and not as
one of referring to reality is commonly associated with the anti-realist view of science.
However, we have seen earlier in this book that, even from the realist point of view, while
truth is focused on to reality, it has a second facet, since it emerges in a protracted
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cognitive endeavor, which is basically in the nature of an interpretation of reality.
This admixture of the element of interpretation in scientific theories makes the latter
suspect when judged against the criterion of objectivity, but that, of course, is no reason
to simplify the notion of truth by ignoring its interpretational aspect. As we have seen,
truth is a complex thing where its correspondence to reality is conditioned or constrained
by its cognitive origin, where cognition is nothing more than an interpretation while,
conversely, it is an interpretation aimed at and answerable to reality. This, as far as I
understand, is the naturalist perception of truth — truth as it is, not truth as it ought
to be.
The naturalist point of view examines and addresses the idea of scientific truth by rec-
ognizing both its cognitive-interpretative aspect and its commitment to reality, which
entails complexities and tensions in the notion of truth. Philip Kitcher recognizes the
two contrary aspects to truth and has examined these from various angles. Based
on Kitchers ideas on the notion of scientific truth, one can have a broad view of the
issues involved in an authentic discourse on scientific theories as bearers of truth,
though that discourse may eventually turn out to develop approaches and interpreta-
tions differing somewhat from Kitcher's. I have found [49] to be a useful source-book
for this.
Theory choice: the problem of ‘underdetermination’
This is supposed to raise a problem with theory choice. How do we choose a theory
as being a correct one, especially as we recognize that, when judged against available
evidence in any given domain of scientific investigation, there may be not one but, in
principle, an infinite number of theories compatible with the evidence (the problem of
‘under-determination’ of theories by evidence). In reality, it is seldom the case when the
scientific community faces the task of choosing between alternative theories, all compat-
ible with the body of observed facts in some given domain of inquiry, though alternative
theories can conceivably be constructed. However, it often happens that several al-
ternative hypotheses are offered to explain anomalies in the area under consideration,
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one of which survives criticisms and scrutiny from various quarters and, in some spe-
cial cases, a number of mutually compatible hypotheses that cohere with one another
evolve into a theory. A hypothesis is a result of an act of abduction, and abduction by
its very nature is a guesswork aimed at producing a sufficiently consistent and effec-
tive explanation of a number of facts of observation. It is an act of cognition which, in
turn, is based on interpretation against a body of items of knowledge and beliefs accu-
mulated in past experience. There may, in principle, be numerous possible hypotheses
consistent with facts of observation, but only few of those are also consistent with the
knowledge base and the beliefs that make up the internal context of the cognitive act,
and fewer still survive the intricate and subtle process of hypothesis generation, some
of whose salient features have been outlined in chapter 8. Thus, a hypothesis is not an
exercise in logic alone, but a complex and intricate inferential process constrained by a
great many cognitive factors conditioned in a long history of evolutionary development.
All the crows I have observed in the city of Kolkata during my lifetime have been black.
From this I generalize that all crows are black. I could also generalize to the effect that
all crows in the city of Kolkata are black, and those in the city of London are white,
which is logically compatible with the facts of observation on which I generalize. Or I
could choose from an infinity of similar ‘generalizations’, but the latter do not conform
to features of past generalizations that have been found to be fruitful and effective (I do
not enter into the question of the biological features that define a crow and assume that
a crow is unambiguously identified by sight, without reference to its color), and so I do
not entertain these. The cognitive apparatus within me has developed certain processes
of arriving at relevant and meaningful generalizations (meaningful not in the sense of
logic but in the sense of making sense of this world and surviving in it), which make
most of the above generalizations irrelevant in the context of my inference.
Imagine for a moment the phase of history when the framework of classical physics
was being put together, principally around Newtonian mechanics and electromagnetic
theory. All the observational facts collected up to that point of time were compatible
with the theory of relativity and with quantum theory as well. Why, then, were the
theory of relativity and quantum theory (or, to indulge in a further flight of fancy, the
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quantum field theory) not considered and adopted by physicists and mathematicians
of the time who were equipped with astounding reasoning ability? The reason is pre-
cisely the same as that in the case of your child suddenly crying out in an adjacent
room, and you making the inference that she must have fallen and hurt herself while
not even imagining the possibility that a snake may have entered the room and bit-
ten her which, however, is compatible with the fact of the child having cried out. In
either case only those theories and hypotheses were entertained that, in addition to
being logically possible, were consistent with the context. Hypotheses are made in
accordance with the context, building upon ideas and notions that have accumulated
in past experience (while, at the same time, bringing in novel elements as necessary)
with the aim of solving specific anomalies, puzzles, and problems, because that is the
way that human cognition works. In making a hypothesis, the cognitive mind does not
think of anomalies and problems that may come up in a different context — one that
is not of current relevance. The black body problem, or the puzzle of photo-electricity,
or the frame-independence of the velocity of light were not of relevance in the context
of eighteenth and nineteenth century physics, which is why the quantum theory or
the theory of relativity were outside the realm of possibility at that stage even though
these were all compatible with facts of observation accumulated up to that time — no
fact of observation were logically in conflict with these (and, what is more, these sub-
sequently turned out to be successful theories, contrary to the example of the crows
mentioned above).
Hypotheses and theories are not plucked out of thin air but are built in steps upon
past successes in much the same way that natural selection acts in the emergence of
new species — bringing in novelties within the existing pool of genetic material.
Looked at this way, a scientific hypothesis is hugely constrained by the internal context
of knowledge and beliefs of an individual and of the society, while being consistent with
the external context set by facts of observation, where certain aspects of phenomena go
unnoticed. Consequently, only a few distinct hypotheses can, in practice, compete with
one another in any given field of investigation at any given point of time. As with the
beliefs of an individual, numerous different reasoning attitudes, modes of thought, and
half-formed scientific ideas, along with relatively remote beliefs, set the internal context
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of a scientific community in respect of its choice among such competing hypotheses.
All these factors making up the internal context play a role in defining the attitudes
and preferences of various different sections of the scientific community towards the
competing hypotheses, as a result of which the choice among these hypotheses assumes
the form of a complex and often protracted process but, in the end, the one of greater
epistemic value usually prevails, and a new theory is built up around it.
While a scientific theory has to be, in some sense, a true description of some aspect of
nature (recall, however, the complexities inherent in the concept of truth of a theory), a
more immediate requirement that it has to satisfy is that of consistency — consistency
with the existing body of knowledge and with observational and experimental evidence
relating to the relevant field of inquiry. Theories are ultimately accepted or rejected
on grounds of consistency, though a consistent theory does not necessarily attain a
desired standard of truth. In contrast, an emerging hypothesis is often not consistent
with the existing body of knowledge, since it bears the stamp of a belief. It is accepted
by a section of working scientists only because it promises to reveal novel ‘dimensions’
of nature. If the hypothesis does succeed in delivering the goods, then it finds its
place in some new theoretical framework, where it meets with the requirement of
consistency within an emergent theoretical framework.
The new theory does not appear in one single package ready for the market. Once
a number of anomalies appear within an existing theoretical framework (explanation
of the black body spectrum, explanation of the line spectrum of hydrogen), there occur
many failed attempts at framing a hypothesis that can explain at least some of these
anomalies. In the case that more than one hypotheses are offered, the question of choice
among these comes up, which sets in motion currents of criticism, appraisal, and anal-
ysis, where non-epistemic factors play their role alongside epistemic ones, as indicated
above. At times, several hypotheses are offered and found useful (Plancks hypothesis,
Bohrs hypothesis) before these are collated to form the nucleus of an emerging theory
(quantum mechanics).
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In this respect we once again observe a similarity in the ways in which a hypothesis is
formed in the mind of an individual, and a theory takes shape in the scientific practice
of a scientific community. Each of the two processes involves factors of a non-epistemic
nature, based on prior attitudes, emotion-linked preferences and beliefs, but each, at
the same time, involve epistemic judgments and consistency checks, as a result of which
the end product, in the form of a hypothesis or a theory, has to be of epistemic value
(while being, at the same time, conditioned by non-epistemic factors). As we have seen,
this epistemic value is not generally in the nature of a logical soundness, but one relative
to current aims and goals and relative to the context (such as the one set by the Reynolds
number in fluid flow, or by the parameter λa in an optical set-up) in which some part of
nature is observed and studied.
Scientific progress: socially determined or socially con-
ditioned?
The anti-realists put emphasis upon the non-epistemic aspects of theory choice so as
to assert that the succession of theories in the evolution of scientific practice is socially
determined — a point of view apparently conforming to the views of the likes of Kuhn
and Feyerabend [76], [38]. In particular, Kuhn's observation that successive theories are
incommensurate between them and that the progression of scientific theories is not of a
cumulative nature converging to some ultimate truth are, on the face of it, supportive of
this anti-realist point of view. However, we have seen that these notions do have a realist
interpretation as well, where the incommensurability and the non-cumulative nature of
scientific progression are consequences of the contextuality of theories in the sense
outlined above. Science has a progressive aspect to it since it unravels the mechanisms
of nature layer by layer, across a succession of natural borders, and the metaphor
of a convergent approximation to some final truth has to give way to metaphors of a
more complex nature such as the one of approximation by means of a succession of
asymptotic series — each describing a limited approximation in some specific context,
where it is conceivable that contexts appear in an unending succession: Nature has an
infinite number of distinct ‘dimensions’, and is inscrutable to the end.
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The question as to whether and how one can locate continuing progress in the history
of science has been a contentious one. In particular, Kuhn and Feyerabend have
been interpreted as having been opposed to the idea that there has been a continuing
progression or development in scientific theories and practices.
In the case of Feyerabend, such an interpretation of his views has been fostered by his
contrary way of saying things — a way that was meant to jolt people into questioning
the received view. In fact, he had too much of sense in him to question the continuing
discoveries in science in a naive way. What he did want to highlight is that there
cannot be a predetermined yardstick of progress in line with the commonly perceived
and advertised ‘methods’ of science. He, above all, was against the mindlessness in
the name of ‘intellect’ in science.
“ ‘Progress of knowledge’ in many places meant killing of minds.” ([38], p 3).
Kuhn, on the other hand, was remarkably lucid in what he meant to say, but the im-
port of what he said was, at times, not transparent because of its novelty. Moreover,
he was too engrossed in bringing in new ideas in bold strokes of the brush to finish
these with detailed explanations. He was fully cognizant of the continuing evolution
in science, and never questioned the fact of scientific progress but, at the same time
he was concerned with setting right the underlying notions. He advanced the insight
that the scientific process achieves distinction by way of eliminating, in a large mea-
sure, disagreement on foundational questions. Generally speaking, progress depends
crucially on creative contributions, and scientists in any given area of research are ca-
pable of identifying and agreeing upon these creative contributions precisely because
they share a common paradigm and are generally reluctant to engage in controversies
upon foundational issues. It is only in the backdrop of normal science that scientific
revolutions make sense, and progress in science is tied with the occurrence of such
revolutions. What is novel in Kuhns discourse on progress is that progress occurs
through a succession of theories incommensurable with reference to one another, and
is therefore of a complex nature ([76], chapter 13) where, moreover, the complexity
repeats itself at various scales nested within each other.
The spectrum of views on scientific progress, to be found in the philosophy of science
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literature is discussed in [90].
In other words, it is possible to recognize and accept the fact of scientific progress
(or of a continuing evolution and development in the sciences) while at the same time
raising deeper questions as to the nature and relevance of that progress. These deeper
questions, however, need not imply that the evolution of scientific theories is driven
predominantly by non-epistemic factors — ones without valid reference to mechanisms
inherent in nature.
But, like an albatross, the non-epistemic factors involved in the interpretational aspect
of truth cannot be shaken off, which is why the traditional dichotomy between realism
and anti-realism is not considered to be of overriding relevance in the naturalist ap-
proach to the philosophy of science. The naturalist point of view adopts the approach of
science itself— when confronted with a choice between apparently conflicting descrip-
tions of reality, science delves deeper and comes up with a broader, if more complex,
description. The case of apparently contrary aspects — epistemic and non-epistemic
— in the notion of truth is of a similar nature, needing a deeper and broader view.
The naturalist approach acknowledges the involvement of individual and social beliefs,
cognitive preferences, and modes of thought in the interpretational aspect of scientific
theories — factors not recognized by realists who are anxious to demarcate their position
from that of the anti-realists, and who are possessed of a disproportionate concern for
the aspect of objectivity of truth, and its epistemic value in the description of nature.
The social beliefs, cognitive preferences, and modes of thought cannot, however, be
in the nature of determining factors in the continuing unfolding of scientific theories
describing and decoding the mechanisms inherent in deeper and deeper layers of reality.
At the end of the day, the theories have to stand the test of reality and hence, whatever
individual and social factors get involved in the formation and acceptance of hypotheses
and theories, these are at best in the nature of conditioning factors.
Philip Kitcher's take on scientific progress is somewhat in the same spirit as Kuhn's:
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“... I offer an analogy to show how my picture of science as providing objective knowl-
edge does not entail that there is some unique, context-independent goal toward which
inquiry aims. That analogy will also suggest a quite different way of thinking about
the goals of the sciences and about scientific progress.” ([72]], Introduction).
The analogy Kitcher speaks of is that of map-making that illustrates the type of sci-
entific realism he wants to espouse — the one he refers to as ‘modest realism’, where
scientific progress is not driven teleologically to some distant but fixed epistemic goal,
but is geared to meeting and solving problems of a contingent nature. It is this pro-
cess that is socially conditioned. In particular, Kitcher relates the issue of scientific
progress with that of social values.
The ideas about the scientific process raised in the present essay are in line with those
developed by Kuhn and Kitcher.
Evolutionary psychology and cultural inheritance
All our cognitive quests are rooted in psychological processes in individuals and in so-
cial groups and communities. What is more, all acts of cognition are continuations of a
prolonged evolutionary process — a process that is now recognized as forming an inte-
gral part of biological evolution — one that can be referred to as the process of cognitive
evolution [51]. The idea of cognitive evolution may be broadened to include two aspects
— a long term aspect within the process of biological evolution and a short term as-
pect of adaptation in the course of developmental history of individuals and societies,
where the latter makes use of and realizes the capacities inherited in the evolutionary
process. Evolutionary psychology talks of dual inheritance ([130], chapter 14) — modes
of thought and cognitive traits acquired by genetic inheritance, and those acquired by
cultural inheritance. Ideas, concepts, and modes of thought propagate culturally by
processes that have a resemblance to the process of evolution by genetic means, though
one need not read too much in this resemblance. Cultural inheritance has features of
its own, and is seen to be expressed in various different cognitive traits in and across
cultures distributed over the globe [92]. Inferences, hypotheses, and theories developed
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by individuals and by scientific communities within different cultures are stamped by
deep-rooted cognitive traits differing across cultures while, at the same time, possess-
ing epistemic value. This is somewhat like the fact that competent chefs from different
culinary cultures all cook excellent and delicious food, but all cook differently, and the
food cooked by them have different kinds of taste. Or like the fact that great musicians
from different cultural backgrounds all produce great and stirring music, but music of
different kinds.
Evolutionary and social roots of human cognition, as also of cognitive values, have
been insightfully discussed in [120], [121].
Basic ideas in evolutionary psychology can be found in [26], [17], [113], in addition to
references mentioned earlier.
Cultural inheritance entails variations of modes of thought, beliefs, and value systems
across cultures as also within cultures — since there exist sub-cultures within cultures
(of which the family is an instance, being the bearer of a micro-culture) — all of which
result in a conditioning of the interpretation of reality that, principally, is the business
of science. All these taken together contrive to set the general course of scientific ex-
ploration that the individuals within a culture or a subculture undertake, the way of
looking at problems and anomalies that come up, the relative importance of intuitive
and deliberative cognitive resources brought to bear in the process of solving the prob-
lems, and a host of similar other features of the inferential and scientific process. It is,
at times, naively asked as to how, for instance, the statement of Newton's laws might
depend on cultural factors, since these leave too little room for cultural specificities
to operate. The response to this cannot, of course, consist of posing an alternative
statement of Newtons laws that a different cultural milieu could possibly produce, since
cultural resources exert only broad structural features of scientific theory making. Copi-
ous indications of that are to be found in comparative studies of the sciences developing
within continental, Islamic, Chinese, Indian, and similar other cultural formations dur-
ing the later middle ages when the modes of practicing science were not subjugated to
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one single mode of approach. Each of these cultures produced its own scientific frame-
work committed to understanding some aspect or other of the mechanisms inherent in
nature, and each having its own area of epistemic validity.
History proceeded along a course where most of the varied frameworks were all sought
to be subsumed under a single dominating cognitive mode of doing science. It is no
use wailing over how things could possibly have developed along an alternative course.
But it is definitely a meaningful proposition to recognize the cross-cultural influences
in science, to recognize that science is an interpretation of reality that is conditioned
by social-cultural modes of thought, and to make the best use of this realization in the
future development of the sciences.
The idea of differing cognitive traits across cultures — and within cultures too — has
distinct dangers of misuse lurking underneath. What is a difference in the overall type
or complexion, somewhat like a difference in flavor, and is often not amenable to explicit
description, is in danger of being depicted as a matter of superiority and inferiority among
culturally inherited cognitive traits. Such interpretations in terms of superiority and
inferiority, and concomitant power relations of domination and subjugation invite, as
a reaction, the opposite tendency of ignoring the cultural differences altogether, this
notwithstanding the fact that cognitive differences have indeed been made use of in
history in developing and extending power relations. This is where a deep and broad
understanding of the notion of epistemic and non-epistemic aspects of the scientific
process meets with troubled and turbulent waters.
The rationality of science: values in troubled times
Indeed, the scientific process as a whole is riddled with deeply conflicting aspects that
seem as turbulent as the erupting conflicts in all major spheres of human interaction
in todays world. This is because of the fact that the course of the scientific process is
often, and indeed generally, dominated by power interests. The aim of scientific inquiry
in major areas of investigation, considered from the instrumental point of view, is not
neutral from the perspective of power relations. As for the epistemic aim, it is often of a
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derivative nature, though a constantly present one, as we have seen above.
Even when all the non-epistemic aspects setting the course of the scientific process are
ignored (this is a big counterfactual assumption indeed) the question of rationality of
science is far from being a settled one. This is an area where, to start with, it appears
that philosophical considerations of the twentieth century vintage (the first three-fourths
of the century, that is,) can have a major role to play. But even such a limited discourse
on the rationality of science dos not inspire confidence, since the issue of rationality of
science as a whole (assuming that the notion of science ‘as a whole’ is at all meaningful)
turns out to be somewhat like that of the rationality of an individual, where the general
feeling is that the question of rationality itself is not a well posed one. Indeed, in order to
pronounce upon the rationality of the scientific process as a whole, one needs to know
what the distinctive method of science is, and then to evaluate whether that method is
conducive to achieving the epistemic aim (recall that we have agreed to ignore, like a true
philosopher, all the non-epistemic aims) of science. And, the prospect is by no means
encouraging on either of the two counts. Whether science has any distinctive method
of its own, setting it apart from other spheres of human endeavor (the demarcation
question in the philosophy of science; see, for background, [54]) is a question that does
not appear to have a clear answer. That the concept of such a distinctive ‘method of
science’ is not a sound one, has famously been expressed by Paul Feyerabend in his
aphorism, ‘Anything goes’ ([38], p 19).
This widely quoted pithy statement of Feyerabends is, at times, interpreted out of
context:
“It [the book ‘Against Method’] is not a systematic treatise; it is a letter to a friend
and addresses his idiosyncrasies. For example, Imre Lakatos was a rationalist, hence
rationalism plays a large role in the book. He also admired Popper and therefore
Popper occurs much more frequently than his ‘objective importance’ would warrant.
Imre Lakatos, somewhat jokingly, called me an anarchist and I had no objection to
putting on the anarchist's mask. Finally, Imre Lakatos loved to embarrass serious
opponents with jokes and irony and so I, too, occasionally wrote in a rather ironical
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vein. An example is the end of Chapter 1: ‘anything goes’ is not a ‘principle’ I hold
— I do not think that ‘principles’ can be used and fruitfully discussed outside the
concrete research situation they are supposed to affect — but the terrified exclamation
of a rationalist [i.e., Lakatos] who takes a closer look at history. Reading the many
thorough, serious, long-winded and thoroughly misguided criticisms I received after
publication of the first English edition I often recalled my exchanges with Imre; how
we would both have laughed had we been able to read these effusions together” ([38],
preface).
The commonly accepted view of the scientific method is that science progresses in cycles
of hypothesis (resulting in a theory), deduction, testing against evidence, and confirma-
tion. Among these, the ‘theory of confirmation’ (either based on a principle of inductive
generalization or of a more general probabilistic variety) has been seen to be not a solidly
founded one and was replaced with a ‘theory of refutation’ by Karl Popper, which too did
not prove to be beyond criticism. As for the process of hypothesis formation and the sub-
sequent process of testing the deductive consequences against evidence, with these two
phases of the scientific process forming, respectively, the context of discovery and the
context of justification, the former was seldom addressed in the philosophy of science
before the advent of the cognitive-naturalist era beginning, roughly, from the nineteen
seventies, and the latter process (that of justification against evidence) was shown to
be theory-laden (see, for instance, [12]), thus making the scheme of theory → deductive
consequences→ justification against evidence devoid of much of the rigor one would like
it to have. In the resulting confusion, the very concept of a formal demarcation between
science and non-science is all but abandoned though, paradoxically, there appears to
be unanimity on the judgment about particular systems and practices, by adherents to
diverse views in the philosophy of science ([54]; i.e., in other words, there have to be
some criteria underlying our judgments in this respect that cannot, perhaps, be stated
in formal terms).
At the same time, the notion of the epistemic aim of science, i.e., of scientific truths of
nature, has also turned out to be a turbid one since, as we have seen, the concept of
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‘truth’ is under a great state of stress between its non-epistemic origin and its epistemic
responsibilities.
All in all, then, it seems that the issue of rationality of science is, again, a confused one.
But, at the same time, a criticism is often leveled against the cognitive-naturalist ap-
proach that the naturalist point of view itself is no less confusing since it is concerned
with only a descriptive account of nature and natural mechanisms, including one of
cognitive processes, and glosses over every concern with what need be or ought to be,
thereby distancing itself with efforts at improvement of human cognitive limitations and,
more broadly, of the human condition in general.
What is the position of naturalism on the question of improvement? This is an issue of
stupendous magnitude, especially in today's world, where emotions, including destruc-
tive ones associated with greed, lust, and craving for power, have been let loose, and
questions of enormous complexity are now flung out to riot-ridden streets, to be settled
at dagger-point. Gone, perhaps, are the days of quiet and nuanced philosophical dis-
course, since momentous issues hang in the balance, to be decided under pressure of
raw emotions at polling booths. Since this is what is, why torment ones mind with what
ought to be? The cognitive-naturalist point of view appears to concern itself with de-
scribing what is, while remaining unconcerned with questions relating to improvement
of what is, towards what ought to be.
It is indeed difficult to deny such accusations and adopt a stance of nonchalance, and
it needs a serious engagement with real issues troubling the minds of men, where these
issues are, in the main, not those of the mechanisms of cognition, but problems of sear-
ing intensity relating to values — to morality and ethics that have found no resolution
in class-rooms, laboratories and philosophy conferences.
And the question of values ultimately hangs heavy on science itself. Science — and the
fetishism of it — has been the cause of immense ravages, and that notwithstanding its
supposed quest for truth, its concern with the secrets of nature. The real test of the
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cognitive-naturalist approach will lie in finding an answer to how values and goals are
generated in the world of individuals, communities, and cultures, and what role they
are destined to play in the turbulent mental life that people live. This, of course, is
vitally linked with how we perceive the world, and how we perceive ourselves.
The greatest philosophical traditions in history have time and again returned to this
question: how we perceive ourselves. And the science of cognition itself is under no
mean burden of responsibility in harnessing its efforts to this eternal quest of mankind
— to that of understanding its own predicament in this world. This, of course, will
entail a pressing engagement with greatly confusing questions of the self, of the soul,
of volition and free will, of conscious and unconscious psychological processes in men,
and of the deep existential turmoil inherent in the human condition of todays world.
Inductive inference appears to be just another piece of esoteric play of ideas, indifferent
to the pressing concerns of our times and to the common sense perception of men.
But inductive inference is precisely the mode of thought that defines the common sense
perception: it is the typically exploratory mode of cognition that subsumes logical and
philosophical thought but does not let itself be reduced to the latter. It is inductive
inference through which we perceive the world and, in the process, perceive ourselves.
But, whether an understanding of inductive inference with its associated unconscious
cognitive processes will bring us any nearer to solving our own problems is anybody's
guess, now that our world is decomposing and getting torn apart, not the least by the
use of fruits of science itself.
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Chapter 10
Summary and concluding words
Faltering ahead with a torch in hand
In this book we have taken a close look at two aspects of human inferential activity
(see below), of which the making of scientific inferences constitutes a special instance.
The two aspects are apparently contrary to each other, which makes the inferential
process, or, to be more precise, our understanding of that process highly non-trivial and
problematic.
It is to be clearly appreciated at the outset that inference making is the activity of the
cognitive system aimed at making sense of the world and achieving certain ends, where
the aspects of achieving and making sense have an intricate relation to each other. In
these acts of making sense and achieving of ends, the cognitive system engages in an act
of interpreting the world around it. Now, in order to understand how exactly the cognitive
system interprets the world, we engage ourselves in understanding and interpreting the
activities of the cognitive system itself. Thus, there are two levels of interpreting and
making sense: one is the cognitive system making sense of the world at large, and the
other is the system engaging in the reflective act of understanding its own inferential
processes, especially those relating to the sciences. Of the two, the latter is actually a
special instance of the former since the cognitive system is itself a part of the world at
large, though that truism does not help us much except in realizing that both of these
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are open-ended processes.
The open-endedness will get explained as I now recall the two apparently contrary as-
pects of the human inferential activity (including the one of making scientific inferences),
which has been the recurrent theme in this book: inferences are rooted in the cognitive
system of the individual and of groups of individuals (such as the scientific communities
in the case of scientific inferences) while, at the same time, these are aimed at grasping
relevant aspects of a mind-independent reality.
The inferential process of the individual is fundamentally of an inductive nature, where
logically driven deductive processes find their place only within the ongoing inductive
flow. The inductive process is generally in the nature of a deeply personal one, where
beliefs and emotions play an essential role though, paradoxically, the end product of the
inferential process has to be effective with reference to the world out there, a world that
does not know of the personal beliefs and emotions. For instance, the scientific hypothe-
ses and theories have to correctly correspond to features and mechanisms inherent in
nature or, in other words, have to be bearers of truth.
The personal aspect of knowledge about the world was highlighted by Michael Polanyi
who, moreover, stressed upon the tacit nature of the greater part of that knowledge
and of the process of gaining that knowledge. Later generations of cognitive scientists
worked upon the idea of tacit cognition, thereby bringing out a number of basic features
of the cognitive activity of the human mind, including the irrationality of the cognitive
process.
The ‘irrationality’ becomes apparent when individuals are given psychological ‘tasks’ of
various types by way of requiring them to address little problems whose solutions are
known to the test-givers (the cognitive psychologists) in terms of sets of rules supposed
to be normative ones. It then becomes necessary to recognize the distinction between
the normative and the descriptive, the latter being the way the cognitive and inferential
processes actually proceed within the human mind. Now, this is a tricky question that
requires a deep look at how the cognitive process operates tacitly, i.e., at an unconscious
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level.
The unconscious mind is capable of greatly complex cognitive activities, most of which
were previously assumed to be exclusively dependent on focused awareness and inten-
tion. While some revealing indications of the range of activities of the cognitive uncon-
scious are available by means of psychological studies, there remains a huge unexplored
area, which calls for speculations and interpretations so that the few pieces of solid in-
formation available can be interpreted and woven into a coherent framework. Evidently,
there may be alternative frameworks of interpretation and speculation, some of which
will prove to be inadequate in the light of subsequent findings, while some others will
gain in strength, and this process of speculating, pruning, and gaining in strength will
continue and, additionally, there will be occasional major transformations in our con-
ception of how the cognitive process, including the processes of inference, works.
This, incidentally, is also the way that science approaches nature and natural phe-
nomena. Mechanisms operating within natural phenomena are revealed to science in
successive stages, in each of which nature appears in a new perspective as greater and
greater depths are probed by means of improved instruments, backed up with improved
conceptual frameworks. In other words, at every stage of interpretation of reality, there
exist un-examined substrata and unacknowledged natural boundaries, due to which
the fit between nature and the theories of science shows up small anomalies and faults
symptomatic of an innate vulnerability of these theories. The latter get replaced by
broader and deeper theories at a later stage which, however, do not bear a clear and
simple relation of reducibility to the earlier generation of theories. The transition from
one stage to the next is often a complex process where hypotheses, essentially of the
nature of inspired guesses, are proposed, and highly speculative ideas are subjected to
criticisms, counter-criticisms, and meticulous appraisal, examining their consistency
with evidence and with vast bodies of concepts of proven worth. In the process, some
of the speculations and hypotheses get abandoned while some others are selected for
further scrutiny and examination.
In the special case of building of theories aimed at describing our cognitive and inferen-
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tial processes, the vulnerability of speculations, hypotheses, and theories is especially
pronounced because of the fact that most of these processes are in the nature of hidden
ones, taking place within the cognitive unconscious. However, one seems to be on fairly
solid ground in saying that all the inferential processes are contextually determined,
where there is an external context as also an internal one to be reckoned with, both of
which are of a deeply complex nature. The external context, described by the stimuli
and inputs from the external world that sets an inferential process in motion is complex
in virtue of the fact that out of the infinite number of environmental inputs that the
cognitive mind can possibly pick up, only a subset (which may be a very large one) is
actually selected depending on their relevance and salience. However, the selection is
made complex by the fact that, first, the criteria of relevance and salience depends on
the current state of mind (including the current set of goals, purposes and values) of the
individual concerned and, secondly, many of the inputs received from the environment,
and subsequently used for inferential purposes, are of a subliminal nature. Most of
the inputs are in the form of cues picked up tacitly and subsequently transformed into
unconsciously formed heuristics.
The internal context of an inferential process is of a similarly complex nature, if not
more, since it is made up of heuristics and beliefs, mostly of an unconscious nature,
additionally involving emotions and affects. In other words, there exist vast repertoires
of hidden components in both the external and internal contexts relevant to the infer-
ential process.
An inference involves a processing of information of a tangled and complex nature where
a vast hierarchy of rules are made use of, again, mostly at an unconscious level. The
rules are of various categories, some of which are independent of beliefs and modes
of thought of individuals and groups of individuals while some others are not so. The
latter include rules of a person-specific and those of an inter-subjective nature, mostly
answering to the description of heuristics. The latter are half-baked rules of thumb and
hunches, many of those of a transient and fluid nature, liable to be discarded unless
proven to be of some worth. On the other hand, there is a vast web of beliefs, many of
which are resistant to revision and are of a relatively remote relevance with reference
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to the inferential act in question. What is of special significance is that a number of
heuristics and beliefs act as resources that propel the cognitive mind across logical
gaps, where the latter are gaps that cannot be bridged by means of objectively defined
rules. In this, the cognitive mind is greatly aided by emotions and affects that facilitate
the making of decisions and acquire relevance in the bridging of the logical gaps. It is
this process of leaping across logical gaps that is specific to inductive inference, which
makes it fallible and, at the same time, personal in nature while being uniquely effective
too.
Of special relevance in the sciences is the process of abduction, i.e., the one of making
of hypotheses that subsequently germinate into scientific theories. A novel hypothesis
that leads to the transformation of an entire conceptual space is a mysterious process
indeed, the true nature of which can only be speculated upon. It is likely to involve
a greatly enhanced exploration of the conceptual space where local instabilities in the
sequential progression of information processing, caused by the amplifying action of
emotions, lead to the development of parallel branchings in the exploration process.
In this, efficient organizing principles like the detection of analogies play a crucial role
whereby relatively remote ideas get correlated and eventually coalesce together to lead
to a conceptual transformation engendering remarkable possibilities.
The scientific theories that result from these processes of an abstruse nature have a dual
significance: these sprout from grounds abounding in beliefs and cultural resources of
individuals and groups of individuals, and are built upon prior structures of existing
concepts and theories and, at the same time, these are aimed at revealing the inner
mechanisms of nature. As a result, the theories are bearers of truths about nature that
have strange and conflicting aspects in them. On the one hand, they are truths largely
independent of opinions and points of view of individuals and groups of individuals
(though this is conditional upon a more or less prolonged process of exchanges and
communications of ideas) and, in this sense, are objective in nature while , on the other,
they are aimed at a mind-independent reality. The mechanisms inherent in the latter
are explored in successive stages of theory that are of an incommensurable nature,
through conceptual transformations akin to a change in perspective. In this, the truths
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are in the nature of socially conditioned interpretations.
But the fact that the inferential acts in science, including the ones arrived at by the
process of abduction, are fundamentally in the nature of interpretations, with logical
gaps remaining within, need not imply a weakness in these. On the contrary, it con-
stitutes a strength of great relevance in our inquiry into nature and in our incessant
engagements with a largely unknown, uncertain, and complex world. There does not
exist any sure-shot way of coming to grips with a vast and complex reality with our
limited and meager cognitive resources other than the one of guessing and groping for
our way ahead, sticking our neck out, making use of what has proved to be of some
worth and discarding what is found to be ineffective while, at the same time, retaining
the lessons of the failures.
The cognitive abilities are, to a quite considerable extent, results of a protracted evolu-
tionary process that is essentially of a similar nature as the one outlined above — build-
ing upon the past in a piecemeal way, in response to contingent necessities. Cognition
has no ultimate goal precisely because it faces nature in an infinite variety of contexts.
Inferences, abstractions, and theories are not aimed at producing a facsimile descrip-
tion of how nature exists and behaves as a whole, but at providing us with a summary
understanding of parts and aspects of nature as we face these in specific contexts so
that we can make effective sense of these. Our theories are like maps drawn from a
limited exploration into nature, based on which we make hypotheses regarding the way
ahead. We then commit ourselves to further explorations in keeping with our hypotheses
and, when rewarded with success, remake the maps, where the new set of maps differ
from the earlier ones in that new aspects are incorporated into these, requiring novel
ways of reading the maps. Theories, in other words, make possible new encounters with
nature. In this, science is continuous with and constitutes a heightened form of our
mundane, day-to-day engagement with reality where we make great use of our ability to
guess, and guess correctly, albeit with equally great support from our judgment based
on sound logic.
The naturalist point of view looks at the actual process by which scientists go about
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their business of interpreting nature, without burdening itself with logical and abstract
considerations of what the aim of science is, what the scientific method is, and what
constitutes scientific progress. In this, the naturalist point of view focuses keenly on the
cognitive roots of how science inquires into nature. It focuses keenly on how inferential
processes actually proceed in the minds of individuals, how a great variety of cultural
resources affect our cognitive endeavor, and how hypotheses are actually formed, giving
rise to theories about the world around us, without burdening itself too much with
questions of norms of rationality; more precisely, it tells us that questions relating to
norms are, in a sense, misplaced ones.
Still, questions relating to norm are not irrelevant. And, abstract and logical considera-
tions are not irrelevant either. In a manner of speaking, considerations in the abstract
are as relevant as those in the concrete. In the context of human cognition and of the
scientific process, the naturalist point of view entails the considerations of the latter
variety, while the former are the ones that were the mainstay in the philosophy of sci-
ence up to the sixties of the last century. The logical approach in the understanding of
human cognition, principally geared to realizations of cognitive mechanisms in artificial
intelligence, captures quite an impressive number of aspects of the cognitive process,
and a logical analysis of the scientific process brings in sharp focus quite an impressive
number of issues relating to the cognitive roots of scientific exploration and the way the
latter relates to a mind-independent reality.
Questions of norm in human cognition cannot be shaken off by the simple assertion that
these do not relate to how cognition actually works. Human cognitive and inferential
processes are not limited within the narrow horizon of effectiveness, because effective-
ness is meaningful only with reference to goals and values. And, questions relating
to goals and values are not confined to the field of cognition alone, because these are
deeply existential ones. Ultimately, these relate to our desires and drives, our cravings
for power, our yearnings for fulfilment, our deep-rooted instincts for sharing and un-
derstanding, our need to improve upon what we have become, and our endless quest for
making sense of our own existence in this world of ours a world that is within us as it
is around us.
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Both the two worlds are fathomless, revealed to us contextually and discontinuously,
in bits and pieces. Our perception of either of the two builds up, shimmers before our
eyes, and then dissolves into a new picture, revealing novel aspects in a new context.
This makes for a quest that remains open-ended even as it constitutes an intoxicating
and dizzying journey. We do hold the powerful torch of logic in our hands, but the rays
emanating from it are too straight to obviate the necessity of guessing, groping, inter-
preting, and faltering ahead along twisting paths in a world that is at once labyrinthine
and layered.
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